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ABSTRACT 
The possibility of genetically intervening in the genome of future people has sparked 
fears about the potentially negative impact of such interventions on social justice. 
The risks of unequal access to these novel technologies, coupled with the dangers of 
the re-emergence of eugenic policies, have been thought to be too great to ignore. 
Should these fears become reality, we will be in danger of creating new social 
inequalities or of exacerbating those already prevalent in modern society.   
The aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact on 
distributive justice of germline cognitive and moral enhancements, and to explore 
how these technologies can become part of the Rawlsian account of justice. 
From a biological perspective, we do not choose who we are. It is widely accepted 
that our genetic make-up is at least partly responsible for the kinds of people that 
we are and that it can have a marked influence on who we become and on our share 
of social primary goods. Because of this “genetic lottery”, inequalities in access to 
opportunities invariably exist. Recent scientific advances, however, may provide us 
with valuable enhancements, particularly to our cognitive and moral capacities, that 
could be used as tools to re-dress these inequalities. Indeed they might even help to 
promote the goals sought by the Rawlsian theory of justice.  
This thesis shows how the justice arguments usually presented against 
enhancement technologies can be addressed from within a society governed by the 
Rawlsian principles of justice. Furthermore, the enhancement of cognitive genetic 
traits, in particular those involved in the development of fluid intelligence, could 
broaden the range of opportunities open to citizens and increase the social product 
available for distribution under the dictums of the difference principle. The moral 
permissibility of germline enhancements designed to augment the capacities for 
empathy and a sense of fairness is supported by the contribution they make towards 
securing the stability of the Rawlsian society.  
If these technologies present no moral issues apart from distributional concerns, a 
society that is governed by the Rawlsian principles of justice would therefore benefit 
from allowing cognitive and moral enhancements of the human germline.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
“The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born 
into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and 
unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts.” 
 
― John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
 
1.1 The importance of the project 
We are now witnessing the very real effects that internal and external aids can have 
on our cognition and on the emotions influencing our moral responses.  New 
scientific advances provide us with the tantalising prospect of being able to maintain 
our attention at a much higher level and for longer, process information more 
effectively and to achieve higher rates of productivity. Likewise, the potential for 
altering our moral and emotional dispositions is re-opening the debate about what it 
means to be moral and to what extent we might be able to control the moral 
dispositions of individuals in order to address complex and challenging issues that 
might threaten our survival.  
Faced with the prospect of altering humanity in perhaps very radical ways, thinkers 
are beginning to speculate about the potential societal gains associated with new 
enhancement technologies. In the field of healthcare, for example, Whitehouse et al.1 
describe the benefits from having a cognitively enhanced workforce. In their paper, 
they describe a fictional scenario where surgeons regularly take attention enhancing 
drugs, resulting in a higher number of successful surgical procedures leading 
ultimately to a decrease in human suffering overall. Conversely, Persson et al.2 
speculate about a world where scientific advances increase the potential for small 
numbers of people to cause very big harms and argue that there could be a duty for 
                                                        
1 Whitehouse, P. J., Juengst, E., Mehlman, M., and Murray, T. H. (1997). "Enhancing cognition in the 
intellectually intact." Hastings Center Report, 27(3), 14-22. 
2 Persson, I., and Savulescu, J. (2008). "The perils of cognitive enhancement and the urgent imperative 
to enhance the moral character of humanity." Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25(3), 162-177. 
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the biological enhancement of individuals to help avoid the dire consequences of 
progress. These arguments are anchored in the idea that such a move will reduce 
suffering and increase wellbeing overall. The need to embrace new enhancement 
technologies seems to paradoxically emanate from the need to counteract the 
negative effects that new advances in technology might bring. 
Prima facie, it might seem that both cognitive and moral enhancements could be 
justified in the name of bigger societal gains. A more tolerant, fairer and empathetic 
world populated with more intelligent and efficient individuals might feel like 
something to be desired. If these capacities were modified permanently through 
germline interventions, the cognitive and moral capacities of individuals would be 
modified permanently, perhaps forever eliminating any societal ills.  Closer scrutiny, 
however, may reveal powerful ethical objections that can make us reconsider 
whether it is wise to embrace these interventions.  
Before these germline genetic technologies make their way into our day to day lives, 
it is our responsibility to identify and explore the myriad of ethical issues that they 
entail.  Of special importance are the socio-economic inequalities that the 
introduction of these technologies might generate. Leaving the discussion of these 
issues until these technologies are fully available and only subject to market 
restrictions will be too late. This is the drive and main focus of my dissertation. In 
order to evaluate whether cognitive and moral enhancements of the human 
germline should be permitted, I carefully assess the effect that these technologies 
might have on distributive justice. I do this by using the Rawlsian theory of 
distributive justice, which is committed to the protection of basic liberties, equality, 
and improving the socio-economic situation of the least advantaged.   
Why Rawls? It is hard to explain why Rawls seemed to me the obvious starting 
point to evaluate the permissibility of germline genetic interventions. The simplest 
answer would be my admiration for his body of work. His ability to reconcile 
concerns of liberty and equality has always struck me as the most daunting of 
endeavours. These often conflicting values have led political theorists to strongly 
support one view over another. His body of work has been dedicated to resolving 
the conflicting claims between liberty and equality.  His principles of justice provide 
an elegant solution. 
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A cursory investigation of the potential issues associated with germline technologies 
highlighted how they had the potential to threaten the liberty and equality that 
Rawls was concerned to protect. The challenge that I face is to carefully scrutinise 
the concerns arising from these technologies and establish whether the Rawlsian 
framework is equipped to answer and accommodate these concerns. The use of 
Rawls’s framework provides me with a systematic procedural system for thinking 
about potential justice issues brought by emerging genetic technologies 
Furthermore, since these advances had not been available at the time when Rawls 
developed his theory, I ask the question whether these new goods could themselves 
become part of the Rawlsian theory. 
Even though attempts have been made to incorporate new enhancement 
technologies in the Rawlsian framework there is an important difference between 
my work and that of others in the literature. Focusing on cognitive enhancements, 
the extension of the Rawlsian conception has generally involved dropping the 
normal functioning assumption that permeated the development of his ideal 
theory.3 As such, new genetic technologies have been added to the Rawlsian 
conception insofar as they restored normal functioning and reinstated the status of 
individuals as fully functioning citizens. Norman Daniels presented an argument of 
this kind by incorporating a full account of healthcare based on the protection of fair 
equality of opportunity.4 Similarly, Colin Farrelly has argued that the distribution of 
a set of valuable natural talents could be distributed through a version of the 
difference principle which he called the Lax Biological Difference Principle.5  My 
adherence to the normal functioning ideal means that I am able to extend Rawls’s 
theory whilst remaining faithful to Rawls’s original assumptions at all times.  
                                                        
3 Rawls uses ideal theory to set the scope of his theory in identifying the principles of justice. He 
makes two assumptions in the development of his theory. One, he assumes strict compliance and two, 
he assumes reasonable favourable conditions, that is, there exists adequate economic means, 
education and the skills needed to run a democratic regime. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice: 
Belknap Press. Pages 8, 245 & Rawls, J. (2005). Political liberalism: Columbia University Press. Pages 
13, 47 and 246.  
4 Daniels, N. (1998). "Negative and positive genetic interventions: is there a moral boundary?" Science 
in context, 11(3-4), 439-53, Daniels, N. (2008). Just health: meeting health needs fairly: Cambridge 
University Press, Daniels, N. (2010). "Rights to health care and distributive justice: programmatic 
worries." Health Rights. 
5 Farrelly, C. (2016). Biologically Modified Justice: Cambridge University Press. 
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This piece of work has been developed as an attempt to incorporate potential 
genetic technologies aimed at the modification of cognitive and moral capacities into 
a Rawlsian ideal political theory. As Thomas Pogge asserts correctly when he talks 
about this potential flaw in the Rawlsian body of works:  
“Perhaps we will never reach a scheme whose worst social position is optimal. 
But we do not need the assurance that such a scheme is reachable in order to 
recognize that we ought to support institutional reform that improves the worst 
social position, just as one does not need the assurance that one can reach 
perfection for undertaking to become a better human being.”6  
Despite concerns about the relevance of ideal theory, I, like Rawls, believe that this is 
the right place to start if we ever want to engage the public into a fruitful debate that 
might result in shaping public policy.  
1.2 The scope and assumptions of the philosophical enquiry  
The prospect of genetically enhancing the cognitive and moral capacities of human 
beings has given rise to a vast amount of discussion regarding their feasibility and 
ethical permissibility. Examining all the salient aspects relating to these technologies 
will take a lot more space than this thesis permits. The following points will help to 
clarify the scope of the thesis:  
 Nature of genetic interventions: The cognitive and moral enhancements 
chosen for the ethical and justice evaluation are all considered genetic 
enhancements of a germline nature. The terms genetic enhancements and germline 
enhancement are used interchangeably from Chapter 3 onwards.  They are 
considered enhancements since their goal is to modify non-pathological human 
traits making them “better than well”. The concept of "enhancement" is contrasted 
to that of "therapy" as only the latter intends to treat or prevent disease.  An 
intervention is said to be done at the germline level when it is carried out either 
within the reproductive cells (sperm and eggs) or in very early stage embryos.  Once 
altered, the modified germline deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is passed from parent to 
child, permanently affecting the child’s genetic make-up, and transferred to future 
                                                        
6 Pogge, T. W. M. (1989). Realizing rawls: Cornell University Press. Page 12 
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generations.  Germline interventions are often distinguished from somatic cell 
interventions. Somatic cells are fully differentiated or adult cells. Intervening at the 
somatic level involves the modification or insertion of new genes into the adult cells 
of the human body. Although the long term effects of somatic cell modifications are 
far from established, it is generally assumed that these changes will only affect the 
individuals receiving the intervention and that future generations will not be 
affected by them.  
These different concepts give rise to four different types of intervention: germline 
enhancements, somatic enhancements, germline therapy and somatic therapy 
The ethical and practical implication these terms convey are very different. A 
cursory survey of the literature indicates that the ethical challenges arising from 
permanently intervening in the genome of future persons with the only purpose of 
improving their already normally functioning traits can be very complex. Such 
challenges may be, for example, far more complex than evaluating the ethical 
permissibility of modifying the genome of an adult carrying a mutation of the 
CFTR gene responsible for the onset of cystic fibrosis.  For the purpose of this 
research I focus on the type of interventions that seem to raise more ethical and 
practical challenges: germline enhancements. 
 Chosen cognitive and moral traits: The cognitive and emotional/moral 
capacities assessed in this thesis were chosen after existing literature indicated that 
they had a biological component and were liable to be altered by genetic means.  
In terms of the capacities affecting cognition, I narrowed down my choice to those 
capacities that had, prima facie, the potential to be valuable for carrying out most life 
plans. For this I drew inspiration from the Cattell-Horn theory of fluid intelligence7 
also known as “on the spot reasoning” and novel problem solving. The choice of 
moral capacities was however guided by different criteria. The desirability of certain 
                                                        
7 This theory argued that the primary abilities  involving intelligence are divided into fluid and 
crystallised dimensions. The fluid dimension they believed is the outcome of biological factors such 
as heredity or damage to neuro-sensory structures. Horn, J. L., and Cattell, R. B. (1966). "Refinement 
and test of the theory of fluid and crystallized general intelligences." Journal of educational 
psychology, 57(5), 253. 
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moral traits can be particularly dependent on social, historical and cultural settings. 
The difficulties in asserting that, for example, it would be in the best interest of 
individuals to be more tolerant, more altruistic, and more empathetic made it 
difficult to find traits that might truly have a universal appeal. Inspired by the 
Rawlsian conception, and in particular by the problem of stability of the well-
ordered society, I wondered whether there could be any moral capacities that could 
contribute towards securing this stability. Following Rawls’s writings on moral 
psychology and the importance he assigns to political virtues, I hypothesised that 
moral dispositions such as empathy and a sense of fairness could positively 
contribute to Rawlsian stability.  
 Safety and precision: Throughout, I have worked on the assumption that the 
genetic technologies I am evaluating would have been proven to be safe and would 
be able to precisely target the desired cognitive or moral traits. Should these 
technologies not be demonstrated to be safe, they must not be permitted and 
therefore no further ethical evaluation would be required. Safety is presumed to be a 
necessary, albeit not a sufficient condition for their permissibility.  
 Ethical evaluation: The chapter dedicated to the broad ethical issues of 
germline technologies provides a brief introduction to the most salient issues found 
in the literature. A detailed exploration of all the ethical issues associated with these 
technologies falls outside the scope of this work, which has as its focus issues of 
distributive justice.  My aim in this thesis is to highlight the main ethical arguments 
that are found in the literature without providing a detailed critique of their 
strength or validity.  The more modest objective in this section is that of making the 
reader aware of the ethical implications that may need to be considered even if all 
the distributive justice concerns are fully addressed. 
 Analysis of the Rawlsian political conception: A thorough critique of the 
Rawlsian political conception is beyond the scope of this work. For the purpose of 
my research I am neither critically assessing the structure nor the content of the 
Rawlsian theory of justice. The evaluation of the Rawlsian framework, whenever it 
takes place, is only performed in order to, first, address the social justice objections 
present in the literature and, second, to assess how these technologies can become 
part of the theory and help Rawls deliver the objectives set by his political 
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conception. My aim throughout has been to keep faithful to the Rawlsian theory of 
justice and its spirit.  
1.3 Aims and structure  
My aim in this thesis is to provide a positive argument in support of the introduction 
of genetic interventions that have the potential to enhance the cognitive and moral 
capacities of individuals. A case in support of the permissibility of these technologies 
will be made from the viewpoint of justice using the Rawlsian political theory as the 
framework for my arguments.  
In order to set the appropriate background to the main justice argument, Chapter 2 
provides an overview of cognitive and moral enhancements. This serves two main 
purposes. First, it provides a snapshot of their use and current scientific 
developments. Second, it offers the context against which to identify the main ethical 
arguments against their implementation. This review serves as an introduction to 
the more daring possibility of potentially modifying the genome to improve the 
cognitive and moral capacities of human beings. In order to discuss the possibility of 
genetic enhancements, I outline existing research and evidence, where available, of 
genome interventions that might result in human genetic modification. In particular, 
I focus on germline interventions designed to permanently alter the capacities of 
future generations.  
The main ethical concerns regarding the implementation of germline genetic 
interventions are then discussed in Chapter 3. This overview helps to illuminate the 
kinds of concerns that need to be addressed if society embraces the use of these 
technologies.  
The Rawlsian theory of justice is introduced in Chapter 4. His concern about the 
effects that inequalities in the distribution of natural talents have on people’s life 
prospects motivates me to use his theory as a framework for the development of my 
arguments. I contend that this concern should also apply to the differences in the 
natural capacities involved in inductive and deductive reasoning, information 
processing and problem solving skills. Furthermore, I argue that germline 
enhancements should be incorporated into his political theory as primary goods.   
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My focus resides in the Rawlsian theory of justice and I argue that this conception of 
political justice provides a positive argument for the permissibility of these 
interventions. I do this by exploring how Rawls’s political theory can and should be 
extended to include genetic cognitive enhancements as social primary goods in their 
role as all-purpose goods, valuable across most conceptions of the good. 
Having secured a place for cognitive genetic enhancements within the Rawlsian 
theory of justice, the focus then turns to evaluating the potential issues of 
distributive justice that these new technologies might bring. Concerns related to the 
potentially restricted access to genetic cognitive enhancements are evaluated in 
Chapter 5.  Each of these concerns is then addressed from a Rawlsian perspective 
and it is shown that they do not pose a threat to a well-ordered society governed by 
Rawlsian principles of justice. Moreover, if supported by an extended fair equality of 
opportunity principle designed to remove any legal barriers of access to these 
technologies, they have the potential to strengthen the drive towards equality and 
reciprocity. 
The possibility of genetically modifying the moral dispositions of empathy and a 
sense of fairness and how these might affect the Rawlsian account of stability is 
explored in Chapter 6. In his later writings Rawls was anxious to ensure that the 
well-ordered society ruled by fair principles of justice was stable and enduring over 
time. I suggest that Rawls didn’t successfully resolve the problem of stability and 
that the possibility of altering the moral disposition of citizens might provide him 
with an additional tool to solve it. The natural capacities for empathy and a sense of 
fairness are incorporated into the Rawlsian account of moral psychology. Having 
been shown to play a constitutive part in the development of a sense of justice, I 
explore whether they might be able to contribute towards securing the stability of 
the Rawlsian society. I conclude that, regardless of their potential to strengthen 
stability, the protection of fundamental basic liberties should prevent the 
compulsory genetic enhancement of the capacities of empathy and sense of fairness. 
Nonetheless, there are strong reasons to grant their permissibility. 
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Chapter 2. Cognitive and moral enhancements - An overview of 
current use and scientific evidence 
This chapter provides the reader with an outline of the most commonly used 
cognitive and moral enhancements and an evaluation of the current situation and 
future developments. An exhaustive analysis of the existing technologies is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. The aim is to provide an overview of current trends in 
cognitive and moral enhancements alongside evidence, wherever available, of 
resulting increased capacities in healthy subjects. 
The first part of the chapter focuses on cognition and how a range of capacities 
linked with its acquisition and development can be affected by different means. The 
use of pharmacology highlights how medication originally developed for the 
treatment of disease has spilled over towards increasing the capacities of healthy 
subjects. This trend is also seen in the areas of brain stimulation and 
neurotechnology. The more invasive nature of these procedures, however, means 
that its application to the non-disease arena is not as widespread. The section on 
cognition finishes with an overview of those “everyday” enhancers that seem to 
largely escape ethical scrutiny due to their assimilation into our everyday lives. 
The second part is dedicated to a brief review of the enhancement of moral 
capacities. As with cognition, attempts to increase moral capacities have taken place 
in the fields of pharmacology, brain stimulation and neurotechnologies.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, nutrition also seems to play a role in the development and suppression 
of antisocial behaviours. 
The review of these current technologies is used as background to explore the 
possibility of investigating the genetic augmentation of cognition and morality. 
Recent technological advances will show that the promise of genetic modification of 
these capacities may become a reality in the not too distant future.  
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2.1 – The enhancement of cognition – A brief overview 
The term 'cognition' is used to describe a range of mental processes commonly 
associated with the acquisition of knowledge.8 The analysis that follows focuses on 
the narrow concept of cognition which excludes aspects pertaining to emotional 
intelligence such as mood and other emotional states. Instead, the discussion centres 
on the impact of these technologies on aspects relating to understanding, memory, 
attention, reasoning skills and executive functions such as decision-making, 
planning and problem solving skills. The use of cognitive enhancements has been 
reported across the millennia with people taking psychoactive substances in order 
to achieve altered states of consciousness. Psychotropic plant substances containing 
mescaline or LSD, for example, were consumed by American Indian tribes to 
facilitate communication with other worlds in visual-seeking ceremonies. Evidence 
of use of these substances can also be traced back to prehistoric times with remains 
being found in sites associated with burial and religious ceremonies.9  
Nowadays, although the reasons behind the yearning to transcend our normal 
capacities may have changed, our desire to explore the limits of our cognition 
remains, it seems, resolute.  Advocates of cognitive enhancements argue that in 
challenging times such as these, they might equip us with improved decision-making 
capacities that might become essential to face the challenges posed by our 
environment, such as climate change, new epidemics, such as avian flu, and 
dwindling natural resources. Some thinkers also argue that the benefits may well 
expand to the moral realm, maintaining that they may even positively contribute to 
moral reasoning.10  
Even though the genetic modification of our cognitive abilities may be a long way 
from being a reality, non genetic enhancers, such as memory enhancing drugs like 
                                                        
8 BMA. (2007). Boosting your brainpower: Ethical aspects of cognitive enhancements. BMA. 
9 Guerra-Doce, E. (2015). "Psychoactive Substances in Prehistoric Times: Examining the 
Archaeological Evidence." Time and Mind, 8(1), 91-112. 
10 Harris, J., and Chan, S. (2010). "Moral behavior is not what it seems." Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 107(50), E183.   Discussing the possibility of moral enhancement, John Harris 
warns about the dangers of  chemically altering emotions linked to our moral behavior. The 
development of smart drugs, he claims , is permissible as long as they positively contribute to moral 
reasoning, the enhancement of cognition therefore would be a better way  to improve ourselves 
morally.  
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Ritalin, external aids, like computers and information storage devices, or even access 
to top class educational institutions are already being regularly used in our society. 
Some of these external enhancers, such as the regular intake of caffeine or the use of 
personal computers for work or leisure are, to a certain extent, uncontroversially 
integrated into our society. Others, such as the use of smart drugs designed to 
augment our attention and alertness levels or the more invasive brain stimulation 
techniques are slowly making a transition away from therapy and towards 
enhancement. 
I provide a concise summary of current cognitive enhancers exploring the use of 
smart drugs, brain stimulation, brain machine interfaces, as well as the more 
commonly used everyday external enhancers, such as caffeine, nicotine, nutrition 
and education. This is accompanied by examples of current evidence on the impact 
that current and potential enhancements can have in our lives.   
2.1.1  Psychopharmacology 
Advances in psychopharmacology have provided us with the so-called ‘smart drugs’, 
which have the power to alter our cognitive capacities. These smart drugs are also 
known as nootropics11 and they can function as cognitive and intelligence enhancers 
designed to augment mental functions such as memory, concentration, alertness and 
information processing.12 The attractiveness of these drugs has led them to have 
already found their place in a society where people are keen to increase their 
productivity and competitive edge.13 
Increasing brain performance by chemical means and other invasive techniques is 
often referred to as neuro-enhancement or cosmetic neurology. At present 
pharmacology is the most used method of attempting neuro-enhancement although 
there is a limited number of studies showing data on improvements in cognition in 
healthy subjects. This is due to strict regulations for drug development and clinical 
trials restricting any testing to the pursuit of therapeutic goals alone. However, it is 
                                                        
11 The term “nootropic” is derived from the Greek roots for mind (noos) and for “toward”  (tropein) 
12 Cakic, V. (2009). "Smart drugs for cognitive enhancement: ethical and pragmatic considerations in 
the era of cosmetic neurology." Journal of Medical Ethics, 35(10), 611-615. Page 1.  
13 Talbot, M. (2009). "Brain gain." The New Yorker, 32-43. 
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through research in existing conditions such as Alzheimer’s, Lewi-Body dementia or 
attention deficit disorders that unintended non-therapeutic effects have been 
reported. This section provides an insight into the research carried out on the most 
popular “smart drugs” and how their use is spilling out into the non-disease arena. 
Pharmacology has focussed mainly on the development of executive and memory 
functions. Although executive function is a complex term to define, it is here 
understood as the high-level cognitive processes that enable people to solve 
problems, plan and execute tasks, process and retain information, and have the 
flexibility to adjust to changing demands. Attempting to boost these capacities with 
the use of smart drugs is becoming more common as their positive results in therapy 
are leading to them being tried out in healthy individuals.  
What follows is a sample of the main medications making a transition from therapy 
to enhancement. 
 Ritalin, Adderall and Dexedrine:  
The main common feature of these drugs is that they were all originally developed 
for the treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and are known 
to work on those patients suffering from deficits in attention, concentration, spatial 
working memory and planning. Ritalin or Concerta (methylphenidate) is perhaps 
the most widely known smart drug. Classified as an amphetamine, it works by 
increasing the level of dopamine in the brain.  Dopamine is a neurotransmitter 
known to have an effect on a variety of brain pathways such as motivation, 
addiction, attention, or motion control. Specifically, it has been used in children 
diagnosed with behavioural problems for the last 40 years and proven to be 
effective in treating attention disorders.14 It is commonly prescribed to children 
suffering from ADHD with the number of prescriptions in the UK doubling in the last 
decade from 359,100 in 2004 to 992,200 in 2014.15 
                                                        
14 Mills, C. (1998). "One pill makes you smarter: an ethical appraisal of the rise of Ritalin." Report from 
the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy, 18(4), 13-7. (page 13) 
15 Bullard, I. (2015). Prescriptions Dispensed in the Community, England 2004-14. Health and Social 
Care Information Centre. Page 139-142 
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The reported improvements from the use of Ritalin have not been restricted to those 
individuals diagnosed with a cognitive impairment. Improvements in planning and 
task execution have also been reported in healthy volunteers after taking Ritalin 
compared to when they were given a placebo. Ritalin is also linked to positive 
changes in working memory in those patients suffering from cognitive disorders but 
when given to healthy volunteers there are still improvements in working 
memory.16  
The intake of Ritalin, however, has not always resulted in improvements in 
performance. Positive results seem to be heavily dependent on the individual’s 
starting baseline level. As the following studies show, the enhancing effects of Ritalin 
seem to depend on the initial functioning level of the cognitive capacity. While 
assessing the effects of Ritalin in healthy individuals, Elliot et al.17 reported 
increased accuracy in spatial working memory tasks with higher results in those 
individuals who presented with initially lower levels of performance. In contrast, 
they also reported some decreases in performance in those with a naturally higher 
working memory capacity. Mehta et al.18 found similar improvements in spatial 
working memory performance, again particularly in those individuals with a lower 
baseline capacity.  
These results have been further replicated and reported in the systematic review 
carried out by Repantis et al.19 . Although this review describes how Ritalin cannot 
be said to have an overall neuro-enhancing effect on healthy individuals, those 
taking the drug displayed increased levels of accuracy in spatial working memory 
tasks: 
                                                        
16 Elliott, R., Sahakian, B. J., Matthews, K., Bannerjea, A., Rimmer, J., and Robbins, T. W. (1997). "Effects 
of methylphenidate on spatial working memory and planning in healthy young adults." 
Psychopharmacology, 131(2), 196-206. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Mehta, M. A., Owen, A. M., Sahakian, B. J., Mavaddat, N., Pickard, J. D., and Robbins, T. W. (2000). 
"Methylphenidate enhances working memory by modulating discrete frontal and parietal lobe 
regions in the human brain." J Neurosci, 20(6), RC65. 
19 Repantis, D., Schlattmann, P., Laisney, O., and Heuser, I. (2010). "Modafinil and methylphenidate for 
neuroenhancement in healthy individuals: A systematic review." Pharmacol Res, 62(3), 187-206. 
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 “The analyses of the existing studies provide no consistent evidence for neuro-
enhancement effects of MPH, though evidence for a positive effect on memory of 
healthy individuals was found.”20  
These improvements in spatial working memory were higher for those individuals 
presenting lower initial levels of performance. It is noteworthy that, once again, 
there was also a general decrease in performance in those individuals with a 
naturally higher working memory capacity.  The effects of Ritalin seem to work best 
with those starting out at a lower end of the performance spectrum.  
Adderall is the market name for mixed amphetamine salts consisting primarily of 
dextroamphetamine. Like Ritalin, this prescription stimulant was also originally 
developed for the treatment of ADHD. The effect that both Adderall and Ritalin have 
on patients suffering from ADHD consists of an increase in attention levels as well as 
a reduction in hyperactivity and impulsivity.21 
In a similar way to Ritalin, Adderall appears to have made a transition towards the 
non-therapeutic arena.  Even though the evidence in this field is limited, randomised 
control trials (RCTs)22 have shown that taking Adderall increases vigilance and 
attention in healthy subjects although they do not seem to improve in other 
cognitive domains. 
However, research led by Irena Ilieva23 has yielded different results. Using a double 
blind randomised trial, they studied the effects of Adderall on 13 different cognitive 
capacities (including episodic memory, working memory, inhibitory control, 
convergent creativity, intelligence and scholastic achievement). Even though the 
results did not show any significant improvement, there seemed to be a shift in the 
way the participants perceived their actual performance when they knew that they 
had taken the drug instead of the placebo. This raises an interesting issue about the 
                                                        
20 Ibid. page 204 
21 Sahakian, B., and Morein-Zamir, S. (2007). "Professor's little helper." Nature(450), 1157-1159. 
22 Franke, A. G., Bagusat, C., Rust, S., Engel, A., and Lieb, K. (2014). "Substances used and prevalence 
rates of pharmacological cognitive enhancement among healthy subjects." European Archives of 
Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 264(1), 83-90. 
23 Ilieva, I., Boland, J., and Farah, M. J. (2013). "Objective and subjective cognitive enhancing effects of 
mixed amphetamine salts in healthy people." Neuropharmacology, 64, 496-505. 
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motivation for taking this particular drug and its rising popularity amongst students. 
The perception that you are doing better than you actually are may be enough of a 
driving force for taking these smart drugs and may perhaps explain their increase in 
use, particularly amongst university students. It is reported that full time university 
students in the US are twice as likely to have used Adderall as young people aged 
between 18-24 not in full time education.24 
Dexedrine was the original medication for the treatment of ADHD and it is also 
prescribed for the treatment of narcolepsy. Although similar to Adderall, its 
composition is slightly different. Adderall is a combination of amphetamine salts, 
75% of which is dextroamphetamine. Dexedrine is 100% dextroamphetamine and 
more powerful than both Adderall and Ritalin when taken in equal doses. The 
enhancing effects on normal individuals have been studied with reported increases 
in motor function, improved performance in cognitive tests and better reaction 
times after taking the drug25  
Its use has now expanded to the military,  particularly amongst military pilots,  as an 
effective means of counteracting fatigue in order to maintain focus and attention for 
longer. Studies have been designed to assess its efficacy in flight simulator situations 
where the participants have been subjected to extended periods of wakefulness. A 
report by John Caldwell et al. analysed the existing studies on sleep deprived pilots 
and showed that, Dexedrine was effective  “for maintaining flight skills, 
psychological mood, and physiological activation (measured via 
electroencephalograph data).” 26 
 Modafinil 
Modafinil (or Provigil) is a wakefulness promoting drug originally designed to treat 
the fatigue symptoms of those suffering from narcolepsy, excessive daytime 
                                                        
24 (2008). Nonmedical Use of Adderall among Full-Time College Students. US Department of Health and 
Human Services, Office of Applied Studies. 
25 Rapoport, J. L., Buchsbaum, M. S., Zahn, T. P., Weingartner, H., Ludlow, C., and Mikkelsen, E. J. 
(1978). "Dextroamphetamine: cognitive and behavioral effects in normal prepubertal boys." Science, 
199(4328), 560-563. 
26 Caldwell, J. A., Caldwell, J. L., and Darlington, K. K. (2003). "Utility of dextroamphetamine for 
attenuating the impact of sleep deprivation in pilots." Aviation, space, and environmental medicine, 
74(11), 1125-1134. 
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sleepiness or, simply, having jobs that require long work shifts. Similarly to Ritalin, 
Adderall, and Dexedrine, Modafinil is now being used by healthy patients for non-
therapeutic purposes, in particular to promote alertness and wakefulness.  
Although reports on the effects of enhancers such as Modafinil are scarce, due 
largely to their ‘off label’27 use, there are already studies that provide us with some 
early results. For example, a study led by Elliot et al. 28 described how, during their 
clinical trial, a control group of healthy adults taking Modafinil showed relative 
improvements in tasks involving spatial working memory and planning compared to 
a placebo group.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, since one of the original uses of this drug was for the 
treatment of sleep disorders such as narcolepsy, researchers have also found a link 
between Modafinil and performance in sleep deprived individuals.29 When given to 
sleep deprived doctors the drug seems to reduce their impulsiveness in taking 
decisions and they showed a greater degree of cognitive flexibility in problem 
solving. These are the results found by Sugden et al30 in a double blind randomised 
trial involving 39 healthy male resident doctors. Their cognitive performance was 
measured after 19 participants were given a placebo and 20 participants took a 
200mg Modafinil tablet. Those participants taking Modafinil scored higher in the 
working memory and planning tests and were less impulsive taking decisions. 
Barbara Sahakian, who took part in the above study, claims that around 90% of the 
worldwide use of Modafinil can be classed as "off-label" use by healthy individuals.  
 
                                                        
27 A medicine or drug is said to be used “off label” when they’re used outside the terms of their 
licence. This may include, usage for an unapproved indication, age group, dosage or route of 
administration. 
28 Elliott, R., Sahakian, B. J., Matthews, K., Bannerjea, A., Rimmer, J., and Robbins, T. W. (1997). "Effects 
of methylphenidate on spatial working memory and planning in healthy young adults." 
Psychopharmacology, 131(2), 196-206. 
29 Repantis, D., Schlattmann, P., Laisney, O., and Heuser, I. (2010). "Modafinil and methylphenidate for 
neuroenhancement in healthy individuals: A systematic review." Pharmacol Res, 62(3), 187-206. page 
204 
30 Sugden, C., Housden, C. R., Aggarwal, R., Sahakian, B. J., and Darzi, A. (2012). "Effect of 
pharmacological enhancement on the cognitive and clinical psychomotor performance of sleep-
deprived doctors: a randomized controlled trial." Ann Surg, 255(2), 222-7. 
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 Piracetam and donepezil.   
Piracetam (Nootropil) & donepezil (Aricept). These drugs act as acetylcholine 
esterase inhibitors and were originally developed for the treatment of Alzheimer’s 
disease.  Acetylcholine is the neurotransmitter charged with facilitating memory 
formation.  Increased levels of Acetylcholine in the brain are linked with 
improvements in cognition in patients with Alzheimer’s disease. Drugs such as 
Piracetam stops the enzyme from breaking down, increasing the intensity and 
duration of action of the neurotransmitter and therefore maintaining or increasing 
cognitive performance in individuals. 
Once again we are seeing how research aimed at the treatment of memory 
deficiencies is now giving way to reported enhancing effects on cognition. In the 
case of donepezil one study of pilots in flight simulator activities showed that it 
enhances the capacity to retain complex training tasks.31 Another study reported 
improved visual and verbal and episodic memory in 30 healthy volunteers.32 
The summary above provides a non-exhaustive list of the smart drugs most 
frequently found in the literature. Both the proven and perceived benefits resulting 
from the use of these nootropics have captured the imagination of ordinary  people 
and thinkers alike.  Their “off label” use makes it very difficult to truly know how 
widespread their use for enhancement purposes has become. In an attempt to 
answer this, Nature prepared a survey back in 2008 and asked 1,400 participants 
from 60 different countries whether they had ever used Modafinil, Ritalin or Beta 
Blockers for cognition enhancing purposes.33 The survey reported that 202 people 
responded with one in five saying they had used drugs for non-medical reasons to 
stimulate their focus, concentration or memory, with Ritalin being the most 
extensively used drug closely followed by Modafinil.  
                                                        
31 Yesavage, J. A., Mumenthaler, M. S., Taylor, J. L., Friedman, L., O‚ÄôHara, R., Sheikh, J., Tinklenberg, J., 
and Whitehouse, P. J. (2002). "Donepezil and flight simulator performance: effects on retention of 
complex skills." Neurology, 59(1), 123-125. 
32 Grön, G., Kirstein, M., Thielscher, A., Riepe, M. W., and Spitzer, M. (2005). "Cholinergic enhancement 
of episodic memory in healthy young adults." Psychopharmacology, 182(1), 170-179. 
33 Maher, B. (2008). "Poll results: look who's doping 
"Nature. City, pp. 674-675. 
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Similar non-therapeutic use was reported on a survey conducted by Babcock et al at 
the Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts. The results showed that “more than 16% 
of the respondents reported trying methylphenidate (Ritalin) recreationally, and 
12.7% reported taking the drug intranasally.”34 A later survey in 200135 conducted 
among 10,904 US college students in 119 different colleges investigated their use of 
Ritalin, Dexedrine and Adderall for non-medical purposes. The responses showed an 
average 6.9% use with participants attending colleges requiring highly competitive 
admission requirements reporting the highest use. 
However this level of off label use does not seem to correlate with the efficacy of the 
drugs themselves, at least this is what the 2010 systematic review carried out by 
Repantis et al seems to show.36 For example, this systematic review states that the 
studies included in the review showed very mixed results in healthy individuals. 
There seems to be similar reports on the effects of the use of pharmacology for 
enhancing purposes. The size of the effect seems to be correlated with the 
performance baseline levels of the individuals. Generally, those already experiencing 
cognitive deficits or starting from a low but normal threshold seem to benefit most 
from taking the drug.  These may indicate that there is a limit to how much cognition 
may be improved. Furthermore, should these drugs fully make their transition to the 
enhancement arena, the concentration of benefits for segments of the population 
that are initially less advantaged may be an important factor in their societal 
acceptability. 
 
 
                                                        
34 Babcock Q Fau - Byrne, T., and Byrne, T. (2000). "Student perceptions of methylphenidate abuse at 
a public liberal arts college." Journal of American college health, 49(3), 143-5. 
35 McCabe, S. E., Knight, J. R., Teter, C. J., and Wechsler, H. (2005). "Non-medical use of prescription 
stimulants among US college students: prevalence and correlates from a national survey." Addiction, 
100(1), 96-106. 
36 Repantis, D., Schlattmann, P., Laisney, O., and Heuser, I. (2010). "Modafinil and methylphenidate for 
neuroenhancement in healthy individuals: A systematic review." Pharmacol Res, 62(3), 187-206. 
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2.1.2 Brain Stimulation & neurotechnology 
Transcranial brain stimulation (TBS) is a non-invasive way of affecting brain activity 
by using electromagnetic induction. There are three types of TBS: transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS); transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS) and 
transcranial alternating current stimulation (TACS). These different types of TBS are 
all non-invasive and they differ from each other in the type of current used (DC or 
AC) and the mode of delivery (using coils or electrodes).37 
Similar to other types of electrical stimulation of the brain (see DBS later on in this 
chapter), TMS was originally developed to aid the research and treatment of 
conditions related to the motor system. These techniques later widened their scope 
and have been successfully used in the treatment of drug resistant depression and 
other mental and neurological disorders.  New research has opened up the 
possibility of diverting this technology towards the modification of mood and 
changes to behaviour and cognitive capacities. 
In terms of cognitive processes, TBS is able to modify learning by influencing the 
modulation of neuroplasticity in the brain. A study team led by Snowball,38  targeted 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPC) combining transcranial random noise 
stimulation (TRNS) with advanced cognitive training in healthy individuals for a 
period of 5 days, and assessed the effect this would have on the speed of arithmetic 
calculation and memory recall arithmetic training. The results of the study showed 
how TRNS coupled with cognitive training enhanced arithmetic performance and 
these effects appear to be lasting. When the participants were recalled six months 
after the study, those changes in performance when presented with further mental 
arithmetic tests were maintained. 
Deep brain stimulation is a recognized and established treatment for the symptoms 
caused by conditions such as Parkinsons disease, tremor and other movement 
                                                        
37 The Nuffield Council of Bioethics. (2013). Novel neurotechnologies: intervening in the brain. London. 
38 Snowball, A., Tachtsidis, I., Popescu, T., Thompson, J., Delazer, M., Zamarian, L., Zhu, T., and 
Cohen†Kadosh, R. (2013). "Long-Term Enhancement of Brain Function and Cognition Using Cognitive 
Training and Brain Stimulation." Current biology : CB, 23(11), 987-992. 
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disorders.39 This treatment involves the implantation of 1.27cm electrodes in the 
brain. The electrodes themselves are connected to battery-driven stimulus 
generators placed under the patient’s skin and electric signals are then sent to 
certain areas of the brain altering the brain cells and neural networks to treat the 
aforementioned conditions. 
The effects of DBS on certain cognitive capacities have manifested themselves 
during the treatment of unrelated conditions such as obesity. A particular study 
designed to treat morbid obesity with DBS resulted in some unforeseen effects on 
memory.40 In this case, a 50 year old patient reported heightened autobiographical 
memory recall whilst being stimulated with DBS impulses.41 
Research into the application of DBS for the treatment of psychological disorders 
such as obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), is now in place yielding some initial 
results on how certain personality traits can be affected. An example of how DBS can 
have a marked effect on mood is described by Schermer.42 The case of the ‘happy’ 
OCD patient describes how after having received DBS for the treatment of OCD, the 
patient’s symptoms remain the same except for an unexplained feeling of happiness. 
The intention to treat a disease on this occasion has instead unexpectedly resulted 
in an alteration of the patient’s mood.  
The aggressive behaviour often found in patients suffering with chronic cluster 
headaches has also shown signs of decline in patients treated with DBS.43 In this 
case, two patients suffering from mental retardation and with severe aggressive and 
                                                        
39 Schermer, M. (2011). "Health, Happiness and Human Enhancement‚ Dealing with Unexpected 
Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation." Neuroethics. 
40 Hamani, C., McAndrews, M. P., Cohn, M., Oh, M., Zumsteg, D., Shapiro, C. M., Wennberg, R. A., and 
Lozano, A. M. (2008). "Memory enhancement induced by hypothalamic/fornix deep brain 
stimulation." Ann Neurol, 63(1), 119-23. 
41 Ibid. “Unexpectedly, the patient reported sudden sensations that he described as “deja vu” with 
stimulation of the first contact tested (contact 4: 3.0 volts, 60-microsecond pulse width [pw], and 
130Hz). He reported the sudden perception of being in a park with friends, a familiar scene to him. 
He felt he was younger, around 20 years old. He recognized his epoch-appropriate girlfriend among 
the people” 
42 Schermer, M. (2011). "Health, Happiness and Human Enhancement‚ Dealing with Unexpected 
Effects of Deep Brain Stimulation." Neuroethics. 
43 Franzini, A., Marras, C., Ferroli, P., Bugiani, O., and Broggi, G. (2005). "Stimulation of the posterior 
hypothalamus for medically intractable impulsive and violent behavior." Stereotact Funct Neurosurg, 
83(2-3), 63-6. 
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disruptive behavioural patterns and not suitable for pharmacological treatment 
were instead implanted with electrodes and provided with neurostimulation. The 
aggressive behaviour of one patient had completely disappeared whilst the other 
appeared a lot calmer and capable to re-instate familial and social relations. 
In the cases just described it seems that the application of DBS for the treatment of 
specific conditions has provided us with unexpected results which could be applied 
towards the modification of certain emotional and cognitive traits. 
New advances in neurotechnology have opened up the opportunity of connecting 
the brain to external devices. Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs), also known as Brain 
Machine Interfaces (BMIs) translate brain activity into command signals for external 
devices.44 It involves the translation of brain signal into commands to operate 
external devices, such as mechanical artificial prosthesis, robotic limbs or computer 
sensors. The external devices will respond according to increasing or decreasing 
specific neural activity. 
There are currently three main forms of BCI. Electroencephalography (EEG) is the 
least invasive technique often coming in the shape of headwear or helmets 
recording electric signals via the scalp. Other techniques such as invasive direct 
connections and electro-corticography (ECoG) use electrodes which are placed on 
the surface of the brain. 
The current research into BCIs is focused mainly on potential ways to assist patients 
affected by paralysis and how to improve the use of prosthesis or any other 
mechanical aids.  Specifically, the aim is to provide them with a novel way to 
communicate, detect any changes in consciousness and help them control mobility 
devices such as prostheses and wheelchairs.  
There seems however to have been a move from these typically therapeutic uses to 
research into the augmentation of cognitive capacities. Particularly, the US has 
                                                        
44 Heersmink, R. (2009). Ghost in the Machine: A Philosophical Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Brain-Computer Interface Applications and their Users. 
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reportedly been using BCIs in the military with the aim of increasing the soldiers’ 
perceptual and attention capabilities and also to control weapons remotely.45 
Their role as potential cognitive enhancers has already been discussed in the 
literature, in particular the creation of neural implants capable of downloading our 
acquired knowledge into synthetic devices or even connecting our brains to the 
internet. Should this be possible, humans would have access to huge amounts of 
information at their fingertips. Futurist writers, such as Ray Kurzweil argue that we 
will reach a point when our “biological brains” will merge with our “synthetic 
brains” giving rise to a super enhanced type of human intelligence.46 Brain to brain 
communication has also been predicted by Alan Rudolph, former Director for 
Chemical and Biological Technologies at the US Defence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA), who claimed: 
“In the long run, we could have brain-brain communication, we could improve 
the performance of normal healthy individuals”47 
In the field of warfare, DARPA is hoping to reach a point were electrodes inserted in 
the brains of pilots can be used as memory implants where complex manoeuvres 
can be stored allowing pilots to perform them without having actually received any 
training.  
Neural stem cells are used for their potential to regenerate damaged brain cells lost 
as a result of disease or injury. Since the brain has not got the capacity to regenerate 
cells naturally, this type of therapy can be vital for patients suffering from chronic 
degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s or those who have 
suffered acute tissue loss caused by a stroke.48 
There is a growing body of evidence that indicates that stem cell transplantation can 
lead to improved cognition in the ageing or diseased brain.  The insertion of neural 
                                                        
45 Kotchetkov, I. S., Hwang, B. Y., Appelboom, G., Kellner, C. P., and Connolly, E. S., Jr. (2010). "Brain-
computer interfaces: military, neurosurgical, and ethical perspective." Neurosurgical focus, 28(5), 
E25. 
46 Kurzweil, R. (1999). The coming merging of mind and machine: Scientific American, Incorporated. 
47 Hoag, H. (2003). "Neuroengineering: Remote control." Nature, 423(6942), 796-798. 
48 The Nuffield Council of Bioethics. (2013). Novel neurotechnologies: intervening in the brain. London. 
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stem cells into the brain of research rats have resulted in improvements in spatial 
learning and memory49. Furthermore, recent research in animal models shows that 
these improvements in cognition are also transferable to the healthy brain. 
The improved performance in normal functioning individuals using these diverse 
brain altering technologies may seem to fall within the realm of science fiction, 
nonetheless, if realised, it will dramatically change the way we use our brain to 
interact with external devices around us. These technologies, however, are still in 
their infancy and their potential to enhance our cognitive capacities needs to be 
further examined. 
2.1.3 Nutrition and environmental enrichment. 
The role of nutrition, essential in fighting off disease and improving the physical well 
being of the individual, is widely acknowledged. Nowadays there is a growing 
recognition that adequate nutrition also provides fuel for the brain and it is essential 
for its optimal development.  
Dietary supplements are widely used in the hope that they will lead to an 
improvement in cognitive capacities. The low risk of the side effects associated with 
these supplements make them fairly uncontroversial and well accepted even though 
evidence of their effectiveness is currently not sufficient to truly consider them as 
effective enhancers. Another reason for their popularity seems to be that these types 
of enhancements are viewed as ‘natural’ by the public and therefore elicit a more 
immediate acceptance. This positive response elicited by ‘naturalness’ was recorded 
during the public engagement activities devised for the 2008 report by the Academy 
of Medical Sciences.50  
Amongst these supplements the market readily offers, fatty acids such as Omega 3, 
vitamins E, B6, B12, Brahmi and Gingko Bilboa among others. Tentative early results 
have linked the use of Omega 3 and Omega 6 fatty acids to improvements in reading 
ability, IQ levels and a deceleration in the cognitive decline of patients with 
                                                        
49 Qu, T., Brannen, C., Kim, H., and Sugaya, K. (2001). "Human neural stem cells improve cognitive 
function of aged brain." Neuroreport, 12(6), 1127-1132. 
50 The Academy of Medical Sciences. (2008). Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs. 
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Alzheimer’s.  A review conducted by Gomez Pinilla51 shows how taking Omega 3 
fatty acids has been consistently linked to optimum brain function. In particular, a 
type of Omega 3 acid named DHA is linked to the enhancement of cognitive abilities 
in rodents. 
Environmental enrichment is understood as the provision of more stimulating social 
and physical surroundings. The effect of enriched environments using animal 
models have also reported improvements in cognitive function. Studies such as one 
conducted  by Leggio et.al52 consistently show that enriched sensorimotor 
environments lead to improvements in spatial and non-spatial memory tasks in rats. 
Although experimental studies purporting to demonstrate the effect of 
environmental enrichment in humans is rare, there is also evidence that autistic 
children experience improvements in cognition and symptom severity. This was the 
result of a randomised control trial in 2013 comparing two groups of autistic 
children. The group exposed to an enriched environment consisting of exposure to 
classical music, aromatherapy, and objects with different shapes, colours and 
textures, carefully chosen to stimulate the children’s senses showed mean improved 
scores after six months.53 
Perhaps another way of thinking about the value of enrichment is to look at the 
effect on brain development that impoverished stimulation causes in the cognitive 
and social development of infants. A study54 carried out in Romania describes the 
cognitive and social status of children selected at random from an orphanage 
compared to non-orphanage children from the same location. The study concluded 
that the orphanage children exhibited deficits in both cognitive and social 
functioning.  
                                                        
51 Gomez-Pinilla, F. (2008). "Brain foods: the effects of nutrients on brain function." Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 9(7), 568-578. 
52 Leggio, M. G., Mandolesi, L., Federico, F., Spirito, F., Ricci, B., Gelfo, F., and Petrosini, L. (2005). 
"Environmental enrichment promotes improved spatial abilities and enhanced dendritic growth in 
the rat." Behavioural brain research, 163(1), 78-90. 
53 Woo, C. C., and Leon, M. (2013). "Environmental enrichment as an effective treatment for autism: a 
randomized controlled trial." Behavioral neuroscience, 127(4), 487. 
54 Kaler, S. R., and Freeman, B. (1994). "Analysis of environmental deprivation: Cognitive and social 
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The provision of good quality education can be said to be the traditional 
enhancement par excellence. It has been shown to improve memory scores and it 
has a protective effect on cognitive decline several decades after schooling has 
finished 55. These improvements can often arise via different pathways with 
education having an impact on health behaviour, type of occupation and social 
interactions all of which are themselves outcomes that can affect cognitive 
performance. Another study56 examined the effects of an educational reform act in 
1947 increasing compulsory education by one year. In a longitudinal study 
comprising 12,000 individuals, the participants were assessed at age 70 and it 
reports higher scores in executive function and memory tasks for those born after 
the measure was implemented. 
2.1.4 The usual suspects: nicotine and caffeine. 
Caffeine is part of the daily routine of many people. It is naturally found in everyday 
foods and beverages such as tea coffee and chocolate, and has gradually become the 
stimulant par excellence. Unlike most of the enhancing substances and technologies 
described in this chapter, caffeine is widely considered to be safe when taken in 
moderation and it has been endorsed culturally. Caffeine has been proved to 
augment vigilance and attentiveness as reported in studies such as the one carried 
out by Wesensten et.al57 in 2005. This randomized controlled trial compared the 
effects of caffeine, modafinil and dextroamphetamine on performance and alertness. 
The results showed that the enhancing effects of caffeine are comparable to those of 
modafinil and dextroamphetamines.  
Smokers have long reported the cognitive ‘kick’ they experience after having a 
cigarette. This is associated with a sharp increase in attention, learning and memory.  
That cognitive kick is in sharp contrast with the health issues associated with 
smoking, however pharmaceutical companies are now researching ways to develop 
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56 Banks, J., and Mazzonna, F. (2012). "The effect of education on old age cognitive abilities: evidence 
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a ‘smart drug’ which will target the nicotine receptors in the brain and therefore 
generate the same cognitive effects reported whilst smoking but bypassing the 
negative health implications. This push to develop a “healthy” formulation of 
nicotine has been prompted by evidence suggesting that its consumption increases 
cognitive performance in patients with neuropsychiatric disorders 58and disease 
related cognitive decline59. Reports on cognitive impairment  induced by nicotine 
withdrawal have led to studies reporting a reversal of that impairment once nicotine 
levels were restored60. Furthermore, there is also evidence that certain aspects of 
attention and memory can improve in healthy subjects although results are  too 
small in magnitude to be significant61  
2.2 The enhancement of morality  - A brief overview   
The previous section explained how we could augment certain components of our 
cognition in ways previously unattainable. Thinkers have seen in moral 
enhancement the answer to deal with existing and upcoming threats such as war, 
climate change and terrorism, largely caused by developments in technologies that 
have given human beings the necessary tools to cause harm at a large scale.  The 
possibility of altering our moral emotions such as sympathy, empathy, a sense of 
fairness and our capacity for moral imagination, provides us with the tantalising 
prospect of altering moral dispositions and behaviours so that these societal 
problems are lessened or at least contained. My intention is not to portray the 
enhancement of moral capacities by biological means as an alternative to more 
traditional methods of moral instruction such as education. I see both methods as 
compatible and complementary to one another.  
It has been argued that such interventions need to be accompanied by superior 
moral qualities to enable us to ascertain the best way to employ our enhanced 
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cognitive powers. As in the case of malevolent genius, superior ability can threaten 
the interests of others when our moral compass fails to show us where best to direct 
our skills and abilities. Unlike in the case of cognition however, it might not be so 
simple to identify which parts of ourselves make us moral. One cannot generally 
break down morality in the same way as fluid intelligence, making its analysis more 
complicated. Many of these moral dispositions may be dependent on the cultural 
and social context and their value often varies within and across ethical doctrines.62 
As I will examine later, moral behaviour may also be dependent on cognitive 
capacities that aid moral reasoning  helping us distinguish between right and wrong, 
and adding another layer of difficulty to what enhancing morality really means. 
These points seem to indicate that unpicking the components of moral behaviour 
would require a much larger investigation than this piece of work allows. To 
simplify the task ahead, the analysing will aim to include those moral dispositions 
that could be considered as contributing to moral behaviours in some if not all 
contexts without trying to establish whether the “right” kind of moral behaviour can 
be achieved. 
2.2.1  Psychopharmacology 
Research on the use of pharmacology has shown that cognitive capacities are 
amenable to manipulation. This section examines whether this claim can also be 
applied to certain emotional dispositions known to affect our moral behaviour. What 
follows is a brief outline of some of the evidence that might support the case for the 
potential biological modification of moral traits. 
2.2.1.1 The happiness neurotransmitter - serotonin 
Serotonin is one of the neurotransmitters thought to have an impact on the moral 
behaviour of individuals. Substances designed to slow down the re-absorption of 
serotonin are commonly prescribed for the treatment of depression and anxiety 
disorders. These drugs are commonly known as SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Re-
                                                        
62 For instance utilitarianism,  deontology and virtue oriented theories  have a very different 
understanding of what it means to behave morally giving priority to consequences, duties and virtues 
respectively. Furthermore, even within the utilitarian theory there will be disagreement as to what it 
counts as achieving the best outcome and how this should  be measured. 
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uptake Inhibitors) and amongst them we can find citalopram, sertraline or 
fluoxetine (most commonly known as Prozac). The level of serotonin in the brain is 
regulated in humans by the MAO-A gene short for monoamine oxidase A and also 
known as the ‘warrior gene’. Having the ‘wrong’ version of this gene leads to a 
deficient re-uptake of serotonin. Deficits in the level of serotonin are linked to 
aggressive and violent behaviours. 
Experiments such as the one carried out by Crockett et al.63 provide some hopeful 
results showing that different levels of serotonin seem to have an impact on the 
range of pro-social behaviours we exhibit.  This study explains how those 
participants treated with the drug citalopram (which stimulates serotonin re-uptake 
in the brain) tended to display quite different decision making behaviours when 
faced with two moral dilemmas: the “trolley problem” and the “ultimatum game”.64 
Findings showed that the intake of citalopram promoted the participants’ pro-social 
behaviour by increasing their reluctance or aversion to hurt others whilst at the 
same time making them more unlikely to accept unfair offers which would put 
others at a disadvantage.  
There is also evidence that some drugs designed to inhibit serotonin re-uptake 
influence moral behaviour, specifically our tendencies towards aggressive 
behaviour. Inhibiting serotonin re-uptake means that the levels of serotonin in the 
brain are boosted by avoiding their re-uptake into the presynaptic cell. This is just 
                                                        
63 Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M. D., and Robbins, T. W. (2010). "Serotonin selectively influences 
moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion." Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(40), 17433-17438. 
64  The moral scenarios presented by Crockett are as follows: In the trolley problem the experimenter 
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responder. If the responser accepts the offer they both walk away with the money, if they reject it 
they both get nothing 
For a more detailed discussion of the results see: ibid. 
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the way Prozac works, according to Kramer, these changes in serotonin will have an 
effect on our social behaviour:  
“if you can alter serotonin and norepinephrine you should be able by mere virtue 
of the change in the biological internal milieu, to produce a more comfortable 
individual”65.  
Prozac is known to lower aggression leading to people being more relaxed, 
agreeable and easy going in their interaction with others.66 This could have an 
influence on our social behaviour leading to an increase in cooperation between 
unrelated groups with conflicting interests and resulting in an improved rate of 
conflict resolution and therefore a reduction in violent confrontations. Research 
carried out by Wood et.al67 support the link between co-operation and levels of 
serotonin. In this piece of research, those individuals whose levels of serotonin had 
been reduced displayed a less co-operative attitude when playing the Prisoners 
Dilemma when compared to those with an increased level of serotonin. 
2.2.1.2 The addictive neurotransmitter - Dopamine 
The discussion of cognitive enhancements showed how drugs such as Adderall and 
Ritalin were thought to affect the dopamine systems of the brain ultimately  
affecting the attention levels of patients suffering from ADHD. Dopamine also has a 
different function linked to our emotional responses to external stimuli. Dopamine 
has become known as the motivation or addictive neurotransmitter because of the 
way it fuels our cravings and how it controls the anticipation of pleasure that 
different activities or objectives may bring. The greater the anticipation of the 
possibility of getting a reward the higher the levels of dopamine found in the brain. 
The different alleles found in individuals  can lead to more or less risky behaviour 
and are strongly linked to desire and reward feelings triggering strong rushes of 
pleasure. Individuals  with a specific version of the dopamine regulator gene D4 
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seem to present a more quick tempered behaviour also characterised by impulsivity, 
embracing novelty seeking  activities.68 In fact the effects of dopamine on our brains 
are often likened to those of cocaine. 
Research attempting to assess the link between dopamine and  pro-social behaviour 
used Torcamole as the chosen drug to increase the level of dopamine in the brain.69  
The combination of drug or placebo with a number of economic games showed that 
the group with increased dopamine levels displayed a general increased sensitivity 
to inequality and a more modest increase in egalitarian behaviour when compared 
to the placebo group.  
2.2.1.3 The love hormones - vasopressin and oxytocin 
Science is steadily providing us with examples that show that our moral behaviour 
towards each other may have a biological basis. I have already described above how 
levels of serotonin in the brain can have an effect on our aversion to harm, rejecting 
unfair offers and our levels of aggression towards others. Next I will focus on 
experiments carried out affecting the levels of oxytocin and vasopressin in both 
animals and humans.  
These two hormones are usually linked to social behaviours, particularly to the 
feelings of attachment that draw us to one another. Oxytocin is released by both men 
and women during orgasm and in women during childbirth. Oxytocin can also be 
increased by sexual intercourse, touch, massage and other more common means 
such as the contraception pill or corticoids used to treat asthma. Vasopressin is 
released in both men and women after sex and is said to have an impact in the 
consolidation of long-term relationships 
Experiments carried out on animals have shown that genetic manipulations can lead 
to improvements in memory in rats and can even change the sexual behaviour of the 
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meadow vole from polygamous to monogamous.70 The case of the prairie vole may 
pave the way towards discovering how we form attachments towards other people.  
Prairie voles' mating behaviour is distinctly different from their closely related 
cousins the Montane voles. Whilst Prairie voles are monogamous and raise jointly 
their young for weeks, the Montane male vole is notoriously polygamous and takes 
no part in the raising of its young. This difference was thought to have a biological 
basis with the male Prairie voles having a much larger number of vasopressin 
receptors when compared to their polygamous counterparts. This study illustrates 
how it is possible to change the mating behaviour of Prairie voles from polygamous 
to monogamous by altering the levels of vasopressin in male voles. Altering the pair 
bonding formation in animals it seems, can now be achieved in a laboratory.71 
Experiments on rats have also shown how depleting the levels of oxytocin in female 
rats leads them to reject their young. Conversely, when oxytocin is injected in rats 
that have never had sex, it leads them to display nurturing behaviours even towards 
young from other female rats. 
Scientists have also studied the effect that different levels of oxytocin has on human 
behaviour. Oxytocin is well known for its role in the formation of mother-infant 
bonding with maternal levels of oxytocin increasing during breastfeeding and 
suckling. This example of bond formation leaves us with the tantalizing possibility of 
influencing the formation of social bonds in humans. 
Nonetheless, caution should be had when attempting to manipulate oxytocin levels 
in humans. Oxytocin seems to increase trust within groups but it does seem to make 
you care less about people outside your group.  
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2.2.1.4 Noradrenaline and the fight or flight response 
The level of noradrenaline in the brain is linked with the “fight or flight” response in 
both humans and animals. Noradrenaline levels have also been shown to influence 
both emotional memory and emotional responses  
These levels of noradrenaline activity can be manipulated using psychotropic drugs. 
One of these drugs, the beta-blocker Propranolol, has been used to treat a variety of 
conditions ranging from hypertension, stress and acute anxiety72 to, more recently, 
the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder to prevent the consolidation of 
emotional memories arising from a traumatic situation.73 
A study of the use of propranolol has shown that by regulating the levels of 
noradrenaline in the brain we can control implicit (but not explicit) forms of racial 
prejudice.74 Implicit bias is thought to have a stronger emotional component than 
explicit forms of bias and can therefore be more susceptible to modification once the 
biomedical pathways linked to this behaviour are identified.75 Another trial76 has 
shown that having taken propranolol, participants tended to assess sacrificial 
actions, that is harming others directly, as morally unacceptable and reduced 
utilitarian considerations in ethical judgments. 
2.2.2 Brain Stimulation and neurotechnology 
Non-invasive brain stimulation has been traditionally used for the treatment of 
cognitive and motor related impairments, however the direct effect that these 
technologies have on emotional responses and moral behaviours has not received 
the same level of interest.  
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Despite a lack of evidence that these interventions result in morally desirable 
behaviours, there have been results that show how they might actually impede 
acting morally. For example, the anterior prefrontal cortex of the brain is known to 
have a role in deception. In other words, this part of the brain seems to be 
particularly active when a person is lying, in particular when those lies had been 
intentionally prepared and fabricated rather than spontaneous lying. This could 
potentially provide us with important information about moral decision making, at 
least in explaining what happens to our brains when we engage in deceitful 
behaviours. Ahmed Karim and his team77 decided to explore how these behaviours 
would be affected following the electrical stimulation of this part of the brain. They 
found that using transcranial magnetic stimulation made people better liars. 
Another related study led by Inga Karton78shows how people’s willingness to tell the 
truth or lie spontaneously can also be influenced by electrical stimulation of the 
brain, in this case the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPC). This study used sixteen 
volunteers who were asked to name the colour of the different discs presented to 
them on a computer screen. Those participants receiving stimulation during the 
experiment to the left DLPC of the brain had a tendency to lie about the colour of the 
disk, whereas those stimulated on the right side of the DLPC had that tendency 
slightly reduced. 
Reciprocal fairness behaviours seem to be negatively affected by TMS when this is 
applied to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPC). Participants in a study 
conducted by Knoch et al.79 showed a reduced willingness to reject unfair offers 
when playing the ultimatum game. The authors also suggest that this might mean 
that participants are less able to resist economic incentives, even when the 
monetary offer is intentionally unfair.  
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The evidence to date, seems to indicate that brain stimulation results in displays of 
selfish rather than moral conduct. However, the pathways leading to these self-
regarding behaviours may one day illuminate the path to more pro-social attitudes 
2.2.3 Nutrition 
The research of nutrition and inadequate moral development has been based on the 
hypothesis that lack of essential nutrients can adversely affect moral behaviours. 
This has prompted some research on the effect that nutritional supplement could 
have on the antisocial behaviours of young prisoners. A trial conducted by Gesh 
et.al80 investigated whether the intake of supplementary vitamins, essential fatty 
acids and minerals would lead to a significant reduction in disciplinary incidents.  
Compared with those participants taking placebos, those receiving the nutritional 
supplements reported an average of 35.1% reduction in offences compared to the 
placebo group with an average reduction of 6.7%81 
Another trial reported how the intake of fatty acids and fish oils result in a lower 
likelihood of high hostility in young adults.82  Furthermore, students taking part in a 
study where they were given daily vitamin supplementation for 4 months reported a 
47% lower mean rate of antisocial behaviour compared to those students taking a 
placebo.83  
 
2.3 Cognition, morality  and genetics. The possibility of augmenting our 
cognitive and moral capacities by intervening in the genome. 
External and biological interventions have been shown to modify both cognition and 
emotions in a variety of ways. The prospect of manipulating our genome brings to 
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the surface some practical difficulties whilst, at the same time, opening up a 
tantalising new prospects to permanently modify the cognitive capacities and moral 
behaviours of individuals 
The belief that our moral and cognitive capabilities have a genetic component is not 
new. Back in 1794 the Marquis of Condorcet supported the view that moral and 
cognitive characteristics could indeed be inherited.84 The aim of this section is to 
establish the feasibility of these genetic interventions ever occurring.  
2.3.1 The influence of genes in the development of cognitive capacities  
The analysis so far has established the way in which cognition can be changed using 
chemical, surgical and external means. The background is now set to extend our 
analysis and assess the evidence behind genetic manipulation of cognition.  
In this section I provide an analysis of the latest technological advances in this area, 
explore the genetic component of cognition and elucidate whether we will be able to 
intervene directly in the genome to augment those capacities that have a genetic 
component.  
Adoption and twin behaviour studies have provided some vital clues in the 
heritability of cognitive capacities. Heritability should be understood as the 
“statistical measure of the genetic contribution to differences among individuals.”85 
The term itself implies that cognitive abilities are not wholly dependent on our 
genes but they might help towards explaining what makes us who we are.  Going 
back to the twin studies, combined findings have shown that 50% of the differences 
in IQ have a genetic basis with the remaining 50% variation being due to 
environmental factors such as education, nutrition, social setting etc. With regards 
to particular IQ domains, 60% of differences in verbal ability can be explained by the 
genetic make-up whereas genes explain 50% of the variance in spatial ability. Twin 
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studies carried out as early as the 1920s consistently suggest a genetic influence in 
what has been commonly known as general intelligence (g)86.  
Significantly these genetic factors seem to have a bigger role as we get older whilst 
environmental influences seem to decline with time: 
“In summary, twin, adoption, and longitudinal family studies of IQ all converge 
on the conclusion that genetic factors increase while shared environmental 
factors decrease in importance with age, at least until middle age.”87 
This could suggest that, as we get older and are free to choose our environment we 
tend to favour those settings most suited to our biological make-up. On the other 
hand, some genes are only activated once we reach adulthood, which might also 
explain the growing influence of our genes as we age. 
This section shows the role that certain genes play in the development of some of 
our cognitive capacities.  However, at no point should we ignore the influence on 
cognition of other external factors such as nutrition, social relationships and family 
settings and their interaction with our genes. Furthermore, it still leaves important 
questions unanswered, such as the contribution of individual genes and the 
complexity of their interaction between themselves and with their external 
environment. 
Establishing a genetic influence on cognitive capacities is the first step, however 
more information is needed about the type and numbers of genes involved in this 
relationship.  It is only then that we would be able to contemplate modifying these 
genetic dispositions. There are, however, difficulties in identifying every single gene 
associated with a compound capacity, such as intelligence. The task of determining 
the heritability of cognitive capacities is a lot more straightforward than detailing its 
exact genetic specification. Rather than researching single gene mutations scientists 
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are dealing with a combination of genes that are involved in complex dimensions 
such as the case of intelligence or "g", generally understood as cognition. Individual 
cognitive traits are affected by multiple genes working together rather than by 
single genes working in isolation.88 
Nonetheless, a number of genes have been identified as influencing certain 
capacities regularly used to measure intelligence. The case of memory formation and 
consolidation has been widely researched in the hope that a solution can be found to 
conditions, such as Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease and age related 
cognitive decline, which are all generally associated with memory deficits. The 
NMDA receptor gene  (NR2B) has been identified as an example of how we can 
influence memory through genetic manipulation in a study led by Tang et al.89 Their 
results show that alterations in the NMDA receptors (known to be associated with 
the formation of memory) can lead to improvements in long term memory in 
transgenic mice when compared to ‘normal’ mice.  The now famous enhanced  
“doogie” mice were reported to show higher ability for storing and coding 
information, greater curiosity  and a stronger preference for new situations than 
normal mice. Although it is too early to determine whether these alterations could 
be successfully transferred to humans it has paved the way for intervening into the 
cognitive capacities of mammals.  
Moving from animal models to studies in humans, research reports that 
polymorphisms of the BDNF gene are linked with poor performance in memory 
tests,90 whilst the COMT gene is linked to the activation of memory circuits.91 
Speech and language disorders are also known to have a genetic component.  In 
particular, the FOXP2 gene is thought to contain a faulty nucleotide which is the 
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cause of a particular hereditary disorder in the area of speech and language.  This 
gene, lacking in chimpanzees and other great apes, is thought to be the “first gene 
relevant to the human ability to develop language.”92 This gene has also been linked 
to the development of learning and spatial cognition. Genetically modified mice 
engineered to express the human form of the FOXP2 gene were demonstrably better 
than non-engineered mice at learning which part of the T-shaped maze to navigate 
in order to get a food reward.93 The importance of how these results may translate 
to research in humans resides in its potential to identify ways to maintain or 
increase procedural memory, that is the memory required for routine everyday 
tasks.   
Reasoning skills and general IQ are known to be influenced by genes such as APOE, 
NCSTN, KL, COMT, PRNP and DISC1. Studies have shown that they can affect the life 
long cognitive ability, particularly relating to reasoning skills, of specific cohorts94.  
Furthermore, children born with 2 copies of the Thr92Al gene are affected with low 
levels of thyroid and have been found to be four times more likely to have a low IQ.95 
This brief summary does not provide the full picture, it does however provide the 
reader with the flavour of the current genetic research into cognition. As science 
constantly develops, the genetic picture will become clearer and it might make the 
possibility of genetic enhancement a reality. 
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2.3.2 Moral capacities with a genetic component:  Can we alter our morality by 
intervening in the genome? 
An analysis of the current situation regarding the development of moral 
enhancements shows how we are already capable of chemically altering 
neurotransmitters linked to aggressive, trusting and pro-social dispositions. There is 
evidence in animal models that seems to indicate that pro-social behaviours are 
hardwired, with "bees that collect pollen for the whole hive, mole rats that build 
elaborate tunnels used by other group members, and meerkats that risk their lives 
to guard a common nest”96 
The biological component of these traits may lead to the more direct genetic 
manipulation of genes presenting an opportunity to permanently change the 
behavioural and moral dispositions of future generations, These advances in 
genetics may lead to what Wasserman and Liao call “geneceuticals”.97 These types of 
substances would target the genetic basis of emotions therefore potentially affecting 
people’s moral behaviour. 
Manipulation of genes in animals has already shown significant behavioural changes 
Experiments already show how we can even change the sexual behaviour of the 
prairie vole from polygamous to monogamous.98 
Genes are responsible for the behaviour of enzymes and neurotransmitters that are 
thought to have a role on the display of a range of moral behaviours. This section 
highlights those more prominent in the literature and that will help substantiate the 
claim that moral dispositions can be modified by genetic means. 
Research shows that low levels of the enzyme known as Monoamine Oxydase A 
(MAOA) combined with childhood maltreatment have an effect on aggressive 
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behaviour displayed in adulthood.99 The gene regulating the production of this 
enzyme can result in two distinct genotypes. Those individuals with high enzyme 
production (HMAG) and exposed to childhood abuse are less likely to display 
antisocial behaviour than those presenting a low enzyme profile (LMAG) and also 
exposed to childhood abuse. Those with higher enzyme levels seem to mitigate 
displays of antisocial behaviour in those cases where the individual has suffered 
mistreatment in childhood. However, the reverse seems to be true if no childhood 
mistreatment has occurred at all. Even though there is no evidence that the presence 
of either genotype solely determines a predisposition to aggressive behaviour it 
brings to the fore the biological component that might lead to those behaviours 
when interacting with certain environments.  
The natural reuptake of serotonin is linked to differences in the serotonin 
transmitter genes.100 A study divided participants into three groups depending on 
the type of serotonin promoter gene they had.  Ordinarily, normal levels of serotonin 
reuptake are associated with the long form of the promoter gene, while a truncated 
version implies reduced serotonin reuptake. The study group was then split 
according to whether participants had two copies of the long gene, two copies of the 
short gene or one copy of each. After they were presented with a version of the 
“trolley problem” those with the long form of the gene were significantly more 
willing to make a typically utilitarian decision and sacrifice one person to protect (in 
this case) five. A shorter version of the stretch of DNA responsible for inhibiting the 
re-uptake of serotonin has been shown to result in more anxious and neurotic 
individuals. 
The gene regulating levels of oxytocin may have an influence on moral judgement 
insofar as they control the levels of these neurotransmitters. Walter et al.101  
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genotyped 154 participants for a functional polymorphism associated with the 
oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR). They found that carriers of the C-allele “rated 
accidentally committed harm as significantly more blameworthy than non-
carriers.”102  Another polymorphism present in the OXTR gene has also been linked 
to utilitarian responses to a range of moral dilemmas. In a study led by Regan 
Bernhard,103 participants were presented with a moral judgement task consisting of 
36 different scenarios. They found a significant difference in utilitarian responses 
between individuals carrying the C-allele compared to those who without this 
genetic variation. 
Esvidence show that the receptor gene polymorphism AVPR1A regulates the re-
uptake of vasopressin.  Just as vasopressin has been linked to the monogamous 
behaviour of prairie voles, new research shows tentative links between pair bonding 
in humans and vasopressin regulation.  Evidence of pair-bonding behaviour in men 
has been linked to the repeat polymorphism RS3 found also in gene AVPR1A.104 Data 
was collected from 552 twin pairs using a pair bonding scale design to assess the 
quality of marital relationships. Those individuals with the RS3 polymorphism 
presented significantly lower scores and reported experiencing more marital 
problems than those lacking the polymorphism. 
The length of the D4DR dopamine receptor gene will be indicative of whether an 
individual is more likely to search for thrills and engage in generally regarded 
dangerous activities such as bungee jumping, parachuting or even more risky and 
non-conventional sexual behaviours. A study led by Richard Epstein105 used a 
tridimensional questionnaire to measure four distinct domains of temperament 
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(novelty seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence and persistence) in 124 
participants. The results showed that those individuals with a particular 
polymorphism of gene D4DR consistently showed higher than average novelty 
seeking scores. These results were replicated in a study by Benjamin et al.106After 
investigating the relationship between the same D4DR polymorphism and novelty 
seeking behaviours in families, results suggested that this association was 
genetically transmitted from one generation to the next. 
This brief overview of the genetic basis of emotional and moral responses have 
shown the potential to alter anti-social behaviours, pair bonding and even our 
utilitarian inclinations.  The genetic basis of morality, it has been argued, can also be 
extended to the moral capacities of empathy and a sense of fairness. Next, I explore 
the grounds for this belief. 
2.3.2.1 Genetic moral capacities: Empathy and a sense of fairness. 
Amongst the potentially enhanceable dispositions, Savulescu gives special attention, 
due to their supposed biological basis, to empathetic and altruistic tendencies and a 
sense of justice.107 Acording to Persson and Savulescu: 
“the core of our moral dispositions comprises, first, a disposition to altruism, to 
sympathize with other beings, to want their lives to go well rather than badly for 
their own sakes.”108 
These dispositions, they believe, are common to worldwide religions, like 
Confucianism, Christianity and Buddhism. Hume, on the other hand, believed that 
our sense of justice falls under the category of artificial virtue, a kind of virtue that 
arises from education and human convention and not from nature.109 Existing 
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research, such as that described above, indicates that these dispositions may be 
modified using biological means and may, therefore, prove Hume's theory to be 
inaccurate. The biological component of certain virtues such as altruism and a sense 
of fairness will have important implications for how we think about moral 
behaviour, in particular if moral dispositions can and should be manipulated. 
Empathy is one moral capacity closely linked to altruism and surrounded by 
controversy. Whilst others, such as Baron-Cohen110 and Jeremy Rifkin111 feel that 
empathy is at the core of achieving a better society. Others such as Paul Bloom112 
argue for a rational restrain of this moral capacity to allow us to make better use of 
it.  
What seems to be clear is the hereditability of the natural component of empathy. 
Twin studies have shown higher correlation in empathy among monozygotic than 
dizygotic twin. This was measured by evaluating empathic responses through the 
observable instances of prosocial behaviours, empathic concern and indifferent 
responses.113  
William Damon114 has attributed the capacity of empathy in humans to the innate 
disposition that can be found in babies from a very early age. Infants display these 
empathic behaviours when they respond with tears when they see someone upset 
or with expressions of pleasure when a person is happy. This capacity can be either 
developed or stagnated depending on the stimuli received by the child but the 
natural tendency to display empathic behaviour seems to be there from the start.  
Early signs of a sense of fairness manifested by reciprocal behaviours in infants as 
young as 3 weeks old are displayed in the context of mother-child relationships. 
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Brazelton et al.115 Have described how the infant's body movement and facial 
expression changes in reaction to her mother's behaviour. When being given signs of 
attention the child 's body would move in smooth circular movements. Conversely, 
the child's movements will become jerky and her face will draw away from her 
mother when the attention is not forthcoming. These are taken as early signs of 
recognition of unfair behaviours and are the precursor of later "tit-for tat" 
behaviours found at a later stage in the child's development.  "Tit-for tat"116 is 
understood to be the most basic display of a sense of fairness and it has been 
identified in toddlers from an early age. For example, a study involving 21 months 
old children showed how children preferred to help a person who had previously 
been nice to them over one who had been unfriendly and mean. As the authors of 
the study claim:  
"these experiments indicate that early helping behaviors show characteristics of 
the rich reciprocal relationships observed in adult prosocial behavior."117 
The apparent biological basis of this empathy and a sense of fairness makes the 
prospect of genetic modification an achievable possibility. The consequences of 
being able to genetically modify our genetic moral dispositions could be far 
reaching. Imagine a scenario where we were able to influence how we form our 
bonds to one another, we may get a better understanding as to how to improve our 
relationships with those around us, particular those with whom we do not share 
familial or cultural ties. Even though we obviously lack any empirical data on the 
consequences of genetically manipulating the degree of social affiliation, it may not 
be unwise to speculate as to what the future will hold. The ethical evaluation that 
follows in Chapter 3 will help illuminate the issues we should consider as we 
embrace these technologies.   
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2.3.2.2 The role of cognition on moral deliberation: Emotional moral enhancement 
versus the enhancement of moral reasoning. 
Historically, moral decision making has been led by rationalistic approaches which 
explained away the role of emotions in our ethical decisions. Socratic and Kantian 
traditions supported the view that being a moral agent was not an accident, you had 
to know how and why you behaved in a morally correct manner. Depending on the 
agent’s ethical framework this process typically involves evaluating issues 
concerning rights, justice or ensuring that virtues such as tolerance, altruism or 
benevolence are preserved. 
Recent advances in neurosciences, however, have led us to have a better 
understanding on how the brain functions when taking morally laden decisions. This 
has led to some interesting insights which present challenges to those either 
advocating a purely rational model of moral decision making and those supporting 
an intuitionist view where our emotions take the lead in moral decision making. A 
biologically enhanced capacity for empathy will be of very little value if the agent did 
not put herself in situations where that capacity would be duly exercised. We need 
to practice to be moral in order to become effective moral agents. Also, having an 
enhanced moral capacity does not in itself tell us enough about how and when to use 
it in a morally appropriate way. It will be only through education and practice that 
those capacities will be of use to both the individual and society at large. Moral 
capacities cannot be considered in a vacuum, our cognitive capacities will teach us 
much about how to be moral in the same way that our moral capacities can guide us 
in using our enhanced cognition 
Haidt and Greene118 have recently speculated that moral judgment may have more 
to do with emotions and intuitions than with moral reasoning. This would seem to 
support the emotivist theories advocated by Hume and be in opposition with the 
Kantian rationalist outlook. However, what current research is really showing is that 
the parts of the brains in charge of both emotions and rational thinking have a role 
in moral reasoning  
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Using the trolley problem as a moral dilemma, a group of participants gave 
markedly different responses to the two different scenarios presented to them. In 
the first case they would be faced with pressing a switch which would divert the 
trolley from the track avoiding the death of five people but causing the death of one 
person by the diversion. In the second case, in order to save the same five people, 
the participant would need to push a bystander from a nearby bridge into the track 
to stop the trolley from killing the other five people. Even though both scenarios had 
the same outcome the response given by the participants was very different with the 
majority of them supporting the first scenario and rejecting the second one. 
Assessing the brain activity of the participants during the experiment showed that 
different parts of their brain was active when evaluating each of the two cases. The 
rational part would take a predominant roll when deciding to switch the direction of 
the trolley, however the emotional part was dominant when deciding whether to 
throw a bystander from the bridge to stop the inevitable death of the five people on 
the track119. 
Other evidence seems to show that patients with prefrontal cortex (ventral medial 
and polar sections) damage display poor moral judgment making them more likely 
to lie, steal, and even hurt themselves and others. Interestingly, the cognitive 
function of these patients does always appear to remain intact which may suggest 
that this type of moral behaviour has at least a non-rational component which 
heavily influences moral outcomes.120 
Savulescu and Person, whilst they support the development of biological means to 
enhance moral capabilities, are against the development of cognitive enhancements 
because of the effect they will have on human’s ability to cause each other harm. 
"Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including 
genetic) interventions could thus accelerate the advance of science, or its 
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application, and so increase the risk of the development or misuse of weapons of 
mass destruction."121  
On the other hand, Savulescu also writes: 
"To be morally enhanced is to have those dispositions which make it more likely 
that you will arrive at the correct judgment of what it is right to do and more 
likely to act on that judgment.” 122 
Savulescu goes on to acknowledge that these capacities will differ depending on the 
account of morality one choses to embrace. Arriving at the correct judgment may 
mean that emotional, dispositions are to be accompanied by cognitive capacities to 
help the moral decision-making process. 
 If we agree that our moral behaviour has both a cognitive and emotional 
component, preventing the development of cognitive enhancements could be to the 
detriment of our moral development. Let us assume that part of our moral decision-
making is partly determined by how well we are exercising our moral reasoning in a 
given situation. This reasoning process will engage our capacity to evaluate 
contrasting versions of events and be able to systematically evaluate all scenarios. If 
we did find a cognitive enhancer which enables us to more effectively process 
information and more clearly understand the messages conveyed to us, it could 
work both as a cognitive and moral enhancer. 
 Discussing the possibility of moral enhancement, John Harris – whilst criticizing the 
chemical alteration of emotions that influence our moral behaviour - supports the 
development of smart drugs if these were to positively contribute to moral 
reasoning. John Harris believes that cognitive enhancement is the best way to 
improve ourselves morally. Moral enhancement should therefore be achieved 
through the improvement of our cognitive capacities.123 
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This debate highlights the need for a careful and detailed discussion of what 
morality entails. I acknowledge that this is an essential part of how and whether 
society should embrace these genetic technologies.  
2.3.3 The ability to modify the genome 
The modification of the genome is done via a number of gene editing techniques. 
Gene editing involves the replacement, deletion or insertion of DNA at a particular 
point of the individual’s genome. There are a number of gene editing techniques 
currently employed, primarily they can be divided in two. One uses engineered 
nucleases (or molecular scissors) and the other one uses a number of viral systems 
to introduce the required changes into the genome.  
One of the earliest techniques used to target and cut certain sequences of DNA was 
the Zinx Finger Nucleases or Zing Fingers (ZNFs). This technique developed in 1989 
proved to be ground breaking  and become the  standard for editing cells in plant 
and animal models. In the field of therapy,  it has been successfully used to make 
people more resistant to HIV. ZNFs  were used to successfully target and destroy a 
gene in the cells of 12 patients suffering from HIV in a study conducted in 2014.124  
However, ZNFs is also a very complex process and carries very high costs. Newer 
techniques are overcoming the problems of cost and complexity and nowadays two 
new editing techniques are gaining ground: TALENS and CRISPR Cas9. 
TALENS or Transcription Acivator Like Effector nucleases is a very similar technique 
to ZNFs developed in 2009. It is considered to be an evolution of the ZNFs technique 
with the advantage of having a much simpler design and application 
The CRISPR Cas 9 technology came into use in 2012 and it has become the most 
popular and go-to technology. This gene editing complex is short for “clustered 
regularly-interspaced short palindromic repeats” and “CRISPR-associated protein 
9”. It has two components, an enzyme and a guide molecule. The guide molecule acts 
as a vehicle to take the enzyme to the target gene, once it reaches its destination the 
enzyme cuts the gene and either modifies it by changing its function, makes it more 
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active or eliminates it completely. Gene editing identifies and cuts pieces of DNA,  
CRISPR identifies the exact gene sequence that needs to be edited and the molecule 
Casp 9,  which is a nuclease protein slices the gene by either replacing it or altering it 
by introducing a specific sequence of RNA. It is cheap, fast and accurate and, so far, it 
has been successfully used in the repair of faulty genes in human embryos. There are 
reports that successful DNA changes in experimental human embryos with inherited 
disease have been achieved using the CRISPR  technology.125 It can radically improve 
human health with the potential to stop the gene mutations causing cancer or 
eliminate the genes causing hereditary diseases. Scientists are looking into 
modifying the genes of mosquitos to prevent them from carrying malaria. 
All these technologies provide us with different ways of altering the genome. The 
key thing is that they provide us with a very real possibility to intervene in the 
genome at embryonic stage and permanently modify the cognitive and moral 
capacities that I have discussed in this chapter. Whether we decide to go ahead and 
embrace these technologies depends on whether their application can survive the 
practical difficulties and an array of ethical and social justice concerns.  
2.4 Practical challenges facing the germline enhancement of cognitive and 
moral traits.  
Having carried out a review of the current evidence and potential for genetically  
enhancing cognitive and moral capacities, it is important to highlight the main 
practical difficulties that might slow down or stop these technologies altogether. 
There are two main challenges that these new technologies must face before they 
could be considered as feasible enhancement options. One is the fact that a wide 
range of external factors need to also be in place for these interventions to 
successfully achieve their enhancement goal. The other one is that they will need to 
survive the objections posed by the genetic diversity argument. 
                                                        
125 Connor, S. (2017). "Rewriting Life - First Human Embryos Edited in U.S."MIT Technology Review. 
City. 
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2.4.1 The limitations faced by genetic engineering. From the fallacy of genetic 
determinism  to the complexity of targeting polygenetic traits. 
The assertion that one gene, or the modification of a gene, causes a specific trait 
defines the essence of what we call genetic determinism.126 
Genetic determinism, however, can be challenged by the complex process that is 
required in transforming genotypic traits into phenotypic characteristics.  The role 
that the environment plays in the expression of genes is of paramount importance. 
Genetic interventions will not be effective in a vacuum. They will need to be 
accompanied by a number of environmental factors that enable the genetic 
predisposition to become an actual capacity.  Nicholas Agar explains how some 
genes lead to the same or very similar phenotype in most environments, whilst 
others seem to vary in response to what he calls “seemingly inconsequential 
environmental changes.”127 This is explained by a phenomenon called epigenesis.128  
This scientific term indicates that there are other factors, apart from the gene, that 
influence whether gene expression takes place and therefore the disease develops. 
These other factors might be environmental or they might originate in internal 
chemical processes. 
David Resnik provides us with some examples of how environmental influence is 
visible in our everyday life.129 He claims that, in the same way that someone with a 
genetic potential to reach a height of 6ft might never do so without the appropriate 
levels of nutrition or healthcare, someone with a genetic predisposition to 
alcoholism will avoid this addiction if they are never exposed to alcohol.  Similarly, 
the effect of certain genes can be counteracted by the intervention of certain 
environmental measures. A well known example is how we manage children 
affected by phenylketonuria.   Phenylketonuria is a genetic condition caused by a 
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mutation in the gene for the hepatic enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase (PAH). 
Children born with this mutation suffer from  a form of mental retardation, however, 
a strict diet virtually free of meat, fish, eggs and most dairy products would lead to a 
child leading a virtually normal life. In this case, the environmental influences 
counteract the effects of our biological commands. Focusing on the possibility to 
genetically enhance our cognitive capacities for example,  these may never be 
realised if the child is reared in an unsupportive familial and social environment that 
does not provide her with adequate educational  or nutritional resources.  Likewise, 
a capacity that enhances your practical reasoning skills will be of very little use to 
individuals if they choose instead not to develop it and follow a life of reckless 
abandonment instead.  
Another consideration is that differences in nutritional and social environmental 
exposures can lead to heritable changes in gene expressions and phenotypes that 
are not caused by changes to the DNA sequence itself. The effects that nutrition can 
have in genetic inheritance has been studied in human populations. For example, the 
connections between malnutrition and limited access to food and the effect this 
keeps having across generations long after the nutritional aspect is no longer a 
problem, have been well documented.130 
Non environmental factors also affect the expressions of genes.  Sometimes a 
mutation occurring in a specific gene might prevent its expression.  For example, 
research on disorders traced back to specific genes has shown that even when the 
mutation is associated with a particular disease, there is no guarantee that the 
disease itself will develop.  
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Failing to acknowledge the non-genetic factors needed to realise our native talents 
will make us fall into “the fallacy of genetic determinism.” 131 According to this view 
all our characteristics would be entirely  defined by our genes, however as the 
examples above show: 
 “In addition to genetic foundations, the individual’s environment, from the non- 
genetic chemicals in each of that individual’s cells to the world around her, plays 
a substantial role in the development of her characteristics and capabilities.”132 
The multifactorial aspect of genetic traits therefore shows that even if a genetic pre-
disposition is present, further requirements are needed to ensure the actual 
development of the selected trait takes place. 
Even if we ignore the multifactorial and epigenetic challenges associated with the 
activity of the genes and the development of the specific traits, the claim of genetic 
determinism can be fought off with an appeal to technology.  It has been proposed 
that genetic interventions could be accompanied by a “switch on/off” facility that 
will determine whether the enhanced capacity is activated depending on whether it 
suits the individual’s chosen life plan. Gregory Stock133 described how this could be 
achieved through the insertion of an “auxiliary” artificial chromosome carrying the 
appropriate genetic information and a mechanism so that the expression of the 
relevant gene could be switched on or off  as per our preference. Should this become 
a possibility, this switch on/off system could become a very effective way to pick 
and choose natural capacities according to the individual’s own preferences.134   
                                                        
131 Etieyibo, E. (2011). "Genetic enhancement, social justice, and welfare-oriented patterns of 
distribution." Bioethics. Page 301 
132 Ibid.  
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Finally, the polygenic character of certain cognitive and behavioural characteristics 
poses another difficulty to the successful and accurate modification of traits via 
genetic means. It is often the case that phenotypic representations are dependent on 
the behaviour of more than one gene. Complex traits such as intelligence or athletic 
abilities are often cited as examples of multiple genes traits. 
Studies of the genetic origins of disease show that disorders rarely have a 
monogenic origin. That is to say the cause of the disease is often not traceable to a 
single genetic mutation. Furthermore, some genes regulate more than one trait or 
characteristics, therefore intervening in one gene with the aim of affecting one 
particular trait can result in unexpected or undesirable changes in a different trait. 
In the field of infectious diseases for example,  it has been found that a variant of the 
DARC gene which offers protection against malaria seems to make people more 
susceptible to HIV.135 
All these factors are obstacles to the direct modification of traits via genetic 
modification. The successful implementation of these technologies will depend, to a 
degree, on how well scientists are able to navigate these hurdles.  
2.4.2 Undermining genetic and social diversity 
One last point to consider before exploring the potential ethical objections to these 
technologies is whether they are likely to undermine genetic diversity. 
The danger that the introduction of germline enhancements is going to endanger the 
genetic diversity of the human race is one of the objections faced by the supporters 
of these new technologies. First, in order to understand the issue of genetic diversity 
we need to provide a definition. Christian Wolfe defines genetic diversity as “the 
variety and frequency of different genotypes or combinations of different genotypes 
within a population.”136 The higher the genetic variability in a population, the higher 
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the number of phenotypic137 variability. Preserving the phenotypic variability of the 
population is important insofar as the higher the variability, the better chance the 
population overall will have to preserve evolutionary change. Critics of germline 
intervention claim that the popularity of certain desirable traits will lead to a 
decrease in the diversity of the genetic pool threatening the long term survival of the 
human population. This is what is commonly knows as the Genetic Diversity 
Argument (GDA).138 
It is unclear to what extent the dangers suggested by GDA will become a reality since 
the technologies we are evaluating are not yet available and it is difficult to ascertain 
to what degree they will be accepted by the general population. Furthermore, the 
effects on genetic variability also depend on an account of genetic determinism that 
has been shown to be unconvincing.  Nonetheless research indicates that the genetic 
diversity of maize has been severely curtailed by the genetic selection of crops to 
accommodate the  growing demand for food.139 The concern associated with this  
lack of genetic variety is whether these crops will be able to survive a plant plague 
severe enough to threaten the world’s food supply. 
Linked to the decrease in genetic diversity is the fear that a decrease in the variety of 
human forms might give way to what Dov Fox calls a “tyranny of sameness”.140 
Homogenous parental decisions that lead to similar enhancements chosen for their 
children might lead to a narrower range of behavioural and cultural norms. The 
danger being that an appreciation and tolerance of plural and diverse views might 
diminish as these enhancements become commonplace.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the modification of some of our cognitive and moral 
capacities is already a reality. This is more pronounced in the field of pharmacology 
where there are indications of successful enhancement both at the therapeutic level 
and with healthy volunteers. 
Recent genetic advances also show promise.  The identification of specific genes and 
neurotransmitters that are linked with cognition and pro-social behaviours has 
opened the door to research investigating the augmentation of these capacities. 
Although, understandably, genetic studies in healthy volunteers are limited, 
research in animal models provides us with initial evidence that the genetic 
alteration of these capacities is possible. This might eventually lead us to the 
tantalising prospect of one day applying these technologies to the genetic cognitive 
and moral enhancement of humans. 
This review, has tried to outline the current evidence and practical difficulties 
involved in the alteration of these capacities. Current evidence provides us with 
grounds for beginning the process of ethically evaluating cognitive and moral 
germline genetic enhancements their potential genetic modification before they 
become a reality.  
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Chapter 3. An overview of the main ethical arguments against 
germline enhancements 
Whether or not the genetic enhancement of our offspring becomes a real possibility 
in the not too distant future there is no doubt that choosing to embrace germline 
cognitive and moral enhancements will be marred with difficulties from the very 
beginning. The introduction of these technologies should be the subject of a 
thorough scrutiny from scientists, ethicists, policy makers and society at large. 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the most salient issues associated with germline 
interventions. Although the focus of this dissertation is the assessment of the impact 
of a cognitively and morally genetically enhanced society on justice, it is important 
to also highlight other equally important ethical concerns. This is not meant to be a 
critical evaluation of each of the ethical arguments, it merely serves as an exposition 
of the main ethical objections associated with their implementation.   
The list of ethical concerns outlined is not exhaustive and it focuses on the effect that 
these technologies may have on future generations. Although discussed as generally 
applying to all germline enhancements,  I have chosen those ethical concerns that 
would be particularly relevant to technologies designed to enhance both cognitive 
and moral capacities. These range from fears of falling back into old coercive eugenic 
practices, to concerns about how genetic modification might affect the autonomy, 
dignity and sense of authenticity of our future children. A brief enquiry into issues of 
implicit and explicit coercion and the effect that these technologies have on 
perceptions of responsibility, complete the chapter.  
Should we ever consider to embrace these technologies, a careful scrutiny of these 
ethical considerations will need to take place before they are part of our everyday 
lives. 
3.1 The shadow of eugenics.  
The ghost of early 20th century eugenic141 practices has not gone away. It still casts 
a long shadow on the contemporary ethical debates surrounding genetic 
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technologies.  Scientific discoveries have often been used to justify dubious social 
policies. Examples include the forced sterilisation of those believed to be feeble-
minded in 1930s US, Sweden, Denmark or Canada and the Nazi ‘Rassenhygiene’ 
(racial hygiene) implemented by the Third Reich with thousands killed to stop the 
proliferation of their genes. Eugenics in the early part of the 20th century came in the 
form of what was later known as  “negative eugenics”. This practice focused on 
stopping certain types of people from being born or reproducing in order to “protect 
the health of the nation or of mankind as a whole.”142 Through government enforced 
policies, a certain kind they perceived as undesirable, such as the feeble-minded, had 
their reproductive rights curtailed or were stopped from being born at all. These 
coercive policies serve as a constant reminder of how gene talk can be used to serve 
the purposes of those having a morally suspect agenda.143 The crimes committed in 
the name of genetic purity and with the false pretence of pursuing a common social 
good are all plain for us to see.  It is also clear, however, that these atrocities were 
not caused by the technological advances themselves. They were caused, at least in 
part, by excessively controlling governments that prioritised their warped social 
vision over some individuals’ rights and liberties.  
The issue of coercive negative eugenics is complex, and as Buchanan144 suggests, it is 
unlikely that utilitarian tendencies trumping rights-based ideologies were the only 
contributing factors. An over-reliance on poor scientific evidence advocating genetic 
determinism and the need to find a scapegoat for society’s ills also contributed to a 
distortion of moral judgement. Eugenics supported the thought that they had found 
the reason for criminality and poverty in the genes, entirely dismissing the 
overwhelming effect that the environment has when interacting with our biology. 
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Understandably, scientific advances have brought along fears that these eugenic 
practices can resurface and these now extend to the alteration and modification of 
those yet to be born. This contrasts to the negative eugenics policies aimed at 
stopping certain types from coming into being and brings subtly different albeit 
related ethical concerns. Bringing about a certain type of individual through genetic 
modification is known as positive eugenics. Positive eugenics provides individuals 
with the power to intervene in the genetic make-up of future offspring. A key factor 
in establishing whether this renewed fear is justifiable is thought to derive from 
whether these new practices are likely to be imposed on individuals. Some authors 
think that preserving the rights that individuals have in taking procreative decisions 
is key in order to avoid accusations of coercion in the implementation of genetic 
enhancements. 
This is the view taken by authors such as Nicolas Agar in his book Liberal 
Eugenics145. State coercion, control and the belief that a particular conception of the 
good should be imposed on society are at the heart of the old eugenics. Conversely, 
the liberal type of eugenics defended by Agar is dominated by the hallmark of state 
neutrality regarding reproductive choices. Furthermore, Agar thinks that individuals 
will have access to the information regarding available genetic interventions 
enabling them to make choices for their offspring in line with their life plans and 
world views.146 According to Arthur Caplan, as long as the reproductive choices of 
parents are free and informed then “there is no reason to think that such a choice is 
immoral on grounds of force or coercion.”147  
Eliminating the coercive aspect of eugenics seems to eliminate the main concern 
that the old practices conjure up and shifts the focus to  other ethical issues that 
need to be considered to ascertain the permissibility of these technologies. Once the 
coercion has been discarded as a concern, authors have begun to considered 
whether that reproductive freedom itself requires some qualification. 
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Limiting  this freedom is often justified on the basis of the view that importance 
must be given to the human nature, autonomy, authenticity and dignity of future 
people. The following section aims to provide some clarification of these arguments. 
3.2 Altering human nature: Effects on the autonomy, dignity and authenticity of 
future people 
Some claim that future persons have a right to receive an unaltered genome. This 
right is enshrined in the 1997 Human Rights and Biomedicine Act.148 Under this 
legislation, genetic modification is only permitted for therapeutic or diagnostic 
purposes and as long as it does not introduce any modification to the genome of 
future persons.  That is to say, in law, individuals have a right to inherit genetic 
material that has not been intentionally modified. However, the interesting question 
is to investigate what may motivate the development of such legislation. I hope that 
this section, may help to elucidate why some thinkers and many members of the 
public may be so keen to keep the biological component of our nature intact. 
It is difficult to disentangle the concept of human nature from those of human 
autonomy, dignity and authenticity.  Worries about modifying the nature of future 
people are in fact often presented in terms of how these changes will affect these 
qualities.  
Next, I provide a concise summary of the arguments against germline technologies 
that are anchored in the protection of autonomy, dignity, and authenticity. 
Starting with the argument from autonomy, we find that different accounts of 
autonomy offer different approaches to interpreting this self-governing capacity. 
Accounts developed by Frankfurt149 and Dworkin150 suggest that the degree of one’s 
autonomy depends on the extent to which the individual’s higher and lower-order 
desires cohere. This account defends the view that, in order to be autonomous 
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individuals should be able to critically reflect on their choices and desires and freely 
review them whenever appropriate. In this sense autonomy is evaluated on how our 
desires or volitions are reflected in our actions. If the freedom to act upon our 
volitions is violated by genetic interventions through a narrowing of our 
opportunities, then those interventions would be considered to harm our autonomy.   
Joel Feinberg's151  understanding  of autonomy is related to this account insofar as 
autonomy is conceived in relation to freedom of choice and available opportunities. 
According to this view future children should be granted the right to “reach maturity 
with as many open options, opportunities and advantages as possible.”152 The child’s 
autonomy equates, according to Feinberg, to the “right to an open future”. The 
potential narrowing of options of our offspring caused by the genetic 
predetermination of their genome was also one of the main threats that Habermas 
identified with newly emerging technologies:  
“Eugenic programming of desirable traits and dispositions ... gives rise to moral 
misgivings as soon as it commits the person concerned to a specific life-project 
or, in any case, puts specific restrictions on his freedom to choose a life of his 
own.”153 
Both Feinberg and Habermas highlight the danger of choosing to enhance our 
offspring in a manner that compromises their autonomy, understood as their ability 
to choose their own path, by predisposing the future child towards a particular life 
path.  According to this view, parents would have a responsibility to ensure that 
children’s capacities for autonomous choice and judgment are nurtured so that they 
are able to choose and pursue a wide range of life plans.  Buchanan supports this 
view and claims that, although the right to an open future will not immediately rule 
out genetic interventions, it will however limit the range of permissible 
interventions to those that “do not so narrow children’s range of opportunities as to 
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violate their right to an open future.” 154 Agar echoes this view with his worry that 
some interventions might rule out or compromise particular life plans:155 
“Capacity enhancements boosting an individual’s chances of successfully 
pursuing a given life plan will often reduce that individual’s chances of 
successfully pursuing alternative life plans. A stock market trader needs to marry 
quickness of decision with aggression. These traits would be harmful in a poet or 
painter for whom reflection is demanded.”156 
Habermas's account of autonomy is characterised by the importance given to self–
authorship.  The special status he gives to the inviolability of human nature is 
justified for its role as “crucial for our capacity to see ourselves as the authors of our 
own life histories, and to recognise one another as autonomous persons.”157 This 
statement suggests that avoiding the manipulation of human nature via genetic 
means would  protect our ability to act in accordance with our own motives and 
therefore regard ourselves and each other as autonomous beings. 
As our offspring are unable to consent to these interventions, their right to decide 
about their future would be harmed. In short, children would not be able to see 
themselves as the authors of their own lives. 
Dena Davis's condemnation of methods of what she calls “direct procreation”158, 
such as sperm sorting and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) can also be 
extended to germline enhancements. The possibility to test and potentially modify 
specific traits  in embryos before implantation, so Davis believes, raises questions 
about the respect given to the autonomy of the future child. Davis interprets the 
threat to autonomy by these newly emerging technologies in terms of the 
expectations that parents may have about the kinds of lives their children will lead. 
The kind of emotional and financial investment that parents put in choosing their 
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child’s traits would incur a sense of entitlement to the expected result. In the context 
of cognitive enhancements in particular, parents may force their children to a path 
of high academic achievement that their child might not have chosen freely. 
Effectively, the parent’s expectations about their children’s future might result in 
narrowing the range of life plans open to their children.  
Detractors of genetic interventions have often claimed that altering our nature by 
genetic means  would undermine the Kantian conception of human dignity, which 
is anchored on the “special worth” of human beings and their ability to act according 
to their own will, having “freedom from dependence on interested motives which 
constitutes the sublimity of a maxim and the worthiness of every rational 
subject.”159 This special worth and freedom to act upon our own will implies that 
there is a duty not to treat humans as mere instruments of our own desires and 
aspirations. Thinkers such as Leon Kass and Francis Fukuyama160 believe that the 
genetic engineering of our future children changes the way we are connected to 
them. In their view, the parent- child relationship becomes one between the “maker” 
and the “made”.  Children are being treated as a means to the ends set by the parents 
or society who decide to enhance them so that they become products of their own 
creation. The self-worth of our future children, they argue, will be damaged by being 
“instrumentalised” by their parents. This would not be the case if parents were to 
follow a process of natural conception where they  have a limited amount of control 
over who their children might be. Through the genetic manipulation of our 
offspring, parents instrumentalise their children making them a product of their 
own preferences. The future person is then unable to feel like they are the outcome 
of their own choices, unable to pursue their own personal goals and develop their 
own moral conceptions.161 
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This criticism is also supported by Michael Sandel162  who also highlights the 
damage in the parent-child relationship. Sandel famously highlighted the dangers 
that genetic modification poses to our relationship with our future offspring when 
we treat them as mere artefacts of our own making. He believes that behind  
intervening in our children’s genome lies a desire to fulfil the parents own desires 
and aspirations. It is, he writes: 
 “a kind of hyperagency – a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, including 
human nature, to serve our purposes and satisfy our desires. The problem is not 
the drift to mechanism but the drive to mastery. And what the drive to mastery 
misses and may even destroy is an appreciation of the gifted character of human 
powers and achievements...The problem is not that parents usurp the autonomy 
of a child they design. The problem lies in the hubris of the designing parents, in 
their drive to master the mystery of birth.” 163 
There is some value, according to Sandel, in accepting our children as gifts and 
appreciating the fact that we cannot choose to have the kind of children we want 
restrains the human tendency towards hubris.164  
The arrogance associated with “Playing God” by potentially creating our children to 
suit our own preference not only offends the  human dignity of our future offspring 
but it also expresses, what Sandel considers, a damaging disposition towards seeing 
ourselves as the “masters of our own nature.”165 
A related concern derived from our ability to dictate the genetic dispositions of our 
future children is how this might affect their sense of authenticity. Discussions  of 
authenticity are often associated with how well people can identify themselves with 
their actions. Carl Elliott rejects enhancements because they are alien to what makes 
us who we are. For a life to be authentic it needs to be uniquely yours and the use of 
external enhancements would undermine this uniqueness and take us further away 
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from our true selves. Furthermore an authentic life is directly linked to self-
fulfilment understood as “discovering and pursuing your own values and your own 
particular talents”.166 This view of authenticity, according to Elliott, is characterised 
by its uniqueness. Moreover, a feeling of self-fulfilment is linked to a meaningful life, 
which is why we should try to preserve it. Another way of expressing the potential 
damage that genetic interventions do to our sense of who we are is found in 
identity-preserving arguments. Authors, such as Walter Glannon,167 argue that 
enhancing an individual’s mental capacities is not so much about improving that 
person but rather what we are doing is altering that individual’s identity. If we want 
to defend this type of enhancement against this particular criticism, we need to 
show that the interventions we are dealing with are identity preserving. I have 
already described how Michael Sandel168 believed that the instrumentalisation of 
our children could harm their human dignity.  Now, his view of humanity, anchored 
in a concept of “giftedness” whereby our talents are not wholly our own, and as such 
we are restricted in the way in which we can alter them, begets a sense of humility 
towards the unexpected. The fact that we don’t have complete control over what 
makes us, leaves us open to the unexpected. This openness over what the future 
holds is conducive to a certain humility much needed, according to Sandel, when 
facing these technological advances. It is through the disruption of our nature 
through genetic intervention that we are at risk of threatening our authentic selves. 
The argument for authenticity cannot be complete without considering the issue of 
naturalness. Some authors believe that it is the potential loss of a sense of 
naturalness in what we are pursuing that can really damage the authenticity of 
human beings. The unnaturalness arising from the use of germline interventions 
comes from a feeling of detachment between our achievements and the means that 
have been used to reach those goals.169 There is a sense according to Kass that “the 
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“naturalness” of means matters.”170 The use of these new technologies removes 
humans from familiar contexts that have characterised their experience so far. 
There is a sense that by embracing these technologies, we are failing to be genuine 
in our pursuits. 
3.3 Drawing the line at therapy 
The definition of genetic enhancement has typically been determined by its 
relationship to the concept of therapy and particularly how it differs from it. The 
widely discussed distinction between therapy and enhancement is important insofar 
as it is often used as a way to draw moral conclusions about the desirability or not of 
the use of emerging biotechnologies. Nick Bostrom171 suggests that the therapy-
enhancement dichotomy comes from the assumption that therapy is generally 
understood as aiming to “fix” specific diseases or injuries whilst enhancement aims 
to improve an organism over and above its healthy state.172 This way to define 
therapy and enhancement coincides with the one offered by the President’s Council 
on Bioethics: 
“A therapy, roughly defined, is a treatment for a disorder or deficiency, which 
aims to bring an unhealthy person to health. An enhancement is an improvement 
or extension of some characteristic, capacity, or activity.”173 
Bio-conservatives174 claim that it is important to keep this distinction since it does 
seem to be an accepted intuition for the majority of the population and provides a 
“moral warning flag” which prompts us to assess the morality of certain biomedical 
interventions.  
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W.F. Anderson believes that the role of medicine should be confined to the 
treatment of disease, leaving enhancements outside the scope of medicine 
 “On medical and ethical grounds we should draw a line excluding any form of 
enhancement engineering. We should not step over the line that delineates 
treatment from enhancement.”175   
Anderson seems to express the view that the traditional goal of medicine is the 
restoration of the human body to its normal state and this is the way it should 
continue.  
 Similarly, Eric Juengst has described how the concept of disease should be used to 
delineate the duties of the medical profession: 
 “Where the human problems anticipated by an intervention cannot be tied 
together into a diagnosable disease entity, with its recognizable constellation of 
subjective symptoms, physical signs and causes, it should not be adopted as a 
proper part of medical practice.”176  
These views are well rooted in the traditional role that medicine has had since its 
origins. In antiquity the concept of enhancement in medical terms had not yet come 
into appearance restoring the functioning of the bodies to their normal state was the 
goal. This was an uncontroversial  position because improvement beyond nature 
was not considered to be a possibility. Urban Wiesing177 describes how the purpose 
of medicine was to turn discrasia into eucrasia i.e., restoring the balance of the four 
humours (phlegm, blood, and yellow and black bile) in the human body. The idea 
that the human condition should not be improved beyond its original state 
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continued during the Middle Ages, the focus being directed towards restoring people 
to the level pre-determined by God. 
Medicine consistently followed the restitutio ad integrum doctrine, by which the aim 
of any given treatment was to restore the normal functioning of the human body. 
There was no consideration given to the possibility of taking the human body 
beyond its original functionality.  
Supporting the difference between therapy and enhancement as a way of ethically 
evaluating an intervention depends on our ability to successfully define health.  In 
order to do so, philosophers employ a number of theoretical frameworks.  
First,  under the biological/functional account of health,  disease is identified from a 
statistical point of view and defined as those deviations from the natural functional 
organization of a species.178 Similarly, Boorse uses statistical normality to define 
health: 
 “Health as freedom from disease is then statistical normality of function, i.e., the 
ability to perform all typical physiological functions with at least typical 
efficiency.”179 
A diseased individual will lack capacities that normal individuals of her species do 
possess.  Following this functional approach, Norman Daniels extends this definition 
and claims that mental and physical disease or impairment are “adverse departures 
from species-typical normal functional organization or "normal functioning," for 
short.”180 These species typical functions are those which have contributed to the 
reproduction and survival of human beings. Norman Daniels introduces a version of 
the “normal function” model as a useful guide in differentiating treatment from 
enhancement. In his own words:  
“The treatment-enhancement distinction draws a line between services or 
interventions meant to prevent or cure (or otherwise ameliorate) conditions that 
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we view as diseases or disabilities and interventions that improve a condition 
that we view as a normal function or feature of members of our species.”181 
According to Daniels, any intervention aimed at restoring an individual’s “species-
typical” functions would be considered as therapy, whereas if the treatment 
employed aims to improve those capacities it would then need to be considered as 
enhancement. The line dividing therapy and enhancement will therefore be drawn 
in terms of those specific functions which will fulfil the goals of a given organism, 
anything which disturbs the normal working of those specific functions should be 
subject to therapeutic intervention. 
Second, the social account of health defines disease and health as contingent and 
highly dependent on social, moral and cultural norms. Under this framework, our 
values,  attitudes and social and institutional arrangements affect how disease and 
health are defined. Norman Daniels agrees with the way our cultural and social 
environment affect our concept of disease and, in 2000, he wrote: 
 “It is our norms and values that define what counts as disease, not merely 
biologically based characteristics of persons.”182  
The implication of this assertion is that, independently of whether someone meets 
the species typical criteria of health, an individual may be considered diseased by a 
given society. In other words,  someone deviating from the societal, moral or 
cultural norm, may be considered not healthy even when this person’s functioning 
fits within the species typical or normal functioning range.  
Both the functional and social normality accounts may offer very different and, 
perhaps, opposing, concepts of normality. This may be problematic to those relying 
on the therapy-enhancement distinction for moral guidance on decisions relating to 
genetic interventions. 
Regardless of these difficulties, supporters of the therapy-enhancement distinction 
consider it a valued tool for establishing the moral permissibility of genetic 
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interventions. Whatever account is chosen to offer moral guidance, Eric Juengst183  
still insists that a line used to differentiate therapy form enhancement can be drawn 
even when it is difficult to find clear cut off points.  
3.4 The effect of enhancement on accountability and responsibility. 
The possibility of enhancing the capacities of individuals raises questions of 
responsibility affecting both the enhanced future person and the parent deciding to 
enhance their future offspring. 
As responsibility seems to diminish as our capacities decrease, so Nicole Vincent 
humorously points out in her discussion of how responsibility tracks capacity “No 
one expects more of Clark Kent but everyone expects Superman to save the 
world.”184  
Even if the use of genetic enhancements does not endow the individual with 
Superman-like powers, there is still the issue of whether, should they be available, 
we have a responsibility to use these enhancements or be held responsible for our 
failure to enhance our offspring. This is of particular relevance when we inhabit a 
society that is committed to offer some kind of compensation for the inequalities in 
prospects caused by natural inequalities: 
“…people who have the means to genetically enhance themselves or their 
offspring but chose not to might not be entitled to remediation. This may have 
special implications when these individuals compete with enhanced individuals 
for scarce resources.”185 
As the above passage indicates, whether or not individuals have been enhanced may 
have an impact on how others behave towards them. Michael Sandel, in particular, 
highlights the risk of becoming a society where solidarity and tolerance towards 
other’s shortcomings or imperfections is undermined. This would translate into a 
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decrease in compassion. The availability of enhancements “…would make it harder 
to foster the moral sentiments that social solidarity requires.”186 Although this 
concern is applied by Sandel to enhancements we choose for ourselves rather than 
our children, this lack of compassion could be extended to our genetically enhanced 
offspring. Since parents have decided not to enhance their children, it could be 
argued that society  will deem the parents wholly responsible for the future of their 
offspring. If those future persons happen not to flourish in their chosen life plans, it 
will be their parents’ fault. The rest of society may not feel that any reparation is 
due. This might create pressure on parents to increase the capacities of their 
children.  Despite parents not being legally forced to choose enhancement 
technologies for their children, there might still exist a level of coercion, that might 
make their choice not entirely free. Michael Esposito187 differentiates between the 
terms implicit and explicit coercion when discussing the ethical implications of the 
pharmacological enhancement of mood and cognitions. These concerns can also be 
extended to the germline modification of our future offspring. Implicit coercion 
would be present when, seeing that others are embracing these technologies, 
parents might feel compelled to enhance their children so that they are not 
disadvantaged when competing against their peers.  Explicit coercion might also 
arise, for example, when posts and positions are only open for competition to those 
who have been genetically enhanced. In this case, the freedom not to enhance might 
be compromised even when governments do not apply any coercive eugenic 
policies. 
This might also affect to what extent we are held legally and morally accountable for 
our actions. The possibility of our genes having a predominant role on our 
behaviour can have direct implications for the legal responsibility we are seen to 
have over the acts we have committed or failed to commit. On the one side, there can 
be a tendency for judges and juries to pass more lenient sentences based on a lesser 
degree of culpability caused by our biological make-up. Nowadays behavioural 
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genetics can be offered as an explanation of how particular criminal behaviours can 
arise. Advances in genetics might make this kind of explanation more commonplace. 
Conversely, some enhancements might enhance individuals in a way that they are 
better equipped to avoid their responsibilities. This is a concern relating to the 
implementation of cognitive enhancements in particular and highlighted by 
Mehlman.188 Mehlman talks about the difficulties of actually determining who has or 
has not been enhanced. This is particularly pertinent to those choosing cognitive 
enhancements where the achieved increase in reasoning skills may not be easily 
recognised. Furthermore, it could be argued that those endowed with enhanced 
cognition would be better skilled at concealing the fact that they have been 
enhanced if this was a practice outlawed in society. They might be better than the 
rest of the population at not being caught for their crime and eluding punishment. 
This section has shown how enhanced capacities might affect how our perceived 
level of responsibility for our actions is changed. With great enhancements seems to 
come great responsibility! A decreased level of solidarity and tolerance towards 
both the enhanced population and those parents who fail to enhance their children 
may lead way to coercion where none previously existed. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The ethical issues associated with germline genetic interventions are novel and 
complex. Novel because we are dealing with technologies that are not yet available. 
Complex, first, because the unfamiliarity with these technologies makes it difficult to 
identify which ethical issues may be relevant. Second, because we are dealing with 
technologies that do not have a direct effect on us but on future people. Speculating 
what is best for future people, adds an extra layer of complexity to an ethical 
enquiry. This additional complexity, for example is lacking from the evaluation of 
somatic genetic interventions which only affect the adult cells of individuals who are 
able to consent.  
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The ethical concerns outlined in this chapter are likely to be the tip of the iceberg. A 
thorough examination demands to critically engage with each of the issues, an 
engagement that is outside the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, an awareness of 
these ethical concerns is needed to help deliberate about the social justice issues 
which are the focus of this piece of work. 
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Chapter 4. Genetic cognitive enhancements and their role within 
the Rawlsian social justice theory  
Having explored a variety of ethical concerns associated with the introduction of 
germline enhancements, my attention now turns to the main focus of this thesis, the 
implications that these interventions can have on issues of justice. 
This chapter evaluates the potential genetic enhancement of the cognitive traits 
which form what has been previously been defined as General Fluid Intelligence 
(Gf). This concept encompasses the broad ability to reason and it involves solving  
“problems in unfamiliar domains using general reasoning methods.”189 Its 
applications to “unfamiliar surroundings” implies that we are dealing with a 
capacity that is naturally occurring in the individual as opposed to acquired through 
external conditioning or learning. The  individual components of Gf include 
capacities such as inductive and deductive reasoning, information processing 
and problem solving skills.  The permissibility of their genetic enhancement will 
be assessed against the backdrop of liberal egalitarian thought. Henceforth, I will use 
the terms General fluid intelligence and reasoning capacities interchangeably. 
My focus resides in the Rawlsian theory of justice. I argue that this conception of 
political justice provides a positive argument for the permissibility of these 
interventions. I do this by exploring how Rawls’s political theory can and should be 
extended to include genetic cognitive enhancements as social primary goods.   
Recent liberal egalitarian theories have considered natural talents and social 
contingencies as morally irrelevant despite their considerable impact on the level of 
opportunities available to citizens. Contemporary liberal political theory provides us 
with different versions of the meaning of egalitarianism. We could aim to achieve 
equality of welfare, wellbeing, resources, or opportunity with each approach having 
different implications for how we ought to deal with the implementation of genetic 
enhancements and their distribution.  All, however, share the idea that inequalities 
caused by morally arbitrary factors need to be eliminated or, at the very least, 
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minimised. Rawls’s concern with inequalities also originates from the moral 
arbitrariness of natural and social contingencies.  However, his political conception 
was particularly ground-breaking for the role assigned to social institutions in 
protecting the moral worth of individuals.190 A society whose basic institutions 
govern the distribution of benefits of social cooperation between citizens according 
to their level of natural talents or skills, Rawls believes, fails to treat the individuals 
as moral equals and to give them the moral worth they deserve.  
Rawls’s political theory provides the theoretical framework in this thesis to discuss 
the impact of genetic interventions in social justice. I chose Rawls because of his 
dedication to addressing the unequal distribution of opportunities and other socio-
economic goods caused by unequal distributions of natural talents.  Since these 
traits are considered to be arbitrary from a moral perspective, justice needs to be 
concerned with their impact on the individual’s life prospects or opportunities. It is 
the impact of these morally arbitrary factors that motivated Rawls in his 
development of fair principles of social cooperation. Rawls’s objective is to stipulate 
principles of justice that promote equality, a type of equality anchored in the idea 
that society must treat everyone as free and equal moral agents whose burdens and 
benefits when engaged in social cooperation are not influenced by factors such as 
natural talents, social standing, race, or gender.191 Failing to implement principles 
that aim to address the inequalities caused by morally arbitrary factors is failing to 
treat citizens equally.  
The chapter begins with an exposition of the development of the Rawlsian political 
conception of justice as fairness. As part of this account, I provide a definition of 
primary goods and of the principles governing their distribution. 
Having acquired a suitable understanding of Rawls’s political conception I then 
begin to explore how genetic cognitive enhancements can be incorporated into the 
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Rawlsian theory and become part of his political conception. This section, in 
particular, evaluates whether genetic cognitive enhancements meet the necessary 
requirements to be counted as primary goods fulfilling their role as all-purpose 
goods and as components in the development of the person as a moral agent. 
I conclude the chapter showing that Rawls’s political conception is able to 
accommodate these newly emerging technologies as they meet the conditions 
required of social primary goods. 
4.1 Rawlsian egalitarian thought, a philosophical liberal framework  to mitigate 
the effects of morally arbitrary factors on people’s opportunities. 
Liberal egalitarian theories of justice have traditionally defended the idea that there 
is a duty to neutralise or minimise the socio-economic inequalities caused by 
morally arbitrary factors.192 Despite having no control over them, these factors can 
have considerable impact on the course of our lives. This has prompted liberal 
egalitarian theories to focus on the effects that consideration of race, gender, social 
class and natural talents have on the individual’s lot in life. It is the concern of 
justice, they claim, to address the effects caused by these morally arbitrary factors. 
Within this liberal thought, I rely on the political theory developed by John Rawls. 
His emphasis on the influence that morally arbitrary factors have on the individuals’ 
life prospects provides an ideal starting point and framework for the development 
of my arguments. The idea of moral arbitrariness of natural and social contingencies 
is defined by Rawls in opposition to what is generally considered as morally 
deserved: 
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 “moral desert always involves some conscientious effort of will, or something 
intentionally or willingly done, none of which can apply to our place in the 
distribution of natural endowments, or to our social class of origin.”193 
From the onset, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls makes clear his rejection of inequalities 
caused by these social and natural contingencies: 
“Not only they are pervasive, but they affect men's initial chances in life; yet they 
cannot possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit and desert. It is 
these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to 
which the principles of social justice apply.”194  
Mitigating the influence that these social and natural contingencies have on the 
opportunities and distribution of all-purpose goods over the individual’s life 
becomes the focus of the development of his political theory. His will be a 
conception of justice that  “nullifies the accidents of natural endowment and the 
conditions of social circumstance as counters in quest for economic and political 
advantage.”195  
Rawls’s concern with inequality as the motivating force for proposing an egalitarian 
system aimed at tackling these inequalities permeates his work from  A Theory of 
Justice to the final statement of his political conception in the revised edition of 
Political Liberalism.  Throughout his work, his account of justice maintains the same 
focus: 
“What the theory of justice must regulate is the inequalities in life prospects 
between citizens that arise from social starting positions, natural advantages 
and historical contingencies.”196  
Underpinning Rawls’s goal to regulate these inequalities is the intuitive idea that, 
since natural talents and social and economic contingencies are undeserved, the 
benefits and burdens derived from them are also undeserved. Rawls proposes a 
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political conception that he believes to be in line with the widely held moral 
intuitions,  implicit in the culture of modern democratic societies: 
“…it seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgements that no-
one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more 
than one deserves one’s starting place in society”197 
These considered judgements, Rawls believes, are deeply held intuitions that 
present themselves clearly and without distortion to the individual.198 They lead us 
to consider, for example, that violations of people’s liberties and discrimination or 
persecution based on gender, religion and race as inherently unjust. His theory of 
justice, therefore, has a very clear set of assumptions anchored in moral intuitions 
that are assumed to exist in most modern democracies. Rawls takes these 
convictions to be embedded within our political culture and any proposed principles 
of justice must be able to capture them: 
“We collect such settled convictions as the belief in religious toleration and the 
rejection of slavery and try to organise the basic ideas and principles implicit in 
these convictions into a coherent political conception of justice. These convictions 
are provisionally fixed points that it seems any reasonable conception must 
account for”199 
Importantly, amongst this set of convictions is that we care about how different 
levels of natural talents impact people’s chances in successfully pursuing their life 
plan.  Rawls takes heed of this concern and argues that natural capacities such as 
intelligence, as well as social contingencies, such as wealth and opportunities affect 
how successfully individuals are able to pursue their chosen goals: 
"Greater intelligence, wealth and opportunity, for example, allow a person to 
achieve ends he could not rationally contemplate otherwise."200   
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Furthermore, the historic distributions of natural capacities and the morally 
arbitrary rewards attached to them have had a cumulative effect on the allocation of 
social and economic advantages and disadvantages, perpetuating inequalities across 
generations. Similarly, access to positions of power and status is in part influenced 
by the cumulative effects of prior distributions of natural talents and abilities and 
the degree to which these have been realised.201  
Rawls believes that these are all powerful reasons to consider how a conception of 
justice can best address the unequal prospects caused by different natural talents.  It 
is his commitment to addressing these inequalities that incites me to explore 
whether and how he is concerned about the cognitive capacities of individuals. The 
following section explores the role that native cognitive abilities played in his theory 
and whether that role can be extended. 
4.2 The effect of cognitive capacities on life prospects and the Rawlsian account 
of fair equality of opportunity. 
The relevance of cognitive capacities for the Rawlsian theory of justice resides in 
their ability to affect the opportunities available to individuals. Since equalising 
opportunities is at the heart of the Rawlsian theory of justice, it is worthwhile to 
explore how these abilities features in his writings. 
Before starting my enquiry, however, it is important to explore how Rawls uses the 
concept of opportunity. Rawls’s understanding of opportunity throughout his works 
may often appear to be confusing. Rawls’s terminology varies when he refers to the 
effects caused by these differentials in natural talents. He often talks about the 
achievement of “ends” and also regularly discusses how natural and social factors 
affect the access to “opportunities” and “positions of authority and responsibility”202, 
“cultural knowledge and skills”203 or “access to education”204,  “prospect of 
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success”,205 and finally the range of  “life chances” or “life prospects”206 available to 
all.  What these terms seem to share is how they all relate to the effect these 
contingencies have on people’s lives, in particular, how successful individuals might 
be in realising their aims and goals in life.  
Rawls uses these terms often interchangeably when arguing in favour of the 
principles of justice. It is for this reason, and for simplicity’s sake that I will be 
broadly using “opportunity” to encompass all these different terms.  In doing this I 
draw inspiration from other Rawlsian inspired authors like Richard Arneson who 
defines opportunity as “a chance of getting a good if one seeks it”;207 and Norman 
Daniels’s similar understanding that a range of opportunity comprises an “array of 
life plans”.208 
Bringing the discussion back to cognitive capacities, let us recall how Chapter 2 
outlined the evidence surrounding the genetic component of cognitive abilities and 
the future prospects of modifying these capacities by intervening in the genome. I 
concluded that these capacities are not only dependent on social and environmental 
factors but that they also have a strong genetic component which enables us to treat 
them, at least in part, as natural talents.  
Their conceptualisation as natural talents leads me to consider whether Rawls 
would be concerned with their effect on the individual’s life prospects. Upon 
reflecting about natural attributes, Rawls includes health, intelligence, vigour and 
imagination as natural attributes that are particularly valuable from a justice 
perspective.209 These traits were used as examples of the type of natural capacities, 
also referred to as natural primary goods,210 that affect the opportunities or life 
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chances open to individuals and the subsequent acquisition of socio-economic 
resources needed to pursue their goals. 
It is because of the special role that natural capacities have that, according to Rawls 
‘…it is also in the interest of each to have greater natural assets. This enables him to 
pursue a preferred life plan.’211  
Having different levels of cognitive capacities also impacts the successful pursuit of 
our goals in a way that should awaken the curiosity of any Rawlsian theorist.  These 
genetic traits are, at least for now, beyond our control and are known to affect the 
range of different jobs and positions individuals are realistically able to access. For 
example, succeeding academically depends in part on the natural capacity we have 
for synthesizing and processing information, our reasoning skills and our ability for 
critical appraisal. This educational success is then likely to lead to better job 
opportunities, potentially yielding higher returns in the acquisition of socio-
economic goods.212 Recent research also suggests that there is a relationship 
between IQ scores213 and average income. These findings, based on US data, indicate 
that the difference in income between someone with an IQ in the normal range and 
someone in the top 2% can range from $6,000 to $18,500 per year.214 Other studies 
have also reported an association between IQ, educational achievement and income, 
with part of this association shown to be mediated by genetic factors.215  
                                                        
211 Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice: Belknap Press. Page 108 
212 It is worth noting that these cognitive capacities will not only yield benefits in pursuing  careers 
requiring a particular set of educational achievements. The improvement of reasoning capacities such 
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These empirical findings show a relationship between our cognitive capacities and 
our ability to access economic goods and opportunities. The effect that cognitive 
capacities have on access to opportunities and socio-economic goods means that we 
are required, from a Rawlsian perspective, to regulate the inequalities caused by 
their unequal distribution.   
The similarities between these cognitive capacities and the natural talents initially 
considered by Rawls further supports the hypothesis that they should count as the 
kind of contingency that Rawls would have considered relevant for inclusion within 
his framework. 
4.2.1 Addressing inequalities caused by differentials in cognitive capacities from 
a Rawlsian perspective.  The move from formal equality of opportunity to 
fair equality of opportunity. 
Having recognised the impact that variations in genetic cognitive talents can have on 
people’s life prospects and their ability to secure socio-economic goods this section 
provides a detailed account of the value of opportunity in Rawlsian theory. Rawls 
concludes that his account of fair equality of opportunity provides a way to deal with 
inequalities arising from social contingencies.  However, addressing inequalities 
emerging from natural contingencies, he claims, requires additional measures to 
regulate the benefits emanating from these inequalities. 
The value that Rawls gives to opportunity is central to the development of his theory 
of justice.  He dedicates one of his principles to protecting what he defines as fair 
equality of opportunity. In A Theory of Justice Rawls takes the reader through a fairly 
arduous path that eventually leads to his principles. He labels each of the stages 
taking him to the fuller conception of fair equality of opportunity as: natural liberty, 
liberal equality and democratic equality respectively.  
Rawls begins his analysis by bringing to our attention a social arrangement, that he 
defines as the system of natural liberty, where careers are open to talents. Under 
this arrangement individuals are judged for jobs and offices purely on the set of 
skills and abilities they possess. Everyone has the right to access any position they 
desire free of any governmental restrictions based on factors such as caste, religion, 
gender, or sexual orientation. These morally arbitrary factors are ignored and 
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institutions are arranged so that there are no legal barriers for people when 
competing for positions that will enable them to acquire socio-economic shares. 
Beyond this, there are no other governmental measures to address the effects of 
these contingencies. This kind of arrangement is commonly known as formal 
equality of opportunity. The implication of a system embracing a purely formal 
equality of opportunity where careers are open to talents without any further 
modifications or adjustments is that the distribution of income and wealth depends 
on our natural talents, abilities, personal qualities such as motivation, ambition, luck 
and, finally, the social context in which we may or may not be able to realise our 
plans.  
Even though this lack of governmental intervention in the regulation of access to 
opportunities seems to be desirable since it preserves the individual’s freedom to 
access positions,  Rawls highlights how any resulting distributions in wealth and 
income will still be affected by social contingencies. In view of this,  Rawls regards 
the elimination of legal barriers in access to positions as insufficient. The system of 
natural liberty does not guarantee fairness since the resulting distribution of 
opportunities and economic assets is still influenced by “morally arbitrary” factors 
such as luck and the familial and social background in which we are born. Justice 
will also need to concern itself with dealing with these inequalities; the lack of 
commitment in the system of natural liberty to avoid outcomes caused by morally 
arbitrary factors leads Rawls to pursue a more substantive principle of opportunity.  
Rectifying the effects of morally arbitrary factors, Rawls argues,  must be the focus of 
a principle designed to protect equality of opportunity. This was Rawls’s objective 
when he described the system of liberal equality where fair equality of opportunity 
goes beyond formal equality of opportunity by ensuring that those with equal 
talents and motivations have an equal opportunity to access positions that confer 
economic, social or political advantages. Fair equality of opportunity, according to 
Rawls, can only be achieved when those with equal abilities and motivations are 
able to access positions open in a formal sense and, most importantly,  also have a 
fair chance to attain them. Rawls here makes the  move towards a system where fair 
equality of opportunity is maintained through the elimination of the influence of 
social contingencies:  
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“The thought here is that positions are to be not only open in a formal sense, but 
that all should have a fair chance to attain them. Offhand it is not clear what is 
meant, but we might say that those with similar abilities and skills should have 
similar life chances. More specifically, assuming that there is a distribution of 
natural assets, those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the 
same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success 
regardless of their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the 
income class into which they are born. In all sectors of society there should be 
roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone similarly 
motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the same abilities and 
aspirations should not be affected by their social class.”216 
This stronger view of equal opportunity attempts to mitigate the unfair outcomes 
generated by a system of natural liberty by trying to eliminate the effects of 
arbitrary social contingencies. The socio-economic class of the individuals should 
not influence the prospects and life chances available to those similarly motivated 
and endowed. Political institutions, Rawls argues, should aim to correct the morally 
arbitrary social contingencies affecting equality of opportunity through the 
implementation of inclusive policies such as universal access to education. However, 
there is a recognition that universal education alone will not eliminate the 
inequalities caused by morally arbitrary factors. Rather, it will often help to 
entrench them, with the quality of education often widely affected by regional 
segregation and poorly diffused political power.217 The introduction of early 
intervention educational programmes such as Head Start in the US and Sure Start in 
the UK is seen as outreach tools designed to complement the role of universal 
education with a goal to give children under 5 years of age their best start in life and 
to improve their life prospects as adults.218 These programmes incorporate non 
educational measures such as the provision of healthcare and nutritional advice and 
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tools to empower parents to foster the child’s developments. The success of these 
programmes is regularly monitored and the jury is still out on both their cost 
effectiveness and their long term impact on the child’s development.219 
Notwithstanding the improvements incorporated into the equality of opportunity 
account, it still fails to address the inequalities in socio-economic goods caused by 
the different distributions of natural assets. Even though Rawls believes that "there 
is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by 
the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune",220 it seems 
that leaving equality of opportunity as defined above allows too much room for the 
influence of arbitrary factors. Rawls needs to develop a stronger principle that 
removes or minimises the effects caused by our biological make-up. 
4.2.2 The Rawlsian move towards a more genuinely fair equality of opportunity: 
the system of democratic equality. 
In a move to address the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery, Rawls puts forward 
the final piece of the jigsaw in his delivery of true fair equality of opportunity and 
moves on to describe a system of democratic equality. The idea that we should 
deal with the effects of the natural lottery is emphasised by Rawls when he claims 
that to treat people equally one must provide them with genuine equality of 
opportunity.221 If differences in natural talents adversely affect the range of life 
plans available to citizens, it cannot be claimed that genuine equality of opportunity 
exists.222 Providing genuine equality of opportunity means for society to provide 
more attention to those with fewer natural talents and those born into less 
favourable positions. 
How we deal with the inequalities caused by natural talents, Rawls believes, is 
however, strongly influenced by their non-distributable nature. While Rawls did not 
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consider this option, we can now imagine how directly intervening in the genome 
might alter those natural capacities. 
Rawls’s argument develops from the assumption that even though individuals are 
entitled to their natural capacities and to develop them as they choose, they are not 
however entitled to any claim that social institutions should reward them for their 
exercise. Conversely, the distribution of talents and skills are deemed to be a 
common asset and citizens are to share in the benefits derived from their 
distribution. This approach would eliminate the need to genetically alter these 
natural capacities seeking some sort of genetic equality. 223 
The distribution of natural capacities, or their inequalities among people,  are 
understood as part of the common asset yielding benefits to be shared amongst 
citizens.  Differences in their distribution, according to Rawls,  are not to be 
eliminated. Rawls instead, proposes a mechanism whereby citizens will share the 
benefits conferred by different allocations of natural talents. More specifically, 
Rawls’s goal is to regulate this benefit sharing scheme through the adoption of  “a 
principle which mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself.”224 
 
4.3 The re-distribution of socio-economic goods as the chosen Rawlsian 
mechanism for dealing with inequalities in genetic cognitive capacities.  
Understanding how this benefit sharing system works, requires first a brief inquiry 
into the characteristics of the goods that Rawls is seeking to re-distribute. Second, 
the principles that regulate their distribution need to be outlined as well as how 
they relate to one another.  It is only then that we will be in a position to understand 
how we can potentially deal with the inequalities originating from differences in 
cognitive capacities. 
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4.3.1 A brief introduction to Rawlsian primary goods and the influence of the 
basic structure of society on their allocation: 
The socio-economic goods that are regulated by the principles of justice are called 
social primary goods. In his account of primary goods Rawls differentiates between 
social and natural primary goods. Natural primary goods include capacities such as 
intelligence, health and vigour. However, natural primary goods are not the subject 
of distributive justice.  His principles of justice only deal with the distribution of 
social primary goods. Henceforth, when I refer to primary goods these will be 
assumed to be social primary goods unless specified otherwise. 
Social primary goods are broadly defined by Rawls as basic rights and liberties, the 
freedom to pursue opportunities, power and authority, income, wealth, basic 
healthcare, leisure time225, and the social bases of self-respect. Rawls’s definition of 
primary goods and of the role they fulfil within his political conception varies 
throughout his works. In A Theory of Justice primary goods226 are defined as those 
things that everyone should rationally want, regardless of their conception of the 
good. The concept of primary goods is then developed further  in his later writings 
at which point Rawls included basic healthcare and leisure time227 and certain 
public goods contributing to health, such as clean air and unpolluted water.228  
Additionally, primary goods are not simply goods that it is rational to desire because 
of their value in our pursuit of our determinate conceptions of the good. 229  Most 
importantly, they also enable citizens to become fully cooperating members of society 
through the development of their two moral powers.230 The citizen’s moral powers 
are defined by Rawls as a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. 
Each are closely associated with the capacities for reasonableness and rationality. 
                                                        
225 Rawls original definition of primary goods in a ‘A Theory of Justice’ excluded basic healthcare and 
leisure time. These were only added in ‘Justice as fairness’ Rawls, J. (2001a). Justice as fairness: A 
restatement: Harvard University Press. Pages 171-179 
226 Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice: Belknap Press. 
227 Rawls, J. (2001a). Justice as fairness: A restatement: Harvard University Press. Pages 179-180 
228 Ibid. Page 172 
229 Ibid. Page 88 
230 Ibid. Page 19 and 58 
  
87 
Having these powers to a minimum degree will enable the individual to fully engage 
in social cooperation and to take part in society over a complete life. In short, primary 
goods are meant to fulfil the  higher order interests that Rawls assumes all citizens 
have. These are higher order interest in the sense that they are prior to other interests 
citizens might have and pursuing them becomes regulative of the individual’s conduct 
insofar as “whenever circumstances are relevant to their fulfilment, these interests 
govern deliberation and conduct.”231 
Despite the different definitions of primary goods given by Rawls, one aspect of his 
theory that remains constant is that the justice of a given society depends on the 
principles chosen to regulate the distribution of social primary goods. These 
principles will govern the basic structure of society rather than directly interfere in 
the particular moral behaviours of the individuals. The role of the basic institutions 
is key in determining the conditions of social cooperation of a given society. 
Furthermore, through this regulation they strongly, albeit indirectly, influence the 
moral conduct and attitudes of individuals through their promotion or 
discouragement.232 It is therefore expected that just institutions will also serve to 
promote the just behaviour of individuals in their day to day social cooperation with 
one another and in their role as citizens. 
In his article ‘The Basic Structure as Subject’ Rawls clarifies his definition of this 
basic structure: 
“(It is) the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system 
of social cooperation, and how they assign fundamental rights and shape the 
division of advantages that arises through social cooperation. Thus the political 
constitution, the legally recognised forms of property, and the organisation of the 
economy, all belong to the basic structure”233  
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This basic structure therefore becomes the primary subject of justice for Rawls 
because of the potentially pervasive effect and impact that it has on our ambitions, 
chosen life plan and the kind of persons we eventually become:  
“The intuitive notion here is that this structure contains various social positions 
and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life 
determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social 
circumstances. In this way, the institutions of society favour certain starting 
places over others. These are specially deep inequalities.”234  
The statement above explains two things.  First, our expectations are shaped in part 
by our starting positions in society. Second, social institutions play a key role in 
determining whether our natural talents and abilities are realised either through 
perpetuating the inequalities that stop us from achieving our goals or by providing 
the mechanisms needed to minimise these inequalities.   
Since these deep inequalities mentioned by Rawls are rooted within the basic 
structure, we need to be able to secure what Rawls calls “background justice”, that 
is,  the just conditions needed to obtain within these institutions. Securing these 
background conditions will be achieved through the development of principles of 
justice that regulate the distribution of the primary goods that the basic structure 
influences so strongly: 
“liberties and powers are defined by the rules of major institutions and the 
distribution of income and wealth is regulated by them.”235 
Rawls’s objective is to define the principles of justice that govern the basic structure. 
These principles will assign basic rights and liberties, grant equality of opportunity 
and regulate the distribution of economic and social benefits such as wealth and 
income.  Their role is to eliminate, or at least to minimise, any potential inequalities 
originating from within the basic structure of society and their effect on the range of 
opportunities available to all.  
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Rawls believes that the regulation of the basic structure will be fair when it is 
regulated according to two distinct principles of justice. What follows is a brief 
summary of how social primary goods are distributed under the principles 
governing the basic structure. 
4.3.2 The protection of basic rights, liberties, opportunity, and the distribution of 
socio-economic goods under the Rawlsian principles of justice: 
Basic rights and liberties are the primary goods that need to be equally distributed 
and that should not be subject to any trade-offs under the Rawlsian scheme.  The 
principle protecting these goods is known as the principle of equal liberty and, 
under its final formulation in Political Liberalism, it guarantees that everyone is 
entitled to an equal scheme of citizens’ basic rights and liberties independently of 
the position the individual might hold in a given society: 
“Each person is to have an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of basic 
liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.”236 
Although the list of rights and liberties under that scheme is kept fairly vague 
throughout Rawls’s writings, clarification is provided in Political Liberalism, where 
Rawls includes the following: 
“freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties237 and 
freedom of association, as well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and 
integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of 
law.” 238   
Once equal basic liberties are guaranteed for every individual, Rawls’s aim is to 
ensure fair equality of opportunity and to set the criteria for allowable inequalities 
in the distribution of economic goods at the level of the basic structure.  This is 
encapsulated under Rawls’s second principle of justice which is itself split into two 
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distinct parts. Under this principle social and economic inequalities are only allowed 
if a) these inequalities are arranged so that they are to the benefit of the least 
advantaged in society.239 and b) they are attached to positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. The first part of the principle is known as 
the difference principle and the second part is referred to as the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity.   
In summary,  Rawls proposes principles of justice that regulate the social primary 
goods as follows: the first principle of justice guarantees the equal distribution of 
basic rights and liberties; the principle of fair equality of opportunity guarantees fair 
access to offices and positions of power to those with similar talents and ambitions; 
and finally, the difference principle, starting from a default position of equality in the 
distribution of economic goods, only allows departures from this status of equality 
when they benefit the worst off in society. In essence, the role of the difference 
principle is to regulate the socio-economic inequalities caused by the fact that 
individuals, despite the conditions set by the fair equality of opportunity (FEO) 
principle, do not have access to the same opportunities due to their different levels 
of natural talents.  
The introduction of the difference principle is Rawls’s way to address the failures of 
the FEO principle in dealing with the outcomes of differentials in natural talents. 
This formulation of the difference principle is rooted not in the belief that the 
distribution of natural talents is unjust but rather that the outcomes resulting from 
that distribution are undeserved. The difference principle expresses the 
responsibility citizens have in sharing in the profits and burdens resulting from 
different distributions in natural assets.  
Regulating inequalities in socio-economic goods in a way that they maximally 
benefit the worst off requires first, the identification of this worst off group and, 
second, the availability of a measure to make comparisons in the allocations of these 
goods. Rawls is aware that he needs to develop some kind of tool to be able to make 
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these comparisons. This comes in the form of an index of primary goods that enables 
him to make interpersonal comparisons of resource allocation and identify the 
worst off representative individual.  
The inclusion of social primary goods in this index is stipulated as follows: basic 
rights and liberties and fair equality of opportunity are assumed to be equally 
distributed amongst citizens.240 As per the principles of justice dictate, these social 
primary goods ought to be always equal leaving the rest (the powers and 
prerogatives of authority, income and wealth) open for distribution.  Believing that 
the powers and prerogatives coming from occupying positions of authority are 
strongly correlated with income and wealth, Rawls concludes that using these 
economic goods as proxies to evaluate how the lifetime expectations of individuals 
fare, provides an accurate enough measure. In other words, those individuals with 
the least income and wealth are likely to have fewer positions of power in society, 
and vice versa. Rawls claims that we can safely assume the following: 
"those with greater political authority, say, or those higher in institutional forms, 
are in general better off in other respects."241 
Interpersonal comparisons in the allocation of primary goods are then simplified by 
only using the shares of income and wealth as a proxy242. This being the case, when 
it comes to identifying the least advantaged individual, Rawls chooses the 
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representative group that, whilst still receiving an equal share of basic liberties and 
fair access to opportunities, has the least authority and lowest income; in other 
words, those belonging to the "income class with the lowest expectations."243  
Rawls’s political conception now is equipped with principles of justice that are 
egalitarian and reciprocal in nature. They are egalitarian in the protection that they 
afford to basic rights, liberties and access to opportunities. They are reciprocal in the 
way that those most talented and benefitting from social cooperation, give back 
through sharing in the benefits resulting from their superior talents. The reference 
point for these distributional demands is the least advantaged representative group 
in society. 
Now that we have an understanding of the basic workings of the Rawlsian 
distributive principles of justice as well as of the kinds of goods that they distribute, 
we are in a better position to explore how Rawls might deal with the inequalities 
arising from different cognitive talents. 
4.3.3 Dealing with inequalities caused by different distributions of genetic 
cognitive capacities under the Rawlsian framework: 
Applying the Rawlsian theory of justice to genetic cognitive talents seems to imply 
that attempts to address inequalities in socio-economic goods caused by disparities 
in their distribution will be the remit of the difference principle.  
Within a strictly unmodified Rawlsian framework this involves the redistribution of 
income and wealth, leaving the natural capacities of individuals unchanged. 
However, the focus that Rawls gives to income and wealth by appealing to their re-
distributable and measurable character may not be the only alternative in a world 
where scientific advances have made the modification of natural capacities a clear 
possibility. 
Recent scientific technologies offer Rawls the possibility of modifying the list of 
redistributable primary goods. Having the scientific means to alter cognition means 
that these technologies themselves have the potential to become a special kind of 
primary good, a primary good that changes our natural capacity for cognition. This 
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new primary good will be defined as all those genetic cognitive enhancements 
designed to augment our reasoning capacities or general fluid intelligence. 
4.4 Can genetic cognitive enhancements meet the conditions required of social 
primary goods? 
Throughout his writings, Rawls regards primary goods as those natural and socio-
economic goods found valuable in the citizen’s development of their two moral 
powers and in the successful pursuit of their conception of the good. 
First, it is worthwhile to briefly recapitulate and summarise  the Rawlsian primary 
goods and the principles of justice that apply to each category:244 
 
Table 1: The regulation of primary goods by the Rawlsian principles of justice: 
Social Primary Good Principle of Justice 
Basic rights and liberties  1st Principle of justice  
Opportunities (Freedom of 
movement and free choice of 
occupation against a background 
of diverse opportunities) 
2nd part of 2nd Principle of 
justice (FEO) 
Powers and prerogatives of 
offices and positions of authority 
and responsibility 
1st part of 2nd principle of justice 
(difference principle). Regulated 
via the re-distribution of income 
and wealth 
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Income and wealth (also used as 
proxy for powers, offices and 
positions) 
1st part of 2nd principle of justice 
(difference principle)  
Social bases of self-respect Regulated by the correct 
functioning of basic institutions 
according to the principles of 
justice 
 
How each of these goods is regulated within the basic structure is determined by the 
role that each has as either all-purpose goods in pursuing the citizens’ life plans or in 
the development of their moral powers. In this section I define each of these roles 
and evaluate whether genetic cognitive enhancements can be considered as suitable 
candidates to deliver them. 
4.4.1 Primary goods as necessary for the successful pursuit of a conception of 
the good. 
The premise I defend in this section is that the genetic cognitive enhancements I 
evaluate can be classed as all-purpose goods that enable citizens to advance their 
conception of the good which comprises a specific set of final ends and 
aspirations.245 Being able to advance and be successful in the pursuit of our goals 
and aspirations is, as previously mentioned, a higher order interest of all citizens 
and the role of the principles of justice is to ensure that the distribution of primary 
goods is such that this higher order interest is met.  
Since Rawls’s political conception is not committed to any comprehensive world 
view, primary goods will need to be valuable across most life plans developed within 
the permissible or reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by the individual.246 
Rawls views the just society as comprising a wide range of diverse, and often 
opposing, conceptions of the good that will be considered reasonable in so far as 
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they fit within the well-ordered society and are compatible with the principles of 
justice. The well-ordered society is defined by Rawls as one inhabited by citizens 
that publicly accept, agree and act upon the principles of justice247 Since primary 
goods are not designed to serve all conceptions of the good, only reasonable ones, I 
will refer to this requirement as the near-universality criterion. 
The lack of commitment to a particular comprehensive doctrine also requires that 
no particular view is either intentionally promoted nor discriminated by the 
political conception of justice. Simply put, this is intimately related to the near-
universality character of primary goods insofar as the choice of goods is not meant 
to favour any particular comprehensive doctrine. By adhering to the near-
universality condition, our choice of primary goods will, by default, also fulfil the 
neutrality criterion needed for the acceptability of the political conception. 
 4.4.1.1  Meeting the near-universality criterion 
Focusing on our reasoning capacities,  and the near-universality criterion,  the 
proposed genetic technologies will equip citizens with additional tools to enable 
them to further their chosen plans and goals.  These improvements to their cognitive 
capacities will be valuable whether their chosen path is of an intellectual, manual, 
aesthetic or religious nature. An astute critic can argue that these traits are only 
desirable in today’s modern western society. Their value may be questionable in 
other cultures more distant from western democratic societies such as the African 
Dassanech tribe where night-time crocodile hunting is essential in order to survive. 
For the Dassanechs, the most valued capacities are likely to be skills such as quick 
response reactions, strength, speed, better than average eyesight and, above all, 
courage! These will doubtless be very valued traits in a successful crocodile hunter, 
nevertheless, enhanced cognitive skills will contribute towards the success of the 
hunt. For example, better reasoning capacities may improve the tactics employed to 
identify the best places and timing for the hunt and the planning of their hunting 
techniques to enable them to "outwit" the crocodile and ultimately take the upper 
hand. Although this example is extreme and it helps to emphasize the usefulness of 
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these cognitive enhancements as primary goods, it is important to remind ourselves 
of the limited scope that Rawls envisaged for his theory of justice. The domain of his 
theory is that of "democratic societies under modern conditions"248 where pure 
hunter-gatherer subgroups of the population might not be found easily.  
Modern democracies will however encompass a wide range of lifestyles (even if we 
exclude crocodile hunting!). Some groups will value a life of mindfulness and 
meditation, maybe favouring cultural enrichment over the accumulation of capital 
and wealth or simply choosing a life of quiet enjoyment of the countryside. Regardless 
of their preferences, individuals are likely to benefit from cognitive skills that enable 
them to better plan and execute their preferred goals. The case of the “mendicant 
monk” spending his life in isolation surrounded by books and meditating is given by 
Samuel Freeman as an example249 that could be presented against the universality of 
the list of primary goods provided by Rawls.  In this case the foreseen objection is that 
income and wealth will be of no value for this type of contemplative life. A Rawlsian, 
Freeman argues, could easily fend off this objection with three simple arguments. 
First the concept of wealth in Rawls’s theory is suitably undefined and it includes 
things other than cold hard cash. The living quarters, library and the quiet 
surroundings that encourage meditation are also part of the wealth he enjoys. 
Therefore, it is the case that “some degree of wealth is instrumental to any person’s 
good.”250 Second, even if they decide to abjure all material possessions, the Rawlsian 
theory would not stop them from doing so. Citizens would be free to donate these 
goods to other causes important to them. Finally, Freeman believes that the fact that 
there is a possibility that at some point citizens might change or revise their life plans 
it might seem prudent to hang on to valuable resources that facilitate this change. 
When applied to cognitive enhancements, these counterexamples can be combatted 
by arguing that, even if we decided to genetically increase the intelligence of our 
future offspring, this would not confer them any disadvantage should they choose the 
life of the mendicant monk. Sarah Goering comes to this conclusion in her effort to 
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compare the decision to enhance a future child’s intelligence as opposed to, for 
example, increase their height. Whereas it seems that being tall could be even harmful 
in a world designed for short people (she describes a life of head bumping  and not 
fitting though doorframes), this is very different when the decision is to increase 
intelligence: 
“Presumably, improving intellectual capabilities would be desirable in any 
society, and having more of it in a society that is less intelligent would not result 
in any significant disadvantage.”251  
This near-universality criterion has also been used by other authors in their attempt 
to extend the list of Rawlsian primary goods.  In this line, Buchanan et al. define 
natural primary goods as “general purpose means, useful in carrying out virtually 
any plan of life.”252 In his work however, Buchanan is careful not to advocate the 
implementation of particular genetic enhancements unreservedly. The key for 
Buchanan is whether these potential primary goods will be broadly valuable across 
a wide range of life plans. He then proposes enhanced memory as an example of a 
capacity meeting this requirement claiming that substantially increasing the 
capacity for memory253 would result in improvements in people’s capacity to pursue 
most  life plans. Additionally, Buchanan also defines a “reasonable minimum level of 
education” as an all-purpose good valuable for the pursuit of most life plans 
provided by most democratic governments. This is reminiscent of Rawls’s own 
theory who supports the idea that governments should be committed to a provision 
of universal basic education in order to promote and protect opportunities. In a 
similar vein and, imagining that we would be able to prove that  similar universal 
benefits could be derived from genetic interventions, Buchanan writes: 
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 “if genetic interventions become possible that would prevent comparable harms 
or secure comparable benefits, they could also be justifiably encouraged or 
required by the state.”254  
Despite seemingly endorsing some valuable genetic interventions, Buchanan brings 
our awareness to the threat to value pluralism or diversity of the good  that failing to 
meet this near-universality criterion can bring: 
“What is regarded as a natural asset as opposed to a natural deficit and which 
natural assets are regarded as most valuable depend in part on what we assume 
to be a good human life.” 255 
The point raised by Buchanan highlights how choosing desirable traits may 
undermine the diverse range of values held across different cultural groups. The 
issue of how certain deeply held values might be weakened by the introduction of 
genetic interventions is perhaps best represented by a religious doctrine that 
considers genetic interventions as morally repugnant.  We can call this the “Playing 
God Argument” as previously presented in Chapter 3. Here we have a group of 
citizens adhering to a comprehensive religious doctrine that regards the genome 
modification of our offspring not only as unnecessary for the pursuit of their goals 
but also morally repugnant. In this case the near-universality response may not 
suffice to address the objections raised by the religious doctrine. Their worry rests 
on the nature of the good and on what it signifies, rather than the value that the 
goods might have for the pursuit and realisation of goals and life plans. Rawls might 
answer this objection by claiming there is no obligation to intervene in the genome 
of our offspring if this happens to go against our deeply held convictions. The 
protection given to the citizen’s basic rights and liberties means that genetic 
interventions would not at any point be compulsory and people should be able to 
freely choose whether or not to enhance their offspring. Similarly, an appeal to 
reasonableness would preclude any comprehensive doctrine from imposing their 
beliefs on other citizens. The limited scope of the political conception affects the 
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type of public discourse that can be offered to shape constitutional essentials.256 
Appealing to the creed and beliefs attached to our own comprehensive doctrine is 
not a permissible way of political justification. That is, whilst some citizens may find 
these interventions to be morally repugnant not only for themselves but for 
everyone, the principles of political justice would stop them from preventing others 
from using these interventions.  
Arguably, Rawls would have been aware that no comprehensive list of primary goods 
could have been developed that ultimately served the goals of all comprehensive 
world views. The fact that Rawls restricted the value of primary goods to most life 
plans betrays this worry. Holding out for the universal applicability of such goods 
could have derailed the development of his political conception altogether. This 
clearly highlights the difficulty of reaching a universal consensus on the good life and 
further complicates the choice of germline interventions.   
Before proceeding to assess the condition of neutrality, I shall address the related 
objection that intervening in our children’s genome in order to increase their 
cognitive capacities might hamper their range of opportunities. 
This objection is clearly linked to the autonomy concerns summarised in Chapter 3.  
Recall Joel Feinberg’s argument stating that our offspring’s autonomy rights are 
violated when we narrow or close their future options and respected when our 
actions are directed towards keeping these options open.257According to this view 
future children should be granted the right to “reach maturity with as many open 
options, opportunities and advantages as possible.”258 Before reaffirming the near-
universality quality of genetic cognitive enhancements, we need to make sure that 
this does not come at the expense of opportunity. The question then is whether 
increasing the reasoning capacities of children as proposed in this thesis will shrink 
the array of opportunities of our offspring.  
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Enhanced cognitive capacities, however, are likely to have the opposite effect.  
Increasing the fluid intelligence of future citizens can improve their capacity to 
evaluate available life plans and widen the access to alternative courses of actions 
that might not have been considered otherwise.  Furthermore, their problem solving 
skills could improve, helping them to overcome the hurdles that might have 
otherwise blocked potential career or job opportunities. Mianna Lotz’s259 response 
to concerns about limitations to the autonomy of future generations similarly 
defends the promotion of certain rational capacities for their role in the 
development of the child’s autonomy. Lotz has defended the view that "capacities of 
rational thought and self-control, and freedom from pathologies such as self-
deception" are internal "adequate conditions for a child’s emerging autonomy." 260 
As parents, Lotz claims, we have a positive duty to provide these conditions and 
therefore, to promote the autonomy of our offspring. Parents would fulfil this duty 
"by seeking to develop in their child the skills and capacities for information seeking, 
critical reflection, deliberative independence, and the like."261 In Lotz’s view the 
enhancement of these capacities will positively contribute towards their autonomy, 
understood as the ability to independently choose and strive towards achieving the 
goals and life plans future offspring choose to adopt.  
An alternative approach to avoid the open future objection, would be to increase the 
number of genetic enhancements available for parents to use rather than try to 
select a few that would fit the right criteria.262 More specifically, should all offspring 
benefit from ALL enhancing interventions there would be no issue of any 
opportunities being narrowed. Quite the opposite, the range of opportunities open 
to them would widen as we expand their range of natural talents.  
This could be a viable option if technological advances were safe and widely 
available, and if socio-economic resources were limitless. In this situation parents 
could provide their offspring with a wide range of enhanced capacities as long as 
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they did not pick and choose isolated specific interventions that had the potential to 
narrow their opportunities. This 'all or nothing' approach would mean that 
enhanced children, having received all available interventions, have the option to 
then choose to develop the capacity of their choosing. Their range of opportunities 
would not be prejudiced by being predisposed towards one particular capacity. The 
challenge of denying them an open future would then only arise when choosing one 
particular enhancement precluded another type of intervention.  
However, the circumstances of justice that motivated Rawls’s theory are found 
“whenever persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social 
advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity.”263 If unlimited resources would 
be accessible to everyone in society, it would negate the need for a theory of justice. 
Rawls puts this succinctly: “there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice.”264 
Limiting the scope of interventions to genetic cognitive enhancements addresses 
several concerns. First, it addresses the concern that some interventions might 
narrow the range of opportunities available to future offspring. Second, they will not 
only be valuable across most life plans, but also provide citizens with a wider range 
of opportunities to choose from. Finally, given the conditions of moderate scarcity, it 
presents a more realistic alternative than the option of providing all enhancements 
to future children in order to avoid hindering their opportunities.  
4.4.1.2  Meeting the neutrality criterion 
Rawls’s political conception of justice as fairness aimed to obtain the support of 
citizens holding a wide range of comprehensive doctrines. By narrowing the scope 
of his theory exclusively to the political sphere, he widened its appeal and therefore, 
its inclusivity. Guaranteeing the universal scope of his account of primary goods also 
implies that the chosen primary goods do not favour any particular comprehensive 
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doctrine and are therefore neutral across the different life plans that citizens are 
presumed to want.  
The best way perhaps to illustrate how our genetic cognitive enhancements meet 
the neutrality condition is to outline and contrast previous attempts to increase the 
list of Rawlsian primary goods. Dov Fox265 for instance, identifies short and long 
term memory, verbal and spatial reasoning  and a general cognitive capacity as 
suitable candidates to be included in his wide-ranging definition of natural primary 
goods. His aim is to extend Rawls’s idea of social primary goods classifying these 
traits as natural primary goods and defining these as “hereditable mental and 
physical capacities and dispositions that are valued across a range of projects and 
pursuits.”266 These natural capacities bear a clear similarity to the cognitive 
capacities that would be enhanced with the genetic technologies that I am here 
defending and could be considered near-universally valuable. However, not all 
natural capacities will have the same universal and neutral character.267 To illustrate 
this difference Fox goes on to provide examples of what he considers natural non-
primary goods. Capacities or traits such as sex, height, sociability and tonal pitch, 
loyalty, generosity, skin pigmentation and sexual orientation as such non-natural 
primary goods. These traits, according to Fox “may be advantageous or even 
indispensable for some or even many among the possible paths a child’s life could 
take, but for others might not be useful at all.”268 
I agree that it seems doubtful that some of these capacities will be neutral across 
most permissible rational life plans and conceptions of the good. For instance, if we 
take creativity or musical ability as examples, it is hard to see how these capacities 
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could be considered as natural primary goods in the Rawlsian sense or how 
technologies contributing towards their augmentation could be considered social 
primary goods, unless we chose a career dedicated to artistic pursuits and music. 
Furthermore, choosing those enhancements will not signal the kind of neutrality 
towards all possible life plans we need in the Rawlsian society. As Deena Davies 
highlights: 
 "Parents who go to great trouble to have a child with perfect pitch may find it 
very hard when the child spurns the piano for the basketball court.”269 
The same argument applies with regards to increased strength or speed, which 
seem to be particularly and almost exclusively suited to the development of athletic 
pursuits. 
Fritz Allhoff’s270 work presents another example of a Rawlsian inspired theory re-
affirming the moral permissibility of genetic enhancements to the extent that they 
augment primary goods or contribute to their augmentation.271 He believes that we 
should permit those interventions “if and only if” this condition is met.  According to 
the author, the genetic enhancements that have a role as primary goods or 
contribute to their augmentation are: improvements to health, increasing resistance 
to disease, improvements to eyesight, speed, strength, increases in mental acuity, 
mathematical and spatial reasoning, language faculties, creativity and musical 
abilities. On the other hand, Allhoff believes that other interventions that, from his 
point of view, would contribute towards creating designer babies, such as 
alterations to height, eye colour or gender selection are not morally permissible.  
Whilst the list that Allhoff provides is problematic in terms of near-universality and 
neutrality for the reasons previously presented, he is right in rejecting what he 
refers to as “designer babies” characteristics. Although he does not expand as to the 
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reasons why these designer baby interventions should be rejected, they clearly 
would not meet the criteria required of Rawlsian primary goods 
Explaining how the above interventions do not meet the universality and  neutrality 
criterion helps to clarify why and how genetic cognitive enhancements do not fall 
foul of these requirements. When we expand our enquiry to interventions that, 
although beneficial, may not be so across a wide range of life plans, we run the risk 
of making a judgment on which lives are worth pursuing and therefore, giving up on 
the neutrality requirement. This value judgment is at odds with the inclusive scope 
of the Rawlsian conception of justice. 
4.4.2 Primary goods essential for the successful development and exercise of the 
citizens’ two moral powers. 
This section defends the claim that the inclusion of the genetic cognitive 
enhancements outlined in this thesis, can, in their role as primary goods, effectively 
contribute towards the development and exercise of the citizen’s two moral powers. 
The importance that Rawls devotes to the development of a sense of justice and a 
capacity for a conception of the good as moral powers is grounded on the concept of 
citizens relating to one another as free and equal individuals. The ideas of freedom 
and equality are essential to the development of the Rawlsian theory of justice, since 
it is on this conception of the person as free and equal that primary goods and the 
principles that regulate them are chosen. 
In Political Liberalism Rawls writes: 
 “The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense 
of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of 
judgment, thought and inference connected with these powers), persons are free. 
Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully 
cooperating members of society makes persons equal.”272 
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Having the two moral powers makes persons free, having the powers at the 
requisite level to effectively function as citizens makes persons equal from a political 
perspective.  
Being free in the Rawlsian sense, however, has two distinct meanings that are 
relevant to their role in the political and social arenas. Citizens are free, first, in so 
far as they are entitled to make appropriate demands on the basic institutions so 
that they are able to fulfil their goals and advance their conception of the good;273 
second, in their ability to revise and adjust their conception of the good at any time 
so that “those ends can be pursued by the means they can reasonably expect to 
acquire in return for what they can reasonably expect to contribute.”274  This second 
interpretation of citizens as free makes them responsible for their own ends. The 
ends they are entitled to pursue, in turn, will be determined by their allocation of 
primary goods. Should this allocation of primary goods not match their expectations, 
citizens are expected to revise their ends rather than demand a higher share of 
primary goods. 
Similarly, persons are considered equal also in reference to their role as citizens. 
The equality of individuals stems from the recognition that everyone has an equal 
right to choose and assess the principles of justice that regulate the basic 
institutions.  
Since genetic cognitive enhancements, in their role as primary goods, need to be  
chosen and distributed in a manner that these powers are developed effectively, it is 
important to briefly clarify the Rawlsian definition of these powers and how they are 
supported by primary goods.  
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4.4.2.1  A sense of justice and the idea of reasonableness  
The first moral power presented by Rawls is the capacity for a sense of justice. 
Having this power equips citizens with the ability to understand, apply and act by 
the principles of justice. 
The sense of justice is closely related to the capacity for reasonableness. When 
citizens recognise and act from the principles of justice whilst also acknowledging 
that others have an equal claim in matters of justice they are said to be acting 
reasonably. Reasonableness also implies that citizens willingly abide by the terms of 
cooperation knowing that others will behave in the same way. It requires that we 
hold our own comprehensive doctrine without imposing it on anybody else, whilst 
expecting that our own view will be respected even if it is not shared by the other 
citizens. 
The assumption that citizens are reasonable or have a sufficient sense of justice has 
important implications for the stability275 of the Rawlsian society. For this reason, 
Rawls will go to great lengths to choose principles of justice that ensure that the 
appropriate primary goods are secured to enable the citizens to develop this moral 
power. 
Securing basic rights and liberties is deemed by Rawls to be essential for the 
development and exercise of the citizen’s sense of justice. In particular the 
protection of equal political liberties and freedom of speech and thought 
provide citizens with the tools to develop and exercise their sense of justice. These 
liberties are considered essential not only for enabling political participation but 
also for the application of the principles of justice in a free and informed manner276 
and judging, using our rationality, whether the basic institutions and the social 
policies generated by them are just.277 
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4.4.2.2  A capacity for a conception of the good and the idea of rationality 
Alongside this sense of justice, the citizens as normally functioning free and equal 
agents will also develop the second moral power, also known as the capacity for a 
conception of the good. This second moral power enables citizens to develop, pursue 
and revise their chosen ends, wanted for their own sake over a complete life. In 
contrast to the capacity for reasonableness, this moral power is closely related to the 
idea of persons as rational agents. A moral agent is considered to be rational by 
Rawls when he/she exercises  “powers of judgement and deliberation in seeking 
ends and interests peculiarly its own.”278 
The equal allocation of what Rawls refers to as civil liberties;  liberty of conscience,  
liberty of association and free choice of occupation is  protected by the first 
principle of justice. These liberties enable citizens to develop a capacity for a 
conception of the good and to exercise this power effectively.279  Their protection 
safeguards the citizens’ inviolable rights to hold their own beliefs, rights to 
expression, inquiry and association.  They also allow citizens not only to choose and 
rationally pursue their conception of the good280 but also to change this plan or 
choose a different one if/when they think it is appropriate. 
Being able to hold the views we consider valuable, whether these are moral, 
religious, or philosophical is non-negotiable for Rawls because of their impact on 
our ability to lead the life we want within our chosen comprehensive view. 
Combining these rights with the fundamental freedom of association also  enshrined 
within the political liberties, allows citizens to successfully join groups or 
associations and hence engage in social cooperation. These rights are essential for 
example for the exercise of our chosen religion, engaging in fruitful employment and 
the exercise of our political rights in a safe setting without fear of being prosecuted 
or marginalised.  
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4.4.2.3  The use of genetic cognitive enhancements for the development of the two 
moral powers 
Supplementing the discussion of the appropriate primary goods for the exercise and 
development of the two moral powers,  Rawls seems to suggest a third power 
needed for the exercise of these two moral powers. Although he doesn’t devote 
much time to this in his writings, he asserts that  “intellectual powers of judgment, 
thought and inference” are also required. Likewise, in Justice as Fairness Rawls adds 
that the development and exercise of the judicial virtues of impartiality and 
judiciousness, as excellences of our moral sense of justice, requires intellect and the 
powers of reason and imagination281:  
“These powers involve intellect and imagination, the capacity to be impartial and 
to take a wider and more inclusive view, as well as a certain sensitivity to the 
concerns and circumstances of others”  
These capacities seem to correlate well to the technologies designed to enhance the 
capacities linked to our fluid intelligence.  Furthermore,  the above passage suggests 
that these capacities could be considered valuable for the development of the two 
moral powers. In Rawls’s view these capacities are present in individuals at different 
levels, with differences in the above minimum required to be a fully cooperating 
member of society. 
Looking first at the sense of justice, these varying natural cognitive capacities 
together with the genetic interventions to augment them can contribute to their 
development in a number of ways. As Rawls points out, the judgements that citizens 
make, guided by both their capacity for reason and their sense of justice will vary. 
Some judgements will apply to the basic structure and how effectively this is ruled 
by the principles of justice, whereas some others will apply to the particular actions 
and character of fellow citizens. When judging the basic structure of society, an 
increased ability to reason and assimilate the detailed and often complex details of 
constitutional laws might enable citizens to better assess whether the protection 
given to basic rights and liberties is sufficient. This improved understanding will 
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lead citizens to be more or less willing to endorse the principles of justice and 
perhaps push for amendments of constitutional changes through political 
participation, and to judge theirs and other people’s preferences and outcomes as 
fair or unfair. The higher our level of reasoning skills the better the assessment we 
will be able to make of both the principles of justice ruling the basic structure and 
the social policies that emanate from them. Similarly, at the level of their 
relationship with fellow citizens, they will be in a better position to assess the 
validity of the claims each of them makes on justice grounds. These claims will have 
to be restricted to the jurisdiction of political justice and only insofar as they affect 
their status as citizens in their exercise of their two moral powers.   
Secondly, the capacity for a conception of the good may also be affected by these 
newly enhanced capacities.  In particular the improvement of information 
processing involved in decision making may help citizens evaluate and revise, if 
needed, which life plan is the best to pursue given their allocation of primary goods, 
hence using this allocation in the best possible way.  
Thirdly, the development of both moral powers faces a further difficulty which is 
brought by a characteristic intrinsic to pluralistic societies. This is what Rawls calls 
the burdens of judgement. These burdens of judgment are defined as the obstacles 
we face when we exercise our powers of reason in our ordinary and political lives 
being influenced by our social background, particular life experiences, upbringing, 
professional occupation and the evidence  available to us when assessing often 
complex moral and political values. These obstacles will also affect how each of us, 
within our own comprehensive doctrine, will answer questions of religion, morality 
and philosophy.  
Amongst the factors that constitute these burdens of judgment, we find that three of 
them directly relate to the barriers to reasoning and reaching a consensus between 
individuals.282 Rawls defines these as the difficulties faced when assessing and 
evaluating complex evidence, the different priority and weight that people give to 
relevant considerations, and the vagueness linked to all our concepts. A fourth 
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hurdle relates to how our set of values is determined by our own unique experiences 
which will inevitably differ from those of other citizens.  The fifth burden identified 
by Rawls highlights how differently people value moral and political values 
differently. Finally Rawls acknowledges that, notwithstanding the plurality of values 
existing in society, social institutions will only be able to choose a limited set of 
“cherished values” within its limited scope.283   
According to Rawls these burdens of judgement are particularly relevant in the 
evaluation of political rulings, due to their inherent level of complex and conflictive 
nature of the issues they commonly address and the fact that available evidence is 
often vague. 
Whether these burdens of judgements can or cannot be overcome may have 
implications to the weight that Rawls gives to reasonable pluralism in his political 
conception. Rawls considered that the burdens of judgement were an indisputable 
fact that gave rise to the pluralism characteristic of modern democratic societies. As 
such, the existence of the burdens of judgements are a consequence of the co-
existence of often incompatible comprehensive world views. Citizens holding 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines face limits on the kind of thing they are able 
to justify to one another. Their convergence on issues relating to their own 
comprehensive doctrines is often very limited. Therefore, agreement on laws 
regulating the basic structure cannot be sought by appealing to any one 
comprehensive doctrine unless we are willing to impose our view by force. For this 
reason, the level of justification is restricted to questions of political justice.   
Despite the difficulties that pluralism may cause in reaching a unanimous political 
consensus, Rawls cherishes this type of diversity in his liberal conception of justice 
and, having considered that the burdens of judgement are part and parcel of 
embracing pluralism, he argues that public debate needs to only apply to political 
reasons. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the possibility of enhancing cognition can be 
particularly relevant to the three burdens of judgement that relate to our reasoning 
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and consensual ability. Possessing a higher level of fluid intelligence and being able 
to better resolve problems, for example, might help us to better evaluate diverse and 
often incomplete evidence. We will be able to better break down the evidence 
presented to us into more manageable components, analyse more comprehensively, 
and identify the information gaps that might stop us from deciding between 
different moral and political judgements. We might also be in a better position to 
recognise the characteristics that make-up a reasonable comprehensive doctrine as 
well as reject those political views that would not be shared by free and equal 
citizens.  
It is important to note that these potential impacts on the burdens of judgements are 
here only presented as a potential consequence of the introduction of genetic 
cognitive enhancements. A more detailed analysis of the epistemic component of 
reasoning would need to be undertaken before making any final assertions. Should 
we assume that the effect on the burdens of judgement does indeed happen as 
described above, the Rawlsian theorist might need to consider the following 
implications. First, the fixed and unchangeable character of the burdens of 
judgements may need to reviewed. In this way the limits of practical reason set by 
the existence of the burdens of judgments can be made more manageable, hence 
reaching a broader consensus for the political conception. Although, the burdens of 
judgement are unlikely to ever be eliminated due to the individual’s life experience 
and the different force of other normative considerations, we might find that more 
convergence between individual comprehensive doctrines is achieved.  Second, 
having realised that there is more common ground between different conceptions 
than originally thought possible, the area of consensus between individuals can be 
expanded beyond the political arena. Arguably this might lead to a more harmonious 
society having a positive effect on the stability of society over time. 
The role of these cognitive enhancements in the positive development of the two 
moral powers shows how the Rawlsian thinker would not object to their 
incorporation into the framework. However, whether the Rawlsian theory requires 
the help of these capacities to strengthen the development of these moral powers is 
another question altogether, and one that will need to be addressed in order to 
complete this discussion.  
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4.4.2.3.1 – A sufficient level of moral powers  – Genetic cognitive enhancements not 
needed for the development of the two moral powers 
Regardless of the contribution that genetic cognitive enhancements can make to the 
development of the two moral powers there is a powerful counterargument rooted 
on the very conception of the Rawlsian person.  
All along, Rawls maintained that the two moral powers only need to be developed to 
a sufficient level for free and equal citizens to operate as fully cooperating members 
of society. This is working on the assumption that people function at a “normal” level 
without any deficits in cognitive capacities. The technologies here proposed will 
augment cognition taking it above the level that Rawls does not consider necessary 
for individuals to fulfil their role as citizens. Since we can assume that those basic 
capacities are met by all citizens, the responsibility of the basic institutions is solely 
that of providing the general all-purpose means to "train and educate their (the 
citizens’) basic capabilities."284   
These all-purpose means, apart from the basic rights and liberties, will include a 
general provision of basic education.  The provision of education in Rawls’s political 
conception is briefly explained in Political Liberalism as follows: 
 “Society’s concern with their education lies in their role as future citizens, and so 
in such essential things as their acquiring the capacity to understand the public 
culture and to participate in its institutions, in their being economically 
independent and self-supporting members of society over a complete life, and in 
their developing the political virtues, all this from within a political point of 
view.”285  
The essential components of the basic education that Rawls refers to in the above 
passage is circumscribed to the role of children as future citizens. It will equip 
children with an understanding of the constitutional rights and liberties and their 
protection as well as a grasp of the economic structures that distribute socio-
economic goods and it will encourage the development of the political virtues 
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associated with a sense of justice. In addition to this, the provision of basic education 
will contribute to the citizens becoming economically self-sufficient, fully 
cooperating members of society.286 The kind of education that Rawls has in mind 
will also have a role in the cultivation of the reasoning skills needed for the effective 
exercise of their sense of justice and capacity for a conception of the good.  
Although I concede that these cognitive enhancements will not be required from a 
Rawlsian perspective if the normal functioning hypothesis is accepted, they still 
positively contribute towards their development. Consequently, even though they 
are not needed, they could still be deemed permissible from a Rawlsian perspective.  
Furthermore, it seems that there could still be a role for these interventions within 
the Rawlsian framework, not dissimilar to that given to education. This role could be 
considered to be complementary in the sense that the introduction of genetic 
cognitive interventions could "enhance" the outputs achieved through education. 
Providing citizens with improved unrealised cognition is likely to mean that the 
realisation of these capacities via education is improved. Furthermore, if we accept 
that an increase in natural talents (other things being equal) means that lesser 
training or educational resources are needed to achieve equally good results287, the 
introduction of cognitive enhancements might result in a more efficient use of 
educational resources. This improvement in the realisation of capacities through 
education can be defined as the “efficiency argument” in that offering these 
interventions alongside education to better train the citizens in the exercise of their 
moral powers will, arguably, result in better outputs with the same level of 
educational resources. Under this efficiency argument,  we might find that, in time, 
the provision of genetic cognitive enhancements alongside education  is the best 
way to develop the citizen’s two moral powers.   
Should the efficiency argument not hold, there is an additional argument to 
incorporate these technologies as potentially valuable as primary goods within the 
Rawlsian framework. Rawls did not include all primary goods as valuable for the 
                                                        
286 Ibid. Page 199 
287 Kollar, E., and Loi, M. (2015). "Prenatal equality of opportunity." Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
32(1), 35-49. Page 38 
  
114 
development and exercise of the two moral powers. Whilst basic liberties were 
specially earmarked for this purpose, the role of income and wealth was limited to 
the actual realisation of these moral powers288 and the advancement of the citizen’s 
chosen ends. Economic resources, in Rawls’s view may not contribute to the 
development of our moral powers. However they will impact on the citizen’s ability 
to engage in political participation and successfully pursue their chosen life plan.  
This chapter has shown how these cognitive technologies can help the actual 
exercise of these powers and the pursuit of goals belonging to a wide range of 
comprehensive doctrines.  Therefore, even if we accept that these enhancements are 
not necessary for the development and exercise of the moral powers, enough 
conditions are met to warrant their inclusion as primary goods.  
4.5 Genetic cognitive enhancements and the index of primary goods 
Even when we accept that the genetic cognitive enhancements I have evaluated 
meet the conditions required of primary goods,  there is one further stumbling block 
that might prevent us from treating these interventions as such.  To successfully 
cement their suitability as primary goods I need to demonstrate that the Rawlsian 
index of primary goods offers the required flexibility and can be modified to 
incorporate these new goods. 
4.5.1  A modifiable Rawlsian Index 
Amartya Sen289 criticised the Rawlsian index of primary goods for not addressing 
the fact that citizens had different capabilities to convert those goods into actual 
utility. In particular, Sen’s criticism revolves around the disadvantage experienced 
by individuals functioning below the normal level and how they need more socio-
economic resources to achieve the same level of utility or wellbeing.  
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Rawls had always insisted on the necessity to avoid these hard cases in order to 
develop his theory. If he succeeded in demonstrating that the principles of justice 
and their applicability worked for normally functioning citizens, then further work 
could be done to extend the theory and deal with those hard cases. Nonetheless, in 
response to Sen’s criticism, he devoted a section in Justice as Fairness, A restatement 
to discuss and introduce a degree of flexibility in the index of primary goods that 
would address the citizens’ “differences in needs arising from illness and accident 
over the course of a complete life”290.  
The key relevant point of the flexibility granted to the index of primary goods with 
regard to the question whether genetic cognitive enhancements could be included is 
the acknowledgement that this index is not fully specified. Moreover, it has a 
provisional character at the point when the principles of justice and the primary 
goods they regulate are chosen. The development of Rawls’s conception of justice 
follows a four stage procedure,291 beginning with the selection of the principles of 
justice themselves. The initial choice of the regulatory principles of the Rawlsian 
society is made under conditions that avoid the biased effect of morally arbitrary 
factors.  At this initial stage, the particular native talents and social conditions of the 
individuals are ignored. Based on the widely held moral intuitions of modern 
democratic society, a general and broadly unspecified set of principles and primary 
goods is drawn up. The second stage sets out the constitutional grounds, granting 
protection to the basic rights and liberties of citizens using as a guide both the 
principles of justice and the socio-economic circumstances of the particular society. 
The third stage involves the enactment of laws and socio-economic policies where 
the application of the difference principle and protection of opportunities is 
regulated alongside a definite list of social primary goods. The list of primary goods 
might be extended taking into account the cultural and economic conditions of 
society when these are fully known. The fourth and final stage consists of the 
application of laws and policies to particular individual cases. Considering the 
individual circumstances of citizens and how rules must be applied to particular 
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cases, defines the final stage of the Rawlsian conception.  At this stage, Rawls 
incorporates some flexibility on the applicability of the principles of justice 
particularly with regards to distributive questions of socio-economic goods. 
The subsequent fuller content of the index of primary goods will then be finalised at 
this legislative stage taking into account this richer set of information regarding the 
different social conditions as well as the various personal goods and services the 
government provides for citizens. This will inevitably also affect the weight given to 
each primary good within that index. Rawls uses the possibility to revise the index at 
legislative stage as an opportunity to consider the possibility of incorporating some 
healthcare provision as a way of addressing Sen’s objection.  Although Rawls 
recognises that this does not fully solve the issue of those persons with “grave 
disabilities”,292 he introduces the prospect for the modification of the index to allow 
situations where “citizens may be seriously ill or suffer from severe accidents from 
time to time”293.  
An index of primary goods is not viewed as rigid but rather as indicative of the sorts 
of the things that people value in societies regarded as just. As Rawls himself claims: 
 “This indeterminacy in the theory of justice is not in itself a defect. It is what we 
should expect.”294  
The flexibility offered by Rawls’s conception of justice is in line with the possible 
range of societal arrangements that can accommodate the principles of justice and  
helps to address Sen’s concerns about the unsuitability of the list of primary goods. 
Furthermore, this acknowledged flexibility opens the door towards the introduction 
of genetic cognitive enhancements into the index.  
4.5.1.1  Incorporating genetic cognitive enhancements into the index of primary goods  
The consideration of healthcare as a potential primary good provides a sample case 
as to how Rawls is prepared to deal with any extensions to the index of primary 
goods. Unlike the genetic cognitive enhancements, however, basic healthcare has the 
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function of restoring citizens to normal functioning whenever it is required. The 
incorporation of genetic enhancements assumes an already normally functioning 
level taking the individual beyond normality. 
Although the baseline level from which both healthcare and genetic interventions 
operate is different, the arguments already proposed for considering genetic 
cognitive enhancements as primary goods are still sound.  Since our chosen 
technologies have been shown to meet the requirements needed of primary goods in 
the same way that income and wealth do, this I believe is enough justification to at 
least recognise the possibility or even desirability for cognitive genetic interventions 
to be added to the index of primary goods at the constitutional stage.  
At this constitutional stage there would be a recognition that the bundle of primary 
goods for each individual, subject to the inequalities permitted by the difference 
principle, should include genetic cognitive interventions. This overall bundle of 
primary goods would include an equal share of basic rights and liberties but the 
genetic cognitive enhancements, powers, offices, authority and wealth and income 
could vary in their allocation. At this point, genetic cognitive enhancements are 
simply additional components of an index designed to make interpersonal 
comparisons, to identify the least advantaged members of society and ultimately 
evaluate the permissibility of any potential socio-economic inequalities. Being the 
recipient or not of genetic cognitive enhancements will be another factor that needs 
to be taking into account to identify the worst off representative group, and to make 
interpersonal comparisons in the distribution of socio-economic goods. 
The variation between all types of goods and how they compare in value against one 
another is something to be decided at the legislative stage. One of the options to be 
considered could be the application of different weights to the worth of these 
technologies relative to the other goods making up the index of primary goods. This 
approach is inspired by the aggregative resource principle whereby, the bundles of 
primary goods across citizens will be equal overall, although variations in the 
composition of those bundles would be permissible.295 
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Applying weights might however add a level of complexity that Rawls was keen to 
avoid in the formulation and applicability of his principles.  Rawls’s solution to the 
weight problem was to use income and wealth as a rough indicator of the overall 
aggregative value of the index. It is not clear how we would better Rawls’s solution 
and systematically rank or weight all the different goods within the index. Besides, 
requiring a clear estimation of the value allocated to each of the goods 
independently, would also require careful thinking about how each of the goods 
relates and interact with one another.  For instance, it might not be easy to establish 
how genetic cognitive enhancements correlate with powers and prerogatives of 
office or to what degree being able to access these technologies results in a 
strengthening of the social bases of self-respect. Holding positions of authority 
might affect our self-respect in a very different way to our family background, 
emotional capacities or peer influence (to name a few). The fact that these new 
technologies are in the very early stages of development adds another layer of 
difficulty with regards to their measurability. This issue will remain challenging at 
the very early stage of implementation when their effectiveness may be hard to 
establish.  
Once these genetic technologies are available,  we will also need to decide whether 
their value is to be determined, for example, by a market price system or whether 
we should instead measure the levels of utility they generate.  In time we might have 
access to information regarding their efficacy. This might then generate information 
about the real effect of these technologies and how they translate from mere 
potentialities to actual talents resulting in an improvement in the life prospect of 
individuals. Both the market value and utility measurement approaches have their 
difficulties and often rely on the type of value judgements about welfare that Rawls 
has always tried to avoid.   
A more suitable alternative to avoiding falling into a perfectionist valuation of these 
technologies might be through the assessment of achieved milestones. These might 
include gaining a University degree, a doctorate, tenure post at a university or 
gaining skilled employment in open competition, to name a few. I believe that this is 
what Rawls would have had in mind when he talked about realised native 
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endowments and how they might be used to identify the least advantaged 
representative group: 
“Thus this group includes persons whose family and class origins are more 
disadvantaged than others, whose natural endowments (as realized) permit 
them to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the course of life turn out to 
be less happy, all within the normal range (as noted below) and with the relevant 
measures based on social primary goods.”296 
It does seem like the kind of achievements resulting from the introduction of genetic 
interventions could play a valuable role in the assessment of the lifetime shares of 
individuals. However, the exact effect measure of these technologies would be very 
hard to establish even if we are able to isolate the many confounding factors that 
might have contributed to the achievement of these milestones. 
All these approaches to put a weight and value to these new technologies seem to 
encounter the measurability problem that Rawls wished to avoid in order to keep 
his political conception simple and workable. In Justice as Fairness, A Restatement,  
Rawls indicated that measurability was one of key factors that stopped him from 
considering extending the list of primary goods to include realised natural talents in 
the index: 
 "If necessary we can also include in the index realised native endowments and 
even states of consciousness like physical pain. However, for the sake of having an 
objective measure and relying on information that is readily available and easy 
to comprehend it is much better not to include such goods in the index."297  
Reinforcing his requirement for simplicity, Rawls is reluctant to make the list of 
primary goods longer than necessary: 
"What is crucial is that in introducing these further goods we recognize the limits 
of the political and practicable: first, we must stay within the limits of justice as 
fairness as a political conception of justice that can serve as the focus of an 
overlapping consensus; and second, we must respect the constraints of simplicity 
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and availability of information to which any practicable political conception (as 
opposed to a comprehensive moral doctrine) is subject." 298 
Notwithstanding the seemingly puzzling issue of measurability and the need for 
simplicity, I have shown in this section how the index of primary goods provides the 
necessary flexibility for the incorporation of these technologies. Perhaps the 
simplest answer to the issues presented by the proposed extension of primary 
goods is to follow Rawls’s guidance. This would involve addressing the 
measurability problem by using wealth and income as proxies to measure the 
relative allocations between individuals and the position of the worst off 
representative groups. Although I have offered a number of alternatives for 
weighing these new technologies,  these do not present an easily implementable 
solution to the measurability problem, partly caused by the little available  
knowledge about the interventions themselves. I do not attempt to argue for any 
specific system, my aim is merely one of showing there could in time be some 
objective measure that will enable the appropriate adjustment of the index of 
primary goods.299  
4.6 Conclusion 
Differences in natural talents have an impact on the life prospects of individuals. 
This impact has been recognised by liberal egalitarian theories, for example, in the 
Rawlsian political conception of justice as fairness.  
Having analysed the role that natural capacities in general play in the development 
of the Rawlsian theory, this chapter examined whether there is room for considering 
the influence of reasoning skills or fluid intelligence in people’s lives and 
incorporating this into this framework. It was shown that these capacities are 
morally arbitrary from the viewpoint of justice, but that the inequalities caused by 
them will need to be addressed as a matter of justice 
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New technological advances in genetics provide us with the tool to modify these 
natural capacities and therefore to increase the cognitive levels of individuals.  
These technologies were shown to qualify as primary goods in terms of their value 
as all-purpose means for the pursuit of a wide variety of ends. These genetic 
cognitive enhancements were shown to meet the near-universality criteria and to be 
neutral across different and opposing comprehensive views without committing to 
any particular comprehensive doctrine. Moreover, they have the potential to widen 
the range of opportunities available to individuals.  
Even though they are not considered necessary for the development and exercise of 
the two moral powers, their positive contribution, the fact that they might 
contribute to them provides an additional argument for their permissibility.   
Having explored their feasibility as social primary goods, I contended that the 
Rawlsian index is flexible enough to allow for the introduction of these goods. 
Despite concerns about their measurability, the index provides the flexibility 
required to incorporate these technologies. Whilst wealth and income can continue 
to be used as proxy measure to assess the individual's lifetime shares of social 
goods, genetic cognitive enhancements have now been added to the list of Rawlsian 
primary goods. These technologies will help to make interpersonal comparisons, to 
identify the least advantaged members of society and, ultimately, to be part of the 
process to assess permissible inequalities in socio-economic shares       
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Chapter 5. Genetic cognitive enhancements and their potential 
negative impact on social justice 
Having shown that genetic cognitive enhancements are suitable candidates to 
become Rawlsian primary goods, the next step is to explore whether the principles 
of justice themselves may be compromised by the introduction of these goods. Allen 
Buchanan300 believes that the real challenge associated with these newly emerging 
technologies is to ensure widespread access to innovation. Restricted access can 
lead to fears about increases in socio-economic inequalities, limited access to jobs 
and positions of responsibilities and a potential erosion of the rights and liberties of 
the unenhanced class. This has been referred to as “the diffusion problem”301 and it 
commonly applies to new expensive biotechnologies. The diffusion problem arises 
when new injustices are created through the limited or slow diffusion of innovations 
to the least advantaged. This problem of limited access is thought to create 
unacceptable advantages in economic, social cooperation or even political power for 
those wealthy enough to afford these new technologies. 
My analysis begins with an assessment of the effect that these technologies may 
have on the citizens' civil and personal liberties caused by limited access to genetic 
cognitive enhancements. I explore how the basic rights and liberties of those unable 
to access these technologies might be eroded by the enhanced population due to the 
increased political and economic power derived from their superior cognition.  The 
potential effect that these technologies can have in the competitive jobs and 
positions available to the unenhanced citizens is explored as is the effect the 
creation of an increasingly uneven playing field can have in the acquisitions of socio-
economic shares. 
These objections are each addressed from a Rawlsian perspective as I evaluate how 
the political conception governed by the Rawlsian principles of justice is able to ease 
the concerns emanating from the introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements.  
The social justice objections caused by the “diffusion problem” can be avoided in a 
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well-ordered society regulated by principles of justice that give priority to the 
protection of basic rights and liberties and ensures the fair value of political 
liberties. The FEO principle forbids discrimination on access to positions based on 
the enhanced status of individuals. The position of the FEO will also be strengthened 
with an extension that I call the "formal equality of access to genetic cognitive 
enhancements principle", requiring that no legal barriers are created to stop 
citizens from accessing these technologies. The potential socio-economic 
inequalities caused by these new interventions will need to be such that they are to 
the maximum benefit of the worst off.  The priority given to FEO over the difference 
principle demands the avoidance of excessive wealth accumulation in the hands of 
the few resulting in a loss of opportunities for the worst off. 
Having addressed any potential concerns from a Rawlsian perspective I outline how 
the introduction of genetic cognitive enhancement working alongside the provision 
of public education can potentially strengthen the work done by the FEO principle. 
Next, I distinguish my account from two other attempts to extend Rawls’s theory of 
justice. First, I show how my account is related to Norman Daniels’ defence of a 
Rawlsian version of the FEO principle regulating access to healthcare. Second, I 
compare my Rawlsian defence of the introduction of genetic cognitive 
enhancements to Colin Farrelly’s “lax genetic (or biological) difference principle” 
and his proposal to regulate inequalities in the distribution of biological capacities to 
realise natural primary goods.302 I will show that both accounts require substantial 
changes to the Rawlsian framework and are not able to adequately address the 
introduction of technologies that take citizens beyond the normal level of 
functioning. Unlike these accounts, my proposal to incorporate genetic cognitive 
enhancements in Rawlsian theory remains faithful to the Rawls's set of 
specifications for his liberal political conception.  
The chapter concludes that a well-ordered society governed by Rawlsian principles 
of justice can permit the introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements. The 
holistic application of the two principles will prevent the unjust consequences that 
critics fear. Moreover, the voluntary uptake of these technologies may contribute 
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towards meeting the goals of Rawlsian justice by broadening the range of 
opportunities open to citizens and increasing the social product available for 
distribution. 
5.1 The introduction of cognitive enhancements and the threat it poses to the 
basic rights and liberties  
This thesis has already explained how the first principle of justice is designed to 
protect a fully adequate scheme or set of equal basic rights and liberties, which 
includes political liberties, such as the freedom to vote and participate in politics, 
freedom of association, freedom of thought and speech, liberty of conscience, the 
integrity of the person, both physical and psychological, and the rule of law. These 
were given special protection by Rawls, ensuring that they took priority over 
considerations of FEO and the distribution of socio-economic goods. The special 
status of these liberties was granted because of their distinct contribution to the 
development and exercise of the individual’s two moral powers, which are central to 
the conception of the person as a fully cooperating member of society. By 
safeguarding the basic liberties, a well-ordered society provides the political and 
social conditions to enable citizens to assess the justice of the basic structure and 
develop and pursue their own conception of the good. 
This section explores how the basic rights and liberties of the unenhanced class may 
be at risk. First, I suggest that limited access to these technologies may give rise to 
grave genetic and economic inequalities that distort the balance in political and 
economic power in society, leading to the erosion of the basic rights and liberties of 
the unenhanced. Second, another threat might come from a paternalistic 
government that enforces these enhancements in an attempt to avoid genetic 
inequalities.  
The goal of this section is to disentangle these arguments before proceeding to 
explore whether they can be combated from a Rawlsian perspective. 
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5.1.1 Paving the way towards the erosion of the basic rights and liberties of 
citizens -  The emergence and widening of genetic and economic 
inequalities. 
In order to illustrate how the introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements can 
compromise the citizen’s basic rights and liberties, let us consider the following 
scenario:  
Access to genetic cognitive enhancements in a democratic society is unregulated, 
leaving its distribution to the workings of a free market economy. The acquisition of 
these goods will hence depend on the purchasing power of those wishing to acquire 
them. At this stage, an unrestricted distribution leads to the potential creation of a 
genetic gap between the haves and the have-nots.  
The germline nature of these interventions means that these genetic differences are 
potentially permanent and will be passed from one generation to another, forever 
perpetuating the genetic inequalities between individuals.  These changes to the 
genome may lead to the emergence of a new genetically enhanced class with 
superior cognitive powers that enables them to dominate the unenhanced. Drawing 
inspiration from the problems faced in the US by the restricted access to expensive 
medical care, Leon Kass provides us with a stark warning: 
 “(if) only the wealthy and privileged will be able to gain easy access to costly 
enhancing technologies, we might expect to see an ever-widening gap between 
“the best and the brightest” and the rest”.303   
Kass is one of the most vocal opponents of genetic enhancements and headed the 
team charged with the creation of a report on enhancement technologies 
commissioned by the (now defunct) President’s Council on Bioethics.304 This report 
advises that extreme caution is needed when considering genetic enhancements 
since they will lead to a slippery slope of ethically dubious interventions that are 
bound to exacerbate existing social inequalities. Their concern is that human 
enhancement technologies will, at least in the beginning, only be available to those 
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able to afford them. Since these will be the people who are already benefiting from 
existing social inequalities, the limited access to newly emerging biomedical 
technologies will only widen the gap between those more fortunate and those who 
already suffer distinct disadvantages from increasing disparities in wealth and 
status305. 
This line of thought is developed by dystopian thinkers such as Maxwell Mehlman 
and Lee Silver who take Kass’s concerns even further and speculate that such 
interventions may lead to the creation of a form of genetic class system. Mehlman 
wrote about a type of genetic aristocracy (genobility) 306 where wealth, privilege and 
power are concentrated, and Silver warned us about the “GenRich”, a genetically 
enhanced class with control over positions of power and the economy who would 
inevitably use the unenhanced class (naturals) as a workforce to further generate 
economic gains for their benefit alone.307 This exemplifies a dystopian extreme that 
sees the unenhanced part of the population at risk of being manipulated by the 
enhanced minority. 
Whether we accept that this restricted access may eventually lead to a new class or 
not, it seems inevitable that the cognitively enhanced will at least enjoy better 
chances in gaining offices and positions of power to some degree. The enhancement 
of these capacities is likely to lead to a concentration of wealth and income amongst 
the enhanced, resulting in access to better opportunities and a greater share of 
economic goods.308  
A potential consequence of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few is the 
potential erosion of people’s rights and liberties. This concern has been raised by 
authors such as Buchanan, Cole and Keohane, who highlighted how the distribution 
of innovations in general is a concern of justice because of their impact on our ability 
to engage in social cooperation as full members of society: 
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“when powerful innovations do not diffuse widely but are only available to some, 
this creates opportunities for domination and exclusion.”309  
This domination and exclusion will emanate from a type of society populated by 
“enhanced co-operators” able to take part in rich, complex and highly productive 
interactions with one another whilst the unenhanced population can only engage in 
a “minimally competent way”.310 These enhanced co-operators may eventually have 
the necessary skills and economic power to manipulate and control the basic 
institutions so that the distribution of political and personal rights and liberties 
works in their favour.  
The conflation of wealth and political power in Europe was infamously present in 
Italy under Silvio Berlusconi who held the presidential post whilst at the same time 
being the richest man in the country.311 Furthermore, the historical link between 
wealth and political power shows how easily the political elite can be perpetuated 
over time. Examples of this lasting power can be found in some wealthy American 
dynasties, such as the Rockefeller or Carnegie families with their political influence 
being felt from the late 19th and still having a major role in shaping education policy 
in the United States.312 The germline nature of cognitive interventions might make it 
even harder to break this transfer of economic and political power from one 
generation to another.  
The control over the basic rights and liberties of the unenhanced can be exerted in a 
number of ways. An example can be seen in the use of political lobbying which 
enables people to further their own agenda. It is not unusual that those with the 
right skills and sufficient money dedicate their time to petitioning and influencing 
politicians for particular causes by shaping ideology or funding political parties that 
strongly align with their own interests. The result, in some cases, is that policies are 
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developed in a way so that the basic structure of society is governed without the 
input of those with fewer economic resources leading to the eventual 
marginalisation of the interests of those who need most support in society.  
This gradual undermining of the basic rights and liberties of the less well off may be 
compounded by the growing reluctance of those with fewer genetic and economic 
resources to make effective use of the formal rights that they still have. Feeling 
betrayed by society, citizens are left wondering whether it is still worthwhile for 
them to carry out the civic activities that might lead to an improvement of their 
position in society. Suspecting that the system is rigged in favour of the privileged 
class, they stop exercising their right to vote or participate in political debate. In 
short, their sense of political efficacy has been damaged in a way that they stop 
being part of the democratic process. The reason we care about political efficacy is 
because it directly affects how and whether citizens make use of their political 
rights. This idea was first introduced in the 1950s by Campbell et al.313 when 
investigating the reasons and motivations behind people’s political involvement: 
“The sense of political efficacy may be defined as the feeling that individual 
political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e. 
that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that political 
and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in 
bringing about this change.”314  
When the feeling that change can be possible through political action disappears, 
citizens stop making use of their political rights and liberties and become complicit 
with the wealthy classes in paving the way towards achieving a basic structure that 
disadvantages the less well off.  
Socio-economic inequalities are seen to be one important contributing factor in the 
decrease of the sense of political efficacy. The link between political participation 
and socio-economic status has been widely discussed in the economic literature 
with the pioneering 1937 work by Tingsten315 becoming the main point of reference. 
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Tingsten’s work argued for a strong positive correlation between political 
participation and socio-economic status.   These findings have been confirmed by 
more recent research, for example the study carried out by Frederik Solt316 where 
he analyses the relationship between inequality and political engagement across 12 
of the world’s richest democracies. Solt’s conclusion is that those countries with 
greater economic inequalities tend to have lower levels of political engagement, 
including election participation, political debate and interest in politics in general. 
Furthermore, this depressed political participation becomes more pronounced as 
relative income declines and within those groups with lowest shares of wealth. If 
lower levels of political participation decrease as economic inequalities increase and 
if the political participation of the least advantaged is most adversely affected, there 
is a strong argument to control any potential inequalities caused by the introduction 
of genetic cognitive enhancements. 
There is also a danger that, once we stop exercising our political rights and our 
political liberties gradually lose their significance, our personal liberties such as 
freedom of conscience, association and non-political speech, will also be affected as 
a result. In order to be able to choose, pursue or make changes to our own way of 
life, not only do we need to make use of our personal liberties, we also need to be 
able to live under laws that allow and support its pursuit. Political liberties when 
equally guaranteed to all, enable individuals to shape institutions so that everyone 
can enjoy and exercise their personal liberties and subsequently have the freedom 
to pursue their chosen life plan. 
Bringing the discussion back to the potential introduction of genetic cognitive 
enhancements, the unequal access to these technologies can play a role in the causal 
chain that leads to the concentration of power in the hands of the enhanced few as 
just described: 
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Figure 1: A causal pathway towards the accumulation of power by the enhanced
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rights and liberties.317 This enforced genetic intervention will particularly put at risk 
the personal integrity and procreative liberty of those parents who would not have 
voluntarily chosen to modify the genetic make-up of their future offspring. In 
discussions surrounding procreative freedom and how it is permissible to limit such 
a liberty, it is generally acknowledged that this liberty takes priority unless a high 
degree of harm is caused by not intervening.  As John Harris explains: 
“Those who would exercise reproductive liberty do not have to show what good it 
would do, rather those who would curtail freedom have to show not simply that 
it is unpopular, or undesirable, or undesired, but that it is seriously harmful to 
others, or to society, and that these harms are real and present, not future and 
speculative.” 318 
This kind of social policy not only is controversial but also deeply troubling and 
reminiscent of the compulsory eugenic policies already discussed in this thesis.  
5.1.2  Societal unrest leading to instability 
As a result of having their basic rights and liberties diminished, the ability of citizens 
to fully participate in society in their role as citizens is immediately compromised.  
Frustrated by their inability to contribute as equal citizens in shaping the social and 
economic policies of their country, some people are likely to feel let down by the 
ruling government and society in general. Consequently, a society unable to protect 
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the basic liberties and opportunities of its citizens as a result of unequal access to 
cognitive enhancements may face societal disruption.  
The unenhanced population could become disenfranchised as they find themselves 
with diminished access to healthcare, legal representation and positions of power, 
whether economic or political.319  Their growing sense of detachment may 
eventually lead to social revolt and uprising, which endangers the stability of 
society. The political instability of a given society is assessed by the propensity of its 
government to change at a constitutional level or, at its most extreme, collapse.320 It 
has been shown that one of the factors leading to increased political instability is 
income inequality.321 As Alesina et al. argue: 
“A large group of impoverished citizens facing a small group of well off 
individuals is likely to become dissatisfied with the existing socio economic status 
quo and demand radical changes, so that mass violence and illegal seizure of 
power are more likely than when income distribution is more equitable.”322 
If the basic liberties of the unenhanced population have been progressively eroded 
or virtually eliminated either by the wealthy few, or by a government implementing 
compulsory genetic modification measures, their resentment towards the political 
system will only increase and may lead to an uprising.  Although a complete collapse 
of the political system may seem alarmist, it can be claimed that we need only look 
at the recent Arab uprising caused, amongst other reasons, by the widespread 
discontent with the economic hardship and social injustices endured by a large 
section of the population.323  
Conversely, countries where political initiatives have been launched to reduce 
inequalities after a period of unrest are shown to be more stable than other 
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countries with similar economic growth.324 This seems to be the case with countries 
in South East Asia with reduced levels of income and wealth inequality after WWII 
and higher levels of stability when compared to Latin American countries.325 
If widening economic inequalities are allowed as a consequence of unrestricted 
access to genetic cognitive enhancements, governments will need to have 
appropriate strategies to deal with the instability that can ensue. 
5.2 Rawlsian response for ensuring the protection of basic rights and liberties  
In the face of the potential threat that cognitive genetic intervention can pose to 
basic rights and liberties, I now evaluate whether the well-ordered society governed 
by Rawlsian principles can ease these worries through the application of the first 
principle of justice and the protection given to the worth of political liberties. 
In line with the reasoning presented in the previous section, Rawls also believes that 
economic and social inequalities go hand in hand with unequal political power. The 
Rawlsian theory of justice echoes the concern presented in this chapter that 
economic inequalities can lead to an erosion of political liberties. 
Rawls believes that socio-economic inequalities are to be controlled in order to 
prevent one part of society from accumulating large political power and using it to 
dominate those with fewer resources:  
“This power allows a few, in virtue of their control over the machinery of the 
state, to enact a system of law and property that ensures their dominant position 
in the economy as a whole. Insofar as this domination is experienced as a bad 
thing, as making many people’s lives less good than they might otherwise be, we 
are again concerned with the effects of economic and social inequalities.”326 
As I have shown, if left unchecked, this diminished economic and political power 
may endanger the individual’s ability to engage in social cooperation, and could even 
affect their equal share of the basic liberties and opportunities protected by a 
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Rawlsian conception of justice. It is important, therefore, that the Rawlsian 
principles of justice are supported by a legislative framework designed to prevent 
the erosion of these key primary goods.  
Recall how the first principle of justice, as defined by Rawls, protects the basic 
political and personal liberties of citizens. This principle was designed to ensure that 
citizens enjoyed a fully adequate scheme of liberties which was, at the same time, 
compatible with the same scheme of liberties enjoyed by all. Furthermore, there are 
two aspects of the Rawlsian political conception that emphasize the important place 
they have in his theory. First, the protection of these liberties will always take 
priority over the distribution of economic goods. Second, the political liberties in 
particular must have their fair value guaranteed. The following sections are 
designed to explain each of these components of the Rawlsian theory and how they 
will help to address the concerns relating to the threat that genetic cognitive 
enhancements might pose to basic rights and liberties. 
5.2.1  Priority of the first principle of justice 
One of the key aspects of Rawls’s theory supports the protection of basic rights and 
liberties against the socio-economic inequalities created by genetic cognitive 
enhancements. This protection is strengthened by the priority he assigns to this 
scheme of liberties over the second principle of justice and therefore over 
considerations of opportunity and distribution of economic goods.  
The individual liberties of said scheme work together as part of a comprehensive 
system. No liberty is supposed to be absolute and there will be times when one 
liberty conflicts with another. When this happens, individuals' liberties may need to 
be adjusted so that the best possible protection is given to the development and the 
exercise of the citizens’ two moral powers. It is the whole scheme of liberties overall 
that has priority over considerations of opportunity, distribution of economic 
resources or other aspects relating to the particular notions of goodness or 
teleological doctrines held by individuals: 
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‘The priority of liberty implies that a basic liberty can be limited or denied solely 
for the sake of one or more other basic liberties, and never, as I have said, for 
reasons of public good or perfectionist values.”327 
The priority of the principle of equal liberty is always required except when 
“reasonably favourable conditions”328 in society are not met. These conditions are 
not fully specified by Rawls. Rather, they are broadly defined as those conditions 
that allow the effective establishment and exercise of said liberties.  The reader gets 
a flavour, even if not fully stipulated, of what these conditions might look like. For 
example, Rawls writes that favourable circumstances will be those where an 
adequate level of economic advance is present and the society has the relevant 
experience and skills to run basic institutions. Where we have societies with levels 
of extreme poverty and/or unstable or unelected governments, it might be 
necessary to restrict certain liberties until the basic needs of the population are met. 
Whenever reasonably favourable conditions are met, however, no liberty is to be 
sacrificed for the sake of other goods. This means, for example, that should 
significant economic gains be had by denying a religious group certain political 
rights, the Rawlsian political conception will explicitly forbid such a move.  A 
government might prevent this type of attack on liberties from happening, say with 
the development of antidiscrimination laws precluding anyone from being treated 
unfavourably because of their race, economic status, genetic make-up or adherence 
to a particular (reasonable) comprehensive view.  This would be the appropriate 
measure to take in a democratic society that is governed by the principles of 
Rawlsian justice.  
First, I consider how this priority might work in the case where restricted access to 
these technologies leads to a situation where the enhanced part of the population 
harmed the political liberties of the unenhanced.  Under the auspices of the first 
principle of justice, any potential attack on the right to political participation of the 
unenhanced would be curtailed by appropriate anti-discriminatory legislation. A 
society ruled by the first principle of justice would encourage and enact legislation 
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to prevent any type of genetic discrimination in the same way that protection is 
offered to citizens on account of their race, religion or gender. The priority of the 
first principle of justice would guarantee the protection of rights and liberties even 
when their restriction resulted in a much higher social product. It might be argued 
that, given the priority that Rawls gives to basic rights and liberties, a simpler 
solution could be to completely ban these technologies. However, this would entail 
unnecessarily forfeiting altogether the potential benefits these technologies might 
bring.  To elucidate this point, let us consider the way Rawls deals with potential 
challenges linked to one of the key primary goods -  wealth. The dangers posed by 
the unfettered accumulation of wealth are addressed by appropriate regulation via 
the principles of justice rather than the complete elimination of wealth 
accumulation. Eliminating wealth would mean that the generated social product 
benefiting the least advantaged would also completely disappear. The Rawlsian 
conception however,  protects the citizens’ rights and liberties and at the same time 
enables citizens to use the benefits generated by these goods as long as they benefit 
the least advantaged. 
Second, should the attack on liberties come from an attempt by the government to 
equalise genetic endowments, the same liberty protecting principle would apply. In 
this case these intrusive genetic interventions would be prevented by an appeal to 
the citizen’s personal or civil liberties and how these override any governmental 
concerns of achieving genetic equality. Although Rawls did not specifically address 
issues of reproductive freedom or the right to have a family , the protection of these 
rights was, I believe, nonetheless implied. As James Nickel points out the so called 
“Lifestyle Rights”329 are omitted from Rawls’s list even though these are included in 
most contemporary bills of rights. Part of these lifestyle rights would involve the 
freedom to found a family which would include procreative freedom within its 
scope. Now, it may be that Rawls did not specifically mention this liberty since it 
could be considered to fall under the umbrella of “freedoms specified by the liberty 
and integrity of the person”.330 This would mean that procreative freedom is 
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“structurally protected”331 by the rights safeguarding the freedom and integrity of 
the person. Given the importance to tolerance and the protection that Rawls affords 
to diverse comprehensive views, it is very plausible that the broad concept of 
Rawlsian liberties is meant to include the citizen’s reproductive rights. Furthermore, 
as part of his justification for basic liberties, Rawls relied on their special role for the 
development of the citizen’s two moral powers. Let us recall that primary goods 
(including basic rights and liberties) were chosen since they were deemed necessary 
to develop these capacities. Having the freedom to choose how and under what 
circumstances to procreate seems to be an important aspect of being able to realise 
our very own conception of the good. This is particularly important if part of that 
conception of the good involves having a family. Reproductive choices are significant 
decisions that individuals make about the kind of life they want to lead; having these 
decisions made by others would mean curtailing the exercise of their second moral 
power.  
The objection to intrusive reproductive policies does not arise out of a concern for 
the foetus. Rather, Rawls would argue that the rights of the parents as citizens are 
being violated. Rawls does not talk about the status of the foetus with his theory 
being focussed on the principles applying to citizens with the two moral powers as 
they engage in social co-operation. Since foetuses cannot be said to possess the 
moral powers as understood by Rawls, any Rawlsian justification prohibiting 
forceful implementation of genetic enhancements would presumably need to be 
grounded in the rights of parents. However, from a Rawlsian perspective we also 
need to be aware of the obligations we hold towards future citizens. From a 
Rawlsian perspective, the government might be entitled to intrude in the 
procreative liberty of its citizens if there was a danger that the future children’s 
status as morally equal agents was being compromised by the reproductive choices 
of their parents. Children, according to Rawls, are presumed to have rights as 
prospective citizens.332 Parents therefore must respect the rights that their children 
have to appropriately develop their two moral powers. Respecting their offspring's 
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citizen rights would include ensuring that they are not deprived of essential medical 
care or basic education. However, the genetic interventions considered here would 
take the level of cognition beyond that necessary to the development of the two 
moral powers. This being the case, the government would not be justified in 
forcefully intervening in the genome of future children by appealing to the 
protection of their future moral status. 
The priority given by Rawls to basic rights and liberties ensures that those unable to 
access these technologies will not have their political or civil liberties undermined 
either by the enhanced few or by a paternalistic government aiming to equalise 
genetic talents. These rights are here protected in a formal way. However, Rawls 
believes that formal protection may not be enough. Protecting the actual exercise of 
these liberties, in particular political liberties, will ensure that citizens are able to 
exercise them if they should wish. This drives Rawls to ensure that the worth or fair 
value of political liberties is safeguarded.  
5.2.2 Fair value of political liberties 
Rawls has consistently maintained that both sets of political and personal or civil 
liberties are of equal weight, albeit they sometimes have different roles in 
developing two distinct aspects of the autonomy of individuals. These different roles 
are reflected in the distinction between the public and private aspects of autonomy 
which are themselves linked to the two separate moral powers of citizens: 
‘The liberties of both public and private autonomy are given side-by-side and 
unranked in the first principle of justice. These liberties are co-original for the 
further reason that both kinds of liberty are rooted in one or both of the two 
moral powers, respectively in the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity 
for a conception of the good.”333 
Public autonomy relates to how we conduct ourselves within the sphere of the 
political through the exercise of our sense of justice and making use of our political 
liberties. Our personal autonomy is characterised by how we conduct our lives 
within our comprehensive worldview and it is aided by the use of our personal 
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liberties in order to form, revise and pursue our conception of the good. Political 
liberties, although having their biggest role in the sphere of public autonomy, also 
contribute to how successful people are in the development and pursuit of their 
private ends. The freedom to pursue our life plan will depend in part on our ability 
to shape policies that provide the conditions to pursue it.  
Whilst still maintaining the co-dependence and co-existence of both sets of liberties, 
Rawls argues that the political liberties, and only they, must be guaranteed their fair 
value by giving them special status: 
“This guarantee means that the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, 
whatever their economic or social position must be sufficiently equal in the sense 
that all have a fair opportunity to hold public office and to affect the outcomes of 
elections, and the like.”334 
This special status arises from the role that political liberties have in establishing, 
securing and maintaining the basic institutions. In particular, these liberties are 
considered essential for the establishment of just legislation through a process that 
is open to everyone on the basis of equality.335 Having protected the priority and 
equal distribution of the full scheme of basic rights and liberties, Rawls is concerned 
that the equality of political liberties in particular may turn out to be merely formal 
unless further constitutional protection is granted.  This concern parallels Rawls’s 
move in A Theory of Justice from formal to fair equality of opportunity. In fact, the 
special status given to political liberties is rooted in very similar reasons; the 
difference now is that he is seeking to guarantee that citizens have a fair chance to 
hold public office and participate and influence political decisions. 
Rawls believed that “the worth or usefulness of liberty is not the same for every 
individual”.336 This is because existing differences in wealth and income equip 
citizens with different means to exercise these liberties. Even though the difference 
principle has been designed to regulate and minimise allowable economic 
inequality, Rawls fears that this might not be enough to ensure that political liberties 
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are not merely formal. Additional measures will need to be put in place. These 
measures may require that legislation is developed to secure that political parties 
are financially independent, elections are publicly funded and that a public facility is 
established to guarantee fair and equal access to the political process.337 
Furthermore,  from a Rawlsian perspective the citizen’s moral agency risks being 
damaged by not giving adequate protection to their political liberties. Without the 
ability and opportunity to make use of political liberties in more than a restricted 
formal sense, we might be placing restrictions on their capacity to exercise their 
sense of justice.338 Protecting these liberties enables citizens to better participate 
and deliberate on political matters. As they engage in political deliberation they have 
the opportunity to justify their beliefs publicly in ways that others can accept. Moral 
agents who, as per Rawls’s definition, already possess a capacity for a sense of 
justice to an appropriate level will now have access to the right political space where 
they can exercise and develop this moral power. 
Looking back at the threat to the sense of political efficacy and the ever decreasing 
level of political participation that disparities in access to genetic cognitive 
enhancements can cause, it is not difficult to see how the measures that Rawls had in 
mind might be important. The institutional protection that is given to everyone’s 
political liberties publicly expresses the equal value of everyone’s participation in 
political activity regardless of their economic position or, in our case, their genetic 
make-up. Whatever feelings of detachment and disillusionment that the unenhanced 
class might feel, will be lessened by the knowledge that society considers their rights 
to be of equal value regardless of their genetic make-up. This will serve:  first, as 
reassurance that they share the same equal moral worth as the enhanced 
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population; and second, as an encouragement to make use of their political rights in 
the knowledge that their voices will be heard. 
5.3 Genetic cognitive enhancements and their impact on opportunity 
Chapter 4 explored how higher levels of natural cognitive capacities influenced the 
range of available opportunities giving rise to higher life prospects and access to 
advantages.  The introduction of genetic interventions would mean that we could 
intervene into these natural capacities and enhance them, subsequently also 
affecting the level of opportunities of individuals. In this section I specifically explore 
how the use of genetic cognitive enhancements could negatively impact or 
jeopardise opportunity. 
5.3.1 Widening socio-economic inequalities and narrowing access to jobs and 
positions of power and responsibility 
Genetic interventions may give rise to huge variations in cognitive abilities, thereby 
potentially compromising access to powers and positions of responsibility for 
unenhanced individuals. This will restrict their life chances and subsequently their 
access to socio-economic goods. The improved capacities of the enhanced citizens 
will improve their competitiveness for higher paid positions and increase their 
share of socio-economic goods, extending the gap between the haves and the have-
nots. This competitive edge will be particularly felt in the job market. Candidates 
with improved genetically modified information processing faculties may 
consistently do better at job selection tests, interviews and entry tests to elite 
universities. For instance, enhanced information processing skills may prove very 
valuable to, for example, a lawyer, when it comes to evaluating the complex details 
of a court case. This would most likely give her a distinct advantage over colleagues 
who need to rely on their more basic natural endowments.  
This competitive advantage does of course also happen naturally without the need 
of any genetic intervention. However, even though naturally occurring variations in 
natural capacities give people some competitive edge over others, the differences in 
competitive levels may be greater where enhancements come into play.  I have 
previously hypothesized that the initial high market value of these technologies 
means that their acquisition may be, at least temporarily,  restricted to the wealthy. 
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Since their offspring are likely to also benefit from better educational resources, 
these enhancements will further increase their chances of success compared to 
those being born into families with fewer economic resources. Furthermore, a 
system where access to genetic interventions is determined by the purchasing 
power of individuals will reproduce existing inequalities over time in two distinct 
ways. First, the higher level of cognitive performance will be perpetuated between 
those cognitively enhanced, since the trait is inherited from generation to 
generation. Second, the higher socio-economic goods gained as a result of the 
improved competitive position in attaining well paid positions will also be passed to 
their future offspring.  
As a consequence, this restricted access to positions of power and higher paid jobs 
might entrench the socio-economic position of the least advantaged and 
compromise both generational and inter-generational social mobility. Poor access to 
non-genetic cognitive enhancements in the form of educational goods is already 
known to negatively affect social mobility and the levels of income and wealth of 
those in the lower socio-economic classes. Research shows that access to high 
quality education in modern democracies is often linked to the level of income of 
parents.  Children of high earners not only inherit their parents’ wealth, but are also 
more likely to be more highly paid in their future jobs than children raised in low 
paid families.339 Corak highlights this point in his evaluation of intergenerational 
inequalities in the United states: 
“Someone born to parents with low income faces a higher risk of less successfully 
transiting through these stages and of ending up in a precarious labor market 
situation, which in turn diminishes his or her capacity for positive parenting. This 
raises the odds of a generational cycle of poverty, but money is as much the result 
as the cause of the vicious circle.”340 
The stages that Corak mentions in this passage begin in the early life of the child and 
they include cognitive, social, emotional and language development stages as key 
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340 Corak, M. (2012). "Inequality from generation to generation: The United States in comparison". 
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determinants of their educational achievement, labour market success and their 
socio-economic status. Children's developmental outcomes and their eventual status 
in society as adults are all confounded, Corak claims, by rigid public policies, the 
internal workings of the family and the rigid structures of the labour markets.341 All 
these environmental factors make a profound contribution to the perpetuation of 
economic inequalities across generations. The relationship between income 
inequality and lower levels of intergenerational mobility has been widely studied 
and it is commonly known as the Great Gatsby Curve. This upward sloping curve 
plots the Gini coefficient (income inequality) against the intergenerational income 
elasticity graded from 0 to 1. The closer to zero the smaller the correlation between 
the parent and the child’s future income.  An example will perhaps best illustrate the 
meaning of this index. A recent study carried out by the OECD quoted an income 
elasticity of 0.50 in the UK in 2014.342 It has been shown that developed countries 
with high income inequalities, such as the UK and the USA show much lower levels 
of intergenerational mobility in earnings than, for instance, the Nordic countries 
where earnings are more evenly distributed.343 Adding the restricted availability of 
genetic enhancements to this mix is likely to exacerbate this generational cycle of 
poverty. 
The range of opportunities available to the unenhanced may also be compromised 
by the power that the enhanced class might acquire in the area of policy making. The 
impact of access to positions of power by the talented alone and how it affects public 
policy making is clearly explained by Iris Young.344 Those occupying social positions 
of power will have greater opportunities – as social, economic and political decision-
makers- to influence the fate of everyone else in society. As explained in the 
previous section, we should not only worry about whether those with the 
appropriate talents access certain positions but also how that can influence the lives 
of those whose lack of ability precludes them from occupying positions of power. 
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Focusing on the educational system in particular, Young highlights the wide ranging 
effect of the concentration of decision making powers in the hands of a few: 
“often a small number of people make decisions that affect many participants in 
an institution and outside it. Educational institutions constitute decision-making 
power about curriculum and student performance evaluation, for example, 
which affect students, teachers, and parents in significant and often far-reaching 
ways.”345 
How education is made accessible to citizens and the content and delivery of 
educational resources will determine how well equipped citizens are to access and 
secure positions in open competition. For example, the provision of expensive 
education for our children results in the ability to access careers that generally yield 
higher economic returns and access to positions of power. Furthermore, if the 
decisions about educational content and educational access are dominated by the 
enhanced class, the interests of those with fewer cognitive capacities may be 
ignored.  
The introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements might, if left unchecked, 
exacerbate and increase socio-economic inequalities across generations.  
Furthermore, these inequalities may be further entrenched by the transfer of 
decision making powers to the enhanced classes. Their influence on existing socio 
political frameworks may fail to safeguard the interest of all members of society, 
creating a society where opportunities are no longer open to all.  
5.3.2 Market stimulus and trickle-down effect insufficient to avoid increasing 
socio-economic inequalities. 
The initial high entry price usually attached to new advances in technology is likely 
to prevent some parts of society from accessing these genetic interventions.  Some 
have argued, however, that this initial exclusion may eventually be to the benefit of 
those worst off in society. Leon Kass himself seems to acknowledge that even though 
access to these technologies may at first be restricted to the rich, the poorer classes 
will also get to reap the benefits: 
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 “To be sure, the gap between the richest and the poorest may increase, but in 
absolute terms the poor may benefit more, when compared not to the rich but to 
where they were before.”346  
Despite his warnings against the rise of new biotechnologies, Kass seems to accept 
the “trickle-down” theory often used to justify economic inequalities where the 
benefits derived from the accumulation of wealth amongst the privileged  will in 
time flow down to the lower classes. 
However, how does this benefit transfer from rich to poor actually work? One 
plausible answer resides in the market stimulus mechanism. According to this 
hypothesis,  genetic cognitive enhancements will first be subsidized by the wealthy 
and also for a time after their introduction whilst very small incremental 
improvements are made to reach optimal performance. However, once this period is 
over, we will have a better version of the technology with a price that will decrease 
in proportion to the increase in demand for the technology. As time goes by, the 
wealthy will have paid for the quality improvements of the technology without fully 
reaping the benefits of their investment. This, Naam347 explains, is because of the 
way high-end technologies, including biotechnological enhancements obey a law of 
diminishing returns:   
“That is to say that someone who can spend 10 times as much on an 
enhancement isn’t going to get 10 times the result.” 348 
Those most privileged would have paid a premium price for products that were new 
and innovative at the time but, undoubtedly, of a much lesser quality than those 
currently available to the majority of the population.  
The last 100 years have provided us with examples of how this restricted access 
eventually disappears with the use of new expensive commodities becoming 
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commonplace. Looking at IT and communications technologies, it was not that long 
ago owning a computer or a mobile phone was only affordable to those with the 
highest disposable income. However, statistics now show that PC ownership in the 
UK has risen from 13% in 1985 to 80% in 2011. Likewise, 86% of the UK population 
owned a mobile phone in 2011 compared to the 20% recorded in 1997349 and 58% 
in 2000.. This increase in ownership has come alongside, and it is very likely to be 
caused by,  a substantial price reduction in these technologies. Crozier and Hajzler350 
explain how this phenomenon can be best illustrated with the Apple II PC which 
came into the market in 1977 at a price of $1,300. Adjusting for inflation that same 
PC would now have been priced at approximately $4,500. Nowadays, however the 
price for a standard PC is around  $1,000. Were we to also adjust for the huge quality 
improvements in technology that have occurred since 1977, the revised “quality 
adjusted”351 price would likely  turn out to be much lower than $1,000. 
If the introduction of genetic enhancement technologies is to follow the same 
pattern, the cost of genetic interventions is likely to be prohibitive to most of us at 
launch and for as long as the patent is in place. Looking at the price history of human 
genome sequencing there are empirical reasons to assume that the price of genetic 
interventions will decrease as technology improves. Back in 2003 the cost of 
sequencing a single human genome was $2.7bn, dropping to  $5,000 in 2013 with 
companies currently being able to offer this service at a cost of $1,000 and 
promising to bring this down to just $100 in the future.352 
Nevertheless, the empirical validity of the market process eventually bringing this 
“trickle-down’ effect whereby the benefits are eventually passed to all socio-
economic groups, has been recently put into question. Whereas the accumulation of 
                                                        
349 Statistics, O. f. N. (2010). General Lifestyle Survey Overview. Office for National Statistics. Page 43 
350 Crozier, G. K. D., and Hajzler, C. (2010). "Market Stimulus and Genomic Justice: Evaluating the 
Effects of Market Access to Human Germ-Line Enhancement." Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 
20(2), 161-179. 
351 A quality adjusted price takes into account quality changes of a product. For example in the case of 
the PC we would take into account the improvements in functionality over the years (when compared 
to their baseline point of reference) to calculate their real price. 
352 Herper, M. (2017). "Illumina Promises To Sequence Human Genome For $100 -- But Not Quite Yet 
"Forbes. City: Online publication. 
  
147 
capital among the wealthy few in 1950’s America seemed to go hand in hand with 
steady increases in income and wellbeing across the rest of the population, recent 
increases in income inequalities are putting into doubt this supposed correlation. 
Recent research suggests that, often, economic growth does not significantly reduce 
poverty levels,353 and income transfers are more often and prominently happening 
from the poor to the rich rather than vice versa.354 This income transfer can take 
various forms including the consumption of goods supplied by multinational 
companies or governmental taxation that goes toward the provision of public 
services entirely supplied by wealthy private institutions. Furthermore, inequalities 
in income distribution seem to be giving way to a “negative trickle-down effect”355 
characterised by a decrease in expenditure in public goods and prohibitive increases 
in the price of housing for low and middle income people to name but a few 
examples. The current housing crisis  experienced by many western developed 
countries is a case in point.  The profits generated by “bricks and mortar” in the last 
two decades prompted high levels of property development that made house prices 
unaffordable not only to the least advantaged but also to the those traditionally 
considered as belonging to the middle class.  Although salaries were increasing, 
unprecedented growth in property development in the market meant that house 
prices were increasing at a much faster rate, making the purchase of property 
unaffordable. Alongside this housing crisis, the increase in private wealth of those 
most powerful creates a pressure on governments to reduce taxation. This 
inevitably leads to a decrease in expenditure in essential public services such as 
health and education, which is bound to affect those with fewer resources most 
significantly. The wealthy class can afford private healthcare and private education 
for their children; those struggling with low incomes will be the ones who suffer.  
Despite the possibility that these newly emerging technologies may eventually be 
made available to most in society, the empirical evidence against the transfers of 
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wealth and opportunities to those who most need them warrants caution and 
demands the development of mechanisms to avoid an increase in the gap of socio-
economic differences and the further marginalisation of the lower classes. The next 
section aims to demonstrate that the application of the Rawlsian FEO and the 
difference principle provides the necessary safeguards to stop the introduction of 
genetic cognitive enhancements from resulting in increased socio-economic 
inequalities and restricted access to opportunities. 
5.4 A Rawlsian response to the potential threat to opportunity from the 
introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements 
The protection that Rawls gives to opportunity is captured within the principle of 
FEO. Working alongside the difference principle, Rawls has at his disposal the 
necessary tools to address the impact that differentials in natural talents have on life 
prospects.  
Before embracing genetic cognitive enhancements as part of the Rawlsian theory, 
we must ensure that they do not present a danger to the life prospects that Rawls is 
trying to protect through his second principle of justice. This section first provides 
an overview of how Rawls protects opportunity using both parts of the second 
principle of justice. Next, I evaluate whether the FEO and difference principles are 
able to deal with the potential challenges posed by the introduction of genetic 
cognitive enhancements. I finish by suggesting that these challenges would not be a 
concern in a society governed by the Rawlsian principles of justice and that they 
could even contribute towards the equality and reciprocity goals of the theory of 
justice. 
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5.4.1 The FEO principle and the difference principles as custodians of the life 
prospects of individuals 
The protection of opportunity or life chances is at the core of Rawls’s second 
principle of justice. 
The second part of this principle, the FEO principle, states that “those who have the 
same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should 
have the same prospects of success.”356 
The principle of FEO was devised by Rawls as a mechanism to minimise the effects 
that morally arbitrary social factors had in people's access to jobs and positions. As 
explained in Chapter 4, this is what motivated Rawls's move from a mere formal 
equality of opportunity to a fair equality of opportunity model. 
By demanding that advantages are determined by the individual’s natural talents 
and motivations, Rawls is essentially removing the effect that morally arbitrary 
social contingencies have on citizens’ life chances. Access to opportunities must be 
such that they track differences in natural ability and motivation alone. As a result, 
those inequalities caused by social conditions are virtually eradicated. Protecting 
FEO enables individuals to benefit from social cooperation including the acquisition 
of primary goods such as, powers, income and wealth.  
Rawls is concerned with the chances for people to access opportunities rather than 
assuring they have equal success pursuing these opportunities. It is important 
however, that people’s prospects are real prospects, and this is what should guide 
the design and governance of basic institutions. Institutions will need to be arranged 
so that they secure “equal chances of education and culture for persons similarly 
endowed and motivated” as well as “equality of opportunity in economic activities 
and in the free choice of education.”357 Furthermore, there should be no excessive 
accumulations of wealth of property 358  as these would threaten access to 
opportunities by all. 
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Controlling for these social contingencies will require a number of measures that go 
beyond the formal protection given to opportunity, through the removal of legal 
barriers based, for example, on gender, religion or ethnicity. Briefly, measures also 
need to be in place so that citizens have a good chance to attain the positions 
available to them. In order to guarantee access to educational goods, Rawls endorses 
some sort of publicly funded education359  to allow children to compete on fair terms 
with each other.360 This education may well be provided by the private sector as 
long as institutional measures are in place to ensure wide access. Provision of basic 
healthcare to ensure that citizens can function as fully cooperating members of 
society is also granted under the scope of the FEO principle. Rawls has been 
notoriously vague in outlining the details of these measures, but he has 
acknowledged that a basic healthcare provision is to be assumed.361 A Rawlsian 
conception of justice will therefore ensure the availability of appropriate 
educational, cultural and basic healthcare resources to enable citizens to have a fair 
go at pursuing those ends that are commensurate with their talents. 
As it stands, the Rawlsian FEO will prevent two discriminatory practices that might 
arise with the introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements. First, those 
genetically enhanced could be considered to be “freaks” and discriminated in the 
same manner that minorities or people with disabilities have suffered and continue 
to suffer in some cases. They might, for example, face discrimination in the labour 
market. Feeling threatened by their superior cognitive abilities, organisations might 
include a requirement to declare whether the potential candidate has been 
genetically enhanced and purposefully exclude them from the shortlisting process. 
Conversely, this discrimination can affect the unenhanced class for very different 
reasons. Expecting that those who are genetically enhanced will actually realise 
their capacities and work at a superior level, organisations may exclude the 
unenhanced from any recruitment campaign. While we should not forget that a 
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genetic capacity is a mere potentiality, this clearly is illegitimate discrimination. A 
selection process should take into account actual skills and achievements rather 
than potentialities. 
Consider now the introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements and the effect that 
they might have on the way Rawls’s FEO principle is formulated. On a first reading of 
Rawls’s FEO principle, those cognitively enhanced would be entitled to advantages 
conferred by their superior cognitive capacities. Once citizens have been born with 
enhanced capacities, adherence to the FEO will guarantee them equal access to jobs 
or positions as those with similar talents and motivation. Let us remember that this 
principle tracked differences in natural abilities and motivation alone. 
However, these genetic interventions mean that what constitutes our natural 
cognitive capacities is now determined not only by our native talents, but also by 
technologies designed to modify these natural talents. Whether access to these 
technologies is open in a formal way is, I argue, a social factor that should be given 
due consideration. Having argued for their value as primary goods, particularly in 
their role of broadening the life prospects of individuals,  a Rawlsian society would 
require that citizens are assured that no formal barriers are in place for citizens to 
preclude them to access these goods. Rawlsian theory should guarantee that access 
to these technologies is not restricted to people in the same way that access to jobs 
and positions and to education is not restricted on the bases of morally arbitrary 
factors. Even though it is not the role of the basic institutions to influence the 
distribution of natural talents, it is within their control to regulate access to the 
technologies that can potentially affect the distribution of these talents and 
ultimately the social product derived from them. The attention that needs to be 
given towards ensuring that no-one is deliberately excluded from acquiring these 
goods derives from the potential interest of the wealthy class to increase their 
economic and political power. 
A situation where those with early access to the technologies put barriers to prevent 
others from acquiring them on the grounds of gender, baseline level of natural 
talents, or socio-economic class, must also be avoided. In the same way that FEO 
guarantees the removal of legal barriers in accessing jobs and positions, we need to 
eliminate legal barriers of access to these technologies. This formal requirement of 
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free access to these goods takes priority over issues pertaining to the distribution of 
the economic goods they might generate. I will refer to the principle that equal 
access to genetic cognitive enhancements should be protected formally as the 
principle of formal equality of access to genetic cognitive enhancements. 
Even though the principle of FEO already provides us with the tools to avoid 
discrimination in access to positions based on the enhanced/non enhanced status of 
individuals, I have argued that an extension may be required to ensure that no legal 
barriers are created to stop citizens from accessing these technologies. 
The Rawlsian principle of FEO, however, does not address concerns relating to the 
socio-economic inequalities caused by these modified natural talents. Since 
differentials in natural talents can potentially be magnified once these technologies 
are available, the next step is to assess whether the difference principle can regulate 
these inequalities so that they are to the advantage of the worst off. 
Having eliminated the formal barriers to opportunity and provided citizens with the 
tools for them to have a fair chance to attain them, access to opportunities is now 
regulated in such a way that only the natural talents - whether these have been 
enhanced or not - and the willingness to develop them have a bearing on citizen’s 
abilities to acquire advantageous positions.  
Rawls now needs to deal with how native endowments, as they limit or enable 
citizens to access jobs and positions,  can affect the distribution of socio-economic 
shares. Guaranteeing FEO says nothing about how socio-economic shares ought to 
be distributed and, without any controls, it could potentially allow large amounts of 
inequalities in wealth and income.  
Bringing the focus back to the enhancement of cognitive natural talents,  Rawls’s 
interpretation of FEO highlights how different sectors of the population have access 
to different opportunities depending on their native talents.  Our different range of 
talents and skills, shaped by the natural lottery, lead us to compete in a playing field 
with many different levels. This competitive level is determined by the different sets 
of skills and motivations possessed by the individuals. Someone with lower 
cognitive abilities may not have access to the same range of opportunities to access 
offices and positions as others with superior cognitive capacities. These different 
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competitive levels will be likely to result in differences in levels of primary goods 
that individuals enjoy. In a society governed by Rawls’s two principles, the 
distribution of primary goods – and, therefore, the differences in the levels of goods 
enjoyed by the more and less talented – will be regulated by the difference principle. 
The difference principle uses wealth and income as proxies for the overall allocation 
of primary goods held by citizens. Unequal distributions in the share of primary 
goods will be considered unacceptable unless they represent an improvement of 
everyone’s prospects and, most importantly, maximises the position of least 
advantaged representative group. Rawls here proposes that inequalities may be 
justifiable if, over their complete life, the worst off are made as well off as possible. 
This is anchored in a prioritarian conception of justice that urges us, as a matter of 
justice, to assist those most vulnerable in society.  
When discussing the type of inequalities that could be allowed, Rawls looks in 
particular at the entrepreneurial class and how their higher income may result in 
raising the long-term prospects of the labouring class. He observes how 
entrepreneurs may be encouraged, by the expectation of higher returns, to do things 
that would yield better prospects for the lower classes. These expected rewards 
would act as an encouragement to put in place more efficient and innovative 
processes that would eventually benefit everyone, including the least advantaged.362  
Having included genetic cognitive enhancements in the index of primary goods they 
now become part of the assessment and measurement, done under the auspices of 
the difference principle, of the overall allocation of distributive shares. I have 
already suggested that taking a combination of income and wealth as a proxy 
measure for the primary goods not regulated by the first principle of justice would 
be the preferred option since it avoids issues of complexity and measurability. 
Following Rawls’s proposal the least advantaged representative group will refer to 
the group of citizens with the least authority and the lowest income, in other words 
those belonging to the “income class with the lowest expectations.”363 
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This group will have an equal share of basic liberties and enjoy FEO, but will have 
the least income and wealth. Since Rawls also believed that the least advantaged 
group is likely to include those with the lowest natural talents, this seems to be 
consistent with my assumption that those with higher talents are likely to reap the 
higher rewards arising from social cooperation. Once the worst off representative 
group is identified via the index of primary goods, the difference principle dictates 
that institutions are arranged so that that socio-economic inequalities work to their 
maximum benefit. The principle in isolation does not, however, tells us anything 
about the level of inequality between groups that is acceptable. To clarify,  the 
treatment of inequalities under the difference principle seems to be compatible with 
a wide range of distributive schemes.  This can be particularly worrying with the 
introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements. In practical terms, allowing the 
implementation of genetic cognitive technologies could mean that we have a group 
of wealthy, cognitively superior individuals whilst a big part of the population 
struggles with lower cognitive skills and a small share of income and wealth. This 
situation, under the difference principle alone, would be permissible as long as it 
was proved to be the best way to benefit those least advantaged in society. These 
extensive socio-economic inequalities between the wealthy and the poorest 
members of society puts at risk the balance in the political power enjoyed by 
citizens, which is at odds with the protection given by Rawls to political liberties. 
Given this potential outcome allowable by the difference principle, would that be 
acceptable for a society whose citizens have to live under fair terms of cooperation? 
The answer that Rawls gives to his critics is simply “no”. The difference principle is 
not working in isolation, the controls set by the principle protecting basic rights and 
liberties and the special value that Rawls gives to opportunity will limit wide 
ranging inequalities in society. Inequalities should be kept to such a level that they 
do not affect the individuals to a point that they do not consider themselves to be 
worthy members of society. Rawls would deem extreme levels of inequality 
unacceptable in a society governed by fair principles of justice. The special status 
given to FEO in particular explains how protection of opportunity limits allowable 
economic inequalities. 
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5.4.2 The priority of equal opportunity over the difference principle 
The lexical ordering that Rawls gave to the principle of FEO over the difference 
principle provides us with another tool to address the potentially problematic 
introduction of genetic cognitive enhancement into his political conception. 
Rawls explicitly argues for this priority even when restrictions to opportunity yield 
the greatest distributive shares to the least advantaged. According to Rawls this 
priority: 
“expresses the conviction that if some places were not open on a basis fair for all, 
those kept out would be right in feeling unjustly treated even though they 
benefited from the greater efforts of those who were allowed to hold them.”364 
The implication of this priority is that the difference principle is subordinate to the 
requirements set by FEO: 
“The role of the principle of fair opportunity is to insure that the system of 
cooperation is one of pure procedural justice. Unless it is satisfied, distributive 
justice could not be left to take care of itself”365  
The difference principle is proposed by Rawls to work alongside the FEO and to 
compensate for the anticipated shortcomings of the FEO principle in dealing with 
different access caused by people having different talents. Rawls’s answer to his 
frustration that opportunity will never be truly equal was to develop a system, via 
the difference principle, to regulate the resulting socio-economic inequalities.  Since 
the least advantaged group is likely to include those with fewer natural talents,  a 
taxation system that redistributes wealth and income towards the least advantaged 
will benefit those that have both fewer natural talents and, possibly, fewer 
opportunities to pursue.  
In Rawls’s view, re-directing economic shares to the least advantaged will also 
eventually lead to increased levels of opportunity. This can be done via a taxation 
system that regulates wealth transfer, as it happens with inheritance, between 
individuals. Using a tax on inheritance, Rawls is trying to avoid opportunities being 
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entrenched within the same groups in society across generations. The income 
generated through this taxation system could be directed to investments in 
education, housing, or healthcare programmes that enhance the level of 
opportunities of those at the bottom of the economic ladder.  Making income and 
wealth work at the service of opportunity seems obvious from a Rawlsian 
perspective since, for Rawls, the link between economic goods and life prospects is 
one that he takes for granted when he discusses the different distribution of income 
amongst social classes: 
“…those starting out as members of the entrepreneurial class in property-owning 
democracy, say have a better prospect than those who begin in the class of 
unskilled labourers.”366   
The previous section hinted at the fact that focusing on the maximisation of the 
economic position of the worst off might lose sight of the relative inequalities this 
principle might generate. However, the priority given to FEO puts a demand on the 
difference principle to limit the degree of inequality allowable in the distribution of 
socio-economic resources. Great accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of a 
few will limit the opportunities available to the least advantaged and therefore 
should be controlled. 
 
5.5 A brief reflection about self-respect and the use of genetic cognitive 
enhancements 
The Rawlsian response to the potential threats posed by cognitive genetic 
enhancements can also be supplemented with the value given to self-respect. 
The social bases of self-respect not only is one of the primary goods that make up the 
Rawlsian conception of justice, but also, Rawls believes, is the most important 
primary good.  
The idea of self-respect is closely linked to the status that citizens enjoy in society. It 
is through their position in society that citizens gain a sense of their own worth and 
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the worth of their conception of the good. If citizens lack self-respect, Rawls argues, 
they will find themselves in a position where, whilst having a capacity to pursue their 
conception of the good, they would not see any value in pursuing it and would lack 
the will to do so. Self-respect is not only an internal psychological state. It is also 
dependent on the way others, in their relationships with us and actions towards us, 
demonstrate their sense of our worth and the worth of our conception of the good. 
Basic institutions have a key role in shaping how individuals view one another.  The 
way these institutions are arranged may result in citizens viewing one another as 
moral equals or, conversely, as undeserving of respect and recognition as moral 
equals. Since the political conception applies to the basic structure of society, when it 
comes to protecting self-respect, the principles of justice regulate what Rawls called 
the social basis of self-respect. The internal psychological state of the individual 
cannot be regulated by institutions. However, a just society can provide institutional 
arrangements that encourage that sense of self-respect amongst individuals. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls maintains that accepting any less than equal basic 
liberties and freedom would leave citizens engaging in political and economic 
activities in a weakened subordinate position in relation to those with greater liberty. 
This will ultimately be “humiliating and destructive of self-esteem”.367 The solution 
that Rawls gives to preserve and nurture the self-respect of citizens of the just society 
is twofold: first, society needs to give priority to equal basic rights and liberties as this 
“entails equality in the social bases of esteem”; 368  second, the institutional 
arrangements must be such that the fair value of political virtues is secured.369 
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The priority that is given to basic rights and liberties together with the assurance of 
the fair value of political liberties are the key social bases of self-respect. The crucial 
value of self-respect, therefore supports the special treatment that Rawls affords to 
the basic rights and liberties. This entails the public affirmation of the basic liberties 
by citizens in a way that expresses “their mutual respect for one another as 
reasonable and trustworthy, as well as their recognition of the worth all citizens 
attach to their way of life.”370  
In a society where unequal access to genetic cognitive interventions gives rise to 
political privilege self-respect would be damaged, unless the mechanisms for the 
protection of basic rights and liberties envisaged by Rawls are in place. By having 
institutional arrangements where protection and priority is given to political 
liberties, a clear message is sent to those cognitively enhanced that their lives are 
not of a higher value and are not entitled to a superior status as far as institutional 
arrangements are concerned.   
The institutions securing access to fair equality of opportunity are also considered 
to be part of the social bases of self-respect. According to Rawls this negative effect 
on self-respect would depend on two factors. One being the actual magnitude of the 
inequality endured; and, the other, the public reasons offered to the individuals 
suffering the inequality.371 
Restricted access to opportunities following the introduction of these enhancements 
can arise from both the direct discrimination against the enhanced/unenhanced in 
accessing positions and from the vast accumulations of wealth at the hands of those 
benefitting from these interventions.  
The exclusion from access to positions based on racial characteristics, gender or 
creed fails to treat individuals with the dignity and respect they are owed as equal 
moral agents. This, in turn,  may have a damaging effect on the individual’s own 
sense of worth.  
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Inequalities accessing opportunities derived from restricted access to genetic 
cognitive enhancements may result in excessive inequalities in the distribution of 
socio-economic goods. Rawls believes that this will affect the individual’s sense of 
worth as follows: 
 “Significant political and economic inequalities are often associated with 
inequalities of social status that encourage those of lower status to be viewed by 
themselves and by others as inferior. This may arouse widespread attitudes of 
deference and servility on one side and a will to dominate and arrogance on the 
other. These effects of social and economic inequalities can be serious evils and 
the attitudes they engender great vices.”372 
It is evident from these writings that Rawls would regard excessive socio-economic 
inequalities as a threat to our sense of worth and how others value us and our life 
plan. The value of protecting self-respect then strengthens the argument of the 
priority of protecting access to opportunities for all, over allowing widespread 
inequalities, even when they work to the advantage of the worst off. Additionally, 
and recognising the damaging effect that a failure to protect liberties and 
opportunity can have on self-respect, Rawls incorporates this primary good in the 
index assessing how well-off individuals really are.  Whatever inequalities the 
difference principle permits, would have been determined taking into account how 
they affect the citizens’ self-respect. Rawls is mindful that increases in income and 
wealth generated for the benefit of the least advantaged may be outweighed by even 
bigger losses in self-respect or our self-worth. Having a sense of self-respect, as 
Rawls claims, involves having confidence in our own ability to pursue our chosen life 
plan and fulfil our intentions which must not be compromised.373 The need to 
consider goods relating to the individual’s status and self-respect restricts the 
relative inequalities deemed allowable in society across the different socio-
economic positions. 
The Rawlsian framework, via the protection given to basic rights and liberties, 
access to equal opportunities and the regulation of socio-economic inequalities  
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fends off any potential threat to this important primary good through the 
introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements.  
5.6 How can genetic cognitive enhancements support the Rawlsian principles of 
justice? 
In developing the principles of justice I have shown how Rawls appears to deal with 
social and natural contingencies very differently. The purpose of the FEO principle is 
the elimination of social contingencies insofar as they affect the life prospects of 
individuals, whilst leaving the inequalities caused by natural contingencies to the 
difference principle. This differential treatment is somewhat at odds with the equal 
weight that he seems to give to the inequalities caused by both types of contingencies 
and it ignores the link between the development of natural talents and the social 
conditions endured by the individual.  The line between social and natural 
contingencies is especially blurred in the case of genetic cognitive enhancements. 
Accommodating these new technologies into the Rawlsian framework is, however, 
possible, as I have argued in the previous sections. Rawls’s political conception 
provides sufficient safeguards to prevent the social justice fears often associated with 
these technologies. Additionally, a simple extension granting the formal legal 
protection to access these technologies, will further strengthen formal equality of 
opportunity regulations and solve any potential problems of exclusion. 
Now my attention turns towards showing that these enhancements should be morally 
permissible not only because they do not threaten justice in the well-ordered society, 
but also because, I argue, they could contribute to, and strengthen, the work done by 
the Rawlsian principles of justice. 
First, I focus on the Rawlsian principle of FEO and the priority it commands over 
income and wealth distribution schemes, I argue that genetic cognitive 
enhancements, alongside education, can do some of the work towards improving the 
level of opportunities of the least advantaged. 
Second, I show how the introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements is likely to 
yield productivity gains, which in turn will give rise to economic goods to be 
distributed under the dictates of the difference principle. 
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By increasing the range of available opportunities and the economic resources 
available for distribution, genetic cognitive enhancements will, alongside education, 
strengthen the work done by the principles of justice in reducing existing 
inequalities. 
5.6.1 The interaction of genetic cognitive enhancements and education and their 
contribution to the achievement of fair equality of opportunity 
The implications of Rawls’s principles of justice for the distribution of investment in 
education can be understood in, at least, three ways. First, people with equal talents 
should have access to the same educational opportunities. Second, we might most 
effectively increase the social product by investing in educational opportunities for 
the more talented. Third, we might most effectively promote fair equality of 
opportunity by investing more in the less talented (and those with social 
disadvantages), especially in the early years of education.   
Next, I provide a brief explanation of how Rawls justifies each of these approaches in 
his writings. 
Rawls advocates the use of compensatory measures designed to close the gap 
between children coming from opposite ends of the socio-economic spectrum. It was 
Rawls’s conviction that children with equal talent and motivation should fare 
similarly as far as educational achievement is concerned. This belief commits Rawls 
to guaranteeing equal access to educational resources on the basis of natural 
abilities alone. The equal distribution of educational resources is hence guaranteed 
on the grounds of fair equality of opportunity. 
However, the Rawlsian difference principle will provide the criteria for allowable 
unequal distribution of these resources. Rawls provides an argument for the 
allocation of more educational resources to those with higher cognitive talents. The 
argument goes that concentrating educational resources on those with higher levels 
of natural talents will enhance human capital yielding higher levels of productivity. 
This productivity gain will then be added to the available stock to be redistributed to 
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the least advantaged.  Only when these gains work to the maximal benefit of the 
least advantage, will this diversion of resources be allowed.374 
Within his theory, Rawls has now provided a criterion for both the equal and the 
unequal distribution of educational resources. That is, equal distribution for those 
with equal talent and motivation and an unequal distribution provided it maximally 
benefits the least advantaged. However, his unequal distribution is further 
constrained by a demand to consider how these educational resources affect citizens 
in more subtle ways: 
“resources for education are not to be allotted solely or necessarily mainly 
according to their return as estimated in productive trained abilities, but also 
according  to their worth in enriching the personal and social life of citizens.”375  
This means that the enrichment of all lives, including the lives of the least 
advantaged will also need to be taken into account before allocation is decided 
purely on the expected return of these trained abilities. These more intangible 
considerations are linked to how unequal distributions might affect the sense of 
worth of the individual. Echoing Rawls’s concerns, other authors such as Brighouse 
and Swift, have also remarked on the importance that equal distributions of 
education might have on the flourishing and wellbeing of individuals.376 Similarly, 
Pogge warns of the devastating effect that excluding citizens from education on 
grounds of their native talents will have on the important primary good of self-
respect.377 
Considerations of efficiency and increased social product are clearly not the whole 
picture.  A balance needs to be struck between the potential increase in the social 
product to be distributed through the combination of genetic interventions and 
education, and the potential negative effects on the least advantaged. 
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It could be argued that the balance to be struck is even more difficult since Rawls’s 
writings also support the diversion of educational resources to those least talented,  
which are presumably those also falling within the least advantaged group: 
“to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to 
those with fewer native assets and to those born into the less favourable social 
positions. The idea is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of 
equality. In pursuit of this principle greater resources night be spent on the 
education of the less rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time 
of life, say the earlier years of school.”378    
The role of education for Rawls lies in its capacity to narrow the differences in 
developed natural talents, understood by Rawls as intelligence, and therefore in its 
capacity to narrow the gap in life prospects. Rawls hopes to achieve that 
differentials in natural abilities either do not translate, or minimally translate into 
differentials in socio-economic goods. 
The introduction of genetic enhancements can affect the way education delivers its 
Rawlsian role, specifically through the improvement of educational outcomes and 
increasing the productivity gains available for distribution under the difference 
principle.  
5.6.1.1 Improving the outcomes of educational achievement 
The enhancement of the natural cognitive capacities of future offspring is likely to 
lead to improvements in educational achievements from one generation to the next. 
Natural aptitude is often seen as a major contributor towards educational success. 
All things being equal, it would make sense to assume that, as we enhance the 
genetic component of cognition, we might achieve better results with the same level 
of educational resources. This does not imply that other factors such as parental 
encouragement, nutrition, and a supportive social network can be substituted by 
new enhancement technologies. On the contrary, the idea is that these technologies 
will be working alongside all the environmental elements that contribute to the 
development of natural talents. Starting from a higher level of natural abilities, we 
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might find that, whilst keeping all environmental cognitive aids equal, there is an 
improvement in educational outputs.  
However, a higher education level might not immediately guarantee the 
achievement of greater educational outputs developed under the same 
environmental conditions. The degree of improvement might also depend on the 
educational stage and age of the child as well as the task or subject area in question. 
Motivation and self-discipline might be equally or more important for educational 
achievement.  Notwithstanding this consideration, research has shown that the 
genetic component of intelligence is one of the drivers of educational 
achievement.379 Achieving greater educational success as a consequence of 
enhanced cognition might also have the additional bonus of affecting the level of 
effort and motivation we might be willing to dedicate to our chosen pursuits. 
Brighouse and Swift have highlighted how “someone who has natural talent with 
respect to some activity is more likely to experience the rewards of early success 
and thus to have more incentive to continue to exert effort than someone who is less 
talented.”380 Enhanced cognitive talents combined with the higher level of 
motivation resulting from their educational rewards may also contribute to the 
successful pursuit of both educational and non-educational endeavours. 
Another factor associated with enhanced natural talents is the potential need for 
educational resources themselves to adapt to and better suit our modified cognition. 
Institutions over time might need to consider how the introduction of these 
technologies could affect both the content and mode of delivery of education. The 
changes in cognition are likely to require that education changes to accommodate a 
progressively superior level of talents. Think for a moment of the improved capacity 
for information processing. Even if we are not referring to the kind of changes that 
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takes people to beyond a species typical level, we might find that the classic style of 
classroom lecture delivery might soon become obsolete. Non-genetic means of 
enhancements such as IPads and smart phones have already forced the introduction 
of mobile teaching technology that goes beyond the classroom. Students no longer 
need to be physically present in a classroom to learn or interact with the teacher and 
other students. Arguably, more efficient ways of learning have become available via 
these external enhancements. Genetic enhancement is likely to contribute to these 
changes even further.  
Genetic cognitive enhancements might lead to better educational outcomes and also 
to changes in the mode of delivery and content of education. The capacity to keep up 
with how citizens are able to enhance cognition will ensure that these talents are 
developed and translate into very real educational achievements. 
5.6.1.2 Increasing the total social product available for distribution 
Let us recall how the argument from efficiency was used by Rawls to justify the 
diversion of educational resources to those with higher natural talents.  
The availability of genetic cognitive enhancements will bring about an increase in 
the cognition of future children, subject to the reproductive decisions taken by their 
parents. As a result, some of these future citizens will fall within the most talented 
and, as per the Rawlsian difference principle, they will be entitled to a higher share 
of educational resources. Their enhanced cognition combined with education will 
yield higher productivity gains that will benefit the least advantaged.  Not only may 
these interventions be beneficial to those individuals who have them, but their 
implementation can bring about broad social benefits that can be made to work to 
the benefit of those most in need.   
Allen Buchanan has also linked enhanced cognition with increases in productivity 
and gains in human wellbeing. Buchanan uses productivity in the sense of improved 
output to input ratio and also as a measurement of  “how good we are at using 
existing resources to create things we value.”381 The argument presented is that 
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cognitive enhancements in particular have the potential to increase this 
productivity: 
“Other things being equal, with enhanced cognitive capacities people will be able 
to do what they now do more quickly and efficiently and also may be able to do 
some new things they will value.”382   
This is reminiscent of the argument presented earlier in this thesis supporting the 
introduction of cognitive enhancements as primary goods as they help citizens to 
better choose, revise and pursue their conception of the good.  Our chosen 
conception of the good can be said to be something we clearly value and, following 
Buchanan, certain enhancements will better equip us to successfully pursue it.383 
An important characteristic attached to genetic cognitive enhancements is how they 
can become more valuable as more individuals have them. This is not only because 
of the individual productivity gains generated by the enhanced. The widespread 
introduction of enhancements may also generate what Buchanan defines as 
“network effects”. These network effects relate to how the benefits of the 
enhancement on the individual depend on how many other people are also 
enhanced. Literacy, numeracy and the widespread use of computers are given as 
examples of external cognitive enhancements which become more beneficial as 
more people have them. For example, there doesn’t seem to be much point in being 
an excellent novelist if no-one is able to read your books. An unforeseen and 
welcome consequence of these network effects is how they might make citizens 
collectively less dependent on a small pool of talented individuals.  As a consequence 
of this wider spread of talent, people might recognise that their “bargaining power” 
is limited and be motivated to accept higher taxes than they would do otherwise. 
It is also clear how the amount of shared knowledge will increase as more people 
are able to read and pass their own acquired knowledge to other individuals. Many 
individuals with increased cognition will be able to achieve together what one 
individual was not capable of achieving. This increase in the knowledge stock held 
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by society can be put to use towards increasing and improving the social product 
and wellbeing of individuals. According to Buchanan, it is society’s responsibility to 
identify those technologies that could have productivity increasing effects and 
assess this against the potential losses of forgoing these technologies.  
A similar argument to that presented by Buchanan has also been put forward by 
Fritz Allhoff who claims we need to be guided by the criteria of “justifiable societal 
gain” when assessing potential inequalities caused by unequal access to  cognitive 
enhancement technologies. Inequalities in access could be permissible, Allhoff 
claims,  if they resulted in a large social product benefitting everyone in society.384 
For example, Allhoff suggests we might be able to permit inequalities if the end 
result was that we find a solution to environmental problems. This kind of approach 
is clearly reminiscent of the Rawlsian reasoning that eventually led him to the 
development of the difference principle.  
One of the main differences of Rawls’s political conception over Allhoff’s defence of 
permissible inequalities is that, as we have seen, it restricts inequalities based on 
societal gain further on the grounds of liberty, self-respect and opportunity. Should 
these societal gains be achieved at the expense of lower and less valuable liberties, 
damage to opportunity and harming the self-respect of some members of society, 
these inequalities would not be allowed. Allhoff’s proposal would have to be further 
qualified so as not to collapse into utilitarianism. As we know, societal gains may 
hide behind them a range of impermissible violations to the exercise and 
development of the citizens’ two moral powers. 
Since Rawls conceived society as a “fair system of co-operation over time”,385  a 
political conception following the Rawlsian principles would seem to support those 
genetic enhancements that secure the resources necessary to preserve the basic 
institutions for future generations. Increases in productivity generated by these new 
technologies might help fulfil this function. Furthermore, the increased social 
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product and the generated network effects will help the work done by the difference 
principle in closing the gap in socio-economic inequalities.  
5.6.3 Genetic cognitive enhancements working towards easing the limitations in 
access to opportunities caused by differentials in  natural talents 
Despite the work that education does in the Rawlsian theory towards ensuring fair 
equality of opportunity, the fact still remains that people’s different levels of natural 
talents will lead to them having access to different levels of opportunities. Once 
again, we find that the commonly levelled criticism that the Rawlsian FEO is too 
endowment sensitive applies. As Jonathan Brown points out: 
“By relativizing equal opportunities to individuals’ talents and motivations, 
Rawls’s theory allows individuals unlucky in the genetic lottery to have 
insufficiently wide ranges of opportunities.” 386 
Although Brown is particularly concerned about those individuals falling below the 
normal functioning level, it is true however that the range of available opportunities 
might always depend, to some degree, on the level of natural talents possessed by 
citizens. As I have shown previously, Rawls suggests that educational resources 
should be distributed in a number of ways. Prioritising the value of self-respect, he 
justifies the distribution of more educational resources towards the least 
advantaged group, regardless of their natural talents. This would be consistent with 
Rawls’s own belief that offering equal quality and level of education to everyone 
would be in line with maintaining the priority of equal opportunity over the 
difference principle.   
However, the conditions of justice mean that we need to take into account how best 
to allocate scarce resources. Diverting more resources to the least advantaged on 
grounds of self respect might ultimately result in the neglect of other societal needs. 
Furthermore, even if offering equal levels of education to everyone was a feasible 
alternative, this would still fail to address the different educational achievements 
caused by initial differences in natural talents. The introduction of genetic cognitive 
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enhancements may ease the burden on the use of educational resources as follows: 
The uptake of these technologies may lead to a progressive improvement of the 
baseline genetic level of individuals. Genetic cognitive enhancements will not and 
should not aim to achieve any kind of genetic equality. The different initial cognitive 
levels of individuals are likely to mean that there will always be differentials in 
natural cognitive capacities. Nonetheless, as the genetic cognitive capacities of 
individuals improve, so will the educational levels they would be able to access. As 
these improved capacities work alongside education, not only will there be an 
improvement in productivity, but also the disadvantage they face in accessing jobs 
and positions of responsibility may itself be reduced. Despite the positional 
character attached to positions of responsibility, the range of life plans available for 
citizens for them to choose will be, nonetheless, widened. 
Cognitive enhancements can therefore promote FEO by contributing towards 
enhancing the range of life chances available to all.387 
5.6.4 Working to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged  
The role of education in facilitating access to opportunities and promoting the 
wellbeing of the least advantaged has been a source of criticism of the Rawlsian 
political conception. The special attention that the Rawlsian theory pays to those 
more talented, biasing the distribution of educational resources towards them, may 
disadvantage those most in need. The danger here is that this distribution does not 
help the range of opportunities of the least advantaged and it might result in greater 
socio-economic inequalities by not providing the extra educational resources 
needed to develop their inferior natural talents. Rawls may presumably be able to 
answer this criticism, saying that the least advantaged will still be entitled to access 
an appropriate amount of educational resources that protects their sense of worth. 
Moreover, as Thomas Nagel388 argues when a system of fair equality of opportunity 
is in place, the access to education is such that individuals are enjoying education to 
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the limits of their capacities. Any social inequality generated by that system is not 
unjust “if natural differences among the persons involved are its primary cause.”389  
Further problems for the least advantaged might also arise from the provision of 
compensatory education. Paul Gomberg thinks that the provision of compensatory 
education envisaged under the FEO is inadequate: 
 “compensatory education for children of the less advantaged would likely be 
insufficient to cancel income and wealth advantages unless we prohibited 
parents from bringing educational materials inside the home, using their 
resources to give their children enriched experiences, prolonging their 
educational opportunity, or even spending more time with them. These 
prohibitions would violate the liberty principle.”390 
The effect that the family had in the life prospects of their offspring was 
acknowledged by Rawls as he claimed that “even when fair opportunity (as it has 
been defined) is satisfied, the family will lead to unequal chances between 
individuals.”391 Given the priority that Rawls gave to opportunity, it seems that he 
would have supported the abolition or at least the regulation of the family392 so that 
the disadvantages suffered by children because of their family environment could be 
minimised. However, Rawls believed that once citizens realised that the whole 
system overall was designed so that advantages to the worst off were maximised, 
they would more readily accept the fact that some social barriers (such as the 
family) still remained and influenced their fortune.  
The availability of genetic interventions might help to address the residual 
disadvantages that the least advantaged might face once the FEO and the difference 
principle are satisfied.  
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Current evidence from the use of smart drugs indicates that the biggest 
improvements in cognition show in those that present the lowest levels of cognition 
at the beginning of the studies.393 This evidence drawn from  in pharmacological 
studies394 may give us reasons to believe that genetic interventions may also have a 
bigger impact on those starting from a lower threshold. Therefore, those that are 
least advantaged from a genetic perspective may benefit more than those who are 
considered to have higher starting genetic cognitive capacities. Rawls believed that 
that those least talented are likely to be members of the least disadvantaged 
group.395 Consequently, the use of genetic interventions amongst the least talented 
individuals may ultimately benefit the least advantaged group. 
I have outlined how genetic interventions will be considered a primary good and 
therefore be part of the index of primary goods that measures how well off people 
are. Individuals would be left free to acquire these interventions with their 
economic primary goods (i.e. their bundle of income and wealth). The Rawlsian 
society may however also consider partly subsidising these interventions based on 
the evidence that they are likely to benefit the least advantaged396 the most. The aim 
of such a policy would be to narrow the inevitable differentials in natural talents and 
subsequently, the differentials in socio-economic allocations caused by them. 
However, this kind of policy must be carefully considered if the Rawlsian society is 
to remain neutral amongst the very diverse and irreconcilable comprehensive world 
views.  
Notwithstanding the difficulties associated with the implementation of a policy 
subsidising these interventions, the general availability of these interventions 
granted by the absence of formal barriers of access will help towards the equality 
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that Rawls is trying to achieve.  Access to these technologies, benefiting those least 
advantaged, may in itself contribute towards more equality in the distribution of 
natural cognitive talents and lead to more equality in the distribution of socio-
economic resources. 
5.6.5 Better use of scarce resources 
Recall that one of the assumptions that Rawls makes at the point of deliberating 
about the principles of justice is that one of the facts of modern democratic societies 
is that they exist under conditions of moderate scarcity. This implies that tough 
choices need to be made regarding the services and primary goods it can afford to 
support and promote. The reality of working with scarce resources however should 
not be an insurmountable barrier against the implementation of genetic 
technologies. In fact, it might provide us with another argument supporting their 
introduction. 
The offer of educational resources under the fair equality of opportunity is not 
immune to this. Governments need to prioritise available funds and allocate them 
towards the alleviation of other social problems such as child poverty, illiteracy or 
the treatment of crippling diseases such as Huntington’s disease, Alzheimer or 
cancer. Should citizens choose to genetically enhance the cognition of their children, 
this might lead to lower investment in education for the achievement of equivalent 
educational outputs. In other words, the investment in educational resources in the 
enhanced population might not need to be as high in order to yield the same results. 
Genetic cognitive enhancements might lead to a society with a larger number of 
citizens who are better skilled needing less financial input from the government. The 
permissibility of these interventions could therefore be justified on account of “the 
just savings principle”.397  Enshrined in this duty is the obligation to preserve the 
conditions needed to protect background justice over time. Citizens, according to 
Rawls,  have a duty to do whatever is necessary to ensure that future generations 
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live under just conditions and to leave their descendants with the equivalent level of 
capital and societal resources that they received from previous generations.398  
A call for prudent spending in order to be able to secure the background justice 
conditions may mean that citizens have a moral duty to cognitively enhance their 
children if this results in the use of fewer resources needed for them to become 
citizens of the well-ordered society. 
5.7 Healthcare and genetic cognitive enhancements – two different approaches 
in the extension of the Rawlsian FEO principle. 
My attempts to incorporate genetic cognitive enhancements into the Rawlsian 
scheme can be contrasted to approaches for dealing with the distribution of 
healthcare. The similarity between healthcare and genetic cognitive enhancements 
resides in the way they affect the range of opportunities of individuals. Both goods 
will contribute towards increasing the range of opportunities available to 
individuals by improving their level of functioning.  
The best way to illustrate the role of healthcare in the Rawlsian political conception 
is by outlining Norman Daniels’s approach to its distribution. Even though other 
authors have proposed schemes of healthcare distribution that are intended to be 
consistent with the Rawlsian framework399, Daniels, I believe, provides the most 
fully developed account by extending FEO to include healthcare.  His concept of 
healthcare does not just include medical assistance, it is a broader concept including 
six distinct dimensions: adequate nutrition; sanitary, safe, unpolluted living and 
working conditions; exercise, rest and healthy lifestyle habits; availability of medical 
services; personal and social support services and an appropriate distribution of 
other social determinants of health.400 Daniels aims to solve the problem of meeting 
health needs through their incorporation into a theory of distributive justice 
suitable to accommodate the requirements of individuals falling below a normal 
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functioning level. Daniels identifies normal functioning in health, with the level that 
can be considered typical within a particular species. Any adverse departures from 
this species typical level will mean that we are no longer within the normal 
functioning range.  According to Daniels, species typical functioning needs to be 
maintained because of the way that it protects the range of opportunities open to 
individuals.401 This requires that access to resources needed to maintain or restore a 
species typical level of health, be given special protection under the Rawlsian 
conception. The aim is to safeguard people’s ability to be fully functioning citizens 
and their capacity to participate in the political, social and economic life. 
Furthermore, Daniels here protects what he calls the normal range of opportunities 
defined as the “array of life plans reasonable persons are likely to develop for 
themselves.”402  
Daniels achieves this by enshrining the concept of health needs within the fair 
equality of opportunity principle. Although the list of primary goods included in the 
Rawlsian index of primary goods remains the same, Daniels proposes that the 
concept of opportunity itself includes healthcare needs in the same way it does with 
educational resources. The extension of the FEO in this way seems to be a logical 
development of the Rawlsian theory in its commitment to maintain the normal 
functioning level of individuals. Even though in his early writings Rawls largely 
avoided any talk about the provision of healthcare with the assumptions that 
citizens were at the normal functioning level, he makes explicit his assumption that 
measures should be taken to maintain the health of the citizens in his later writings: 
“provision of medical care, as with primary goods generally, is to meet the needs 
and requirements of citizens as free and equal. Such care falls under the general 
means necessary to underwrite fair equality of opportunity and our capacity to 
take advantage of our basic rights and liberties, and thus to be normal and fully 
cooperating members of society.”403 
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Daniels drops Rawls’s idealised position of normal functioning altogether and 
develops a version of the Rawlsian FEO principle that he believes accommodates 
those instances where disease and disability stopped citizens from being fully 
cooperating members of society. Taking as a template the institutions regulating the 
provision of education that underwrites the FEO principle, there is room, Daniels 
argues, for the inclusion of healthcare institutions in line with the same central 
intuitions.404  
The institutions that Daniels has in mind are those covering all the six domains that 
he believes matter in securing and maintaining health. These institutions will 
regulate the provision of healthcare resources including public health, 
environmental cleanliness, food and drug protection or personalised medical care. 
The recognition that individuals have claims relating to their healthcare needs is 
anchored in the FEO principle, Daniels now needs to provide an answer as to how 
best to meet these claims.  
Having recognised that people have a right to health based on the protection of 
opportunities, Daniels needs to decide how the resources that meet these health 
needs are to be distributed. Recognising that scarce resources put limits on how 
these health needs are met, Daniels acknowledges that both the institutions 
regulating healthcare and other resources needed to meet FEO must be weighed 
against each other and therefore moral judgements will be needed for decisions of 
resource allocation. It is important that, in an attempt to provide people with the 
appropriate level of healthcare resources to achieve a normal level of functioning, 
we do not jeopardise the provision of other opportunity widening goods, such as 
education. Furthermore the link between education and health is such that 
neglecting to adequately provide for education will ultimately damage the health of 
our citizens. When discussing the effect of income inequalities on health across the 
US, Daniels mentions how those states with less egalitarian distributions have lower 
levels of educational spending and worse educational outcomes. As a result, Daniels 
issues the following warning: 
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“These effects on education have an immediate impact on health, increasing the 
likelihood of premature death during childhood and adolescence (as evidenced 
by the much higher death rates for infants and children in the high inequality 
states). Later in life these effects appear in the socio-economic gradient in 
health.”405  
Taking into account scarcity of resources, and the balancing of other societal needs, 
Daniels proposes that institutions need to be set up so that a scheme of universal 
healthcare is provided whether this is through public provision, private insurance or 
a mixture of both. This scheme is supposed to cover appropriate healthcare needs. 
In order to not deplete healthcare resources by giving absolute priority to those 
with most healthcare needs, Daniels replaces this requirement with a less 
demanding duty to give some priority to the least advantaged. This modification to 
the Rawlsian account means that Daniels can balance social needs without depleting 
all resources in the provision of healthcare.  The principle of opportunity protecting 
access to healthcare is however too general and indeterminate to be able to specify a 
fair allocation of resources. A more fine grained account where we set the limits in 
meeting health needs and the actual delivery of healthcare resources will be part of 
a public deliberation process characterised by the conditions of publicity, 
reasonableness406 and adequate appeal and enforcement mechanisms. Only if this 
process is followed, will society achieve a justifiable approach to the distribution of 
healthcare originating from the requirement to protect opportunity. 
An exposition of Daniels’s account helps to illustrate the main differences between 
his FEO extension to healthcare and my proposal to incorporate genetic cognitive 
enhancements into the Rawlsian framework. What follows explains the differences 
between these two approaches. 
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5.7.1 The introduction of genetic cognitive enhancement vs. Norman Daniels’s 
extended FEO: Two distinct approaches to enhance opportunity. 
Daniels’s approach shows how essential goods for ensuring fair equality of 
opportunity can be incorporated into the Rawlsian conception of justice. Given the 
opportunity of promoting value of genetic cognitive enhancements, a question might 
be posed regarding why a fuller integration into the Rawlsian framework, similar to 
that of healthcare, has not been considered. A closer scrutiny of the differences 
between both goods reveals that they need to be understood very differently in 
terms of the demands of justice. 
Norman Daniels’s account of health is developed in order to protect opportunity, His 
theory rests on the duty to protect the normal functioning of individuals so that 
access to opportunities is not jeopardised. Conversely, the proposed use of genetic 
cognitive enhancements in this thesis is that of increasing the citizens’ cognitive 
capacities beyond the normal functioning level. Where Daniels aims to protect the 
range of opportunity of individuals, my account aims to enhance this range of 
opportunity. My account therefore takes for granted the normal range of 
opportunities that would ordinarily be available to them and that Daniels attempts 
to protect. 
Daniels has, in fact, argued against any requirement of justice to secure 
enhancements:  
“Enhancing otherwise normal conditions— even when they put us at a 
disadvantage compared to others through no fault of our own—is then viewed as 
“not medically necessary.”407  
Since our chosen enhancements are not medically necessary, an account of justice 
will not need to warrant their universal access and hence their protection under 
FEO. Daniels’s reluctance to include these technologies also rests on the 
presumption that support for their introduction into an account of justice is 
grounded solely on the moral arbitrariness of native talents. This, according to 
Daniels, would lead to an extremely demanding account of justice that is required to 
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compensate in some way for the diminished shares in social goods derived from 
factors that are beyond our control.  Daniels feels this reasoning is faulty because it 
places too much weight on the issue of responsibility. However,  a defence of 
cognitive enhancements can also be anchored on the very principle he himself uses 
for his defence of universal healthcare, namely, that the distribution of cognitive 
talents can unreasonably impact on the range of opportunities of individuals.  
Scarce resources mean that guaranteed universal access to these technologies is 
beyond what the Rawlsian account of justice408 would require. However, given the 
priority that Rawls gives to opportunity and the role that these technologies have in 
increasing the native talents of the least advantaged and hence their range of 
opportunities, there is a duty to eliminate any legal barriers to access. Anti-
discriminatory legislation needs to be in place so that anyone who wants access to 
these technologies has the option to access them.   
A further difference between both accounts is how genetic cognitive enhancements, 
unlike healthcare, have been added to the index of primary goods. As explained in 
Chapter 4, their role within the index is that of identifying the least advantaged 
representative group and establishing the relative position of citizens. Rawls did not 
see the need to add health or healthcare to the index of primary goods since he 
worked on the assumption that people were (at least most of the time) functioning 
normally. Despite dropping the normal functioning assumption, Daniels believes 
that introducing healthcare into the index of primary good adds complexity to the 
index and raises the issue of weighing and ranking goods. If healthcare is added to 
the mix, Daniels argues, it will be extremely difficult to determine whether citizens 
having an equivalent index allocation and enjoy roughly equivalent equal positions. 
We would need to know whether their health resource allocation adequately meets 
the needs to maintain or restore normal functioning. For some it might mean only a 
small allocation is needed whereas for others with chronic conditions it might mean 
the vast amount of the overall index. Equal shares will mean very different things 
depending on the level of functioning of individuals. 
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Genetic cognitive enhancements however do not face the same problem of 
measurement. One of the advantages is that we start from a baseline of normal 
functioning, and the aim is not to achieve specific levels of superior functioning. 
Getting enhanced is a one off event in the lifetime of citizens and there is no risk of 
increasing costs in order to achieve ever increasing levels of functioning. 
Furthermore, the least advantaged group is likely to receive the most benefit unlike 
in the healthcare example where people with very complex health needs may never 
be as well off as those already functioning at a normal level. 
Although in defending the enhancement of normal capacities my account may seem 
more demanding and controversial than that of Daniels, it also shows that the 
introduction of genetic cognitive enhancements can be incorporated into the 
Rawlsian framework without the need to drop Rawls’s normality assumption nor 
change the institutional structures needed to control the distribution of these 
technologies 
5.8 An alternative approach to dealing with newly emerging technologies – 
Farrelly’s Lax Biological Difference Principle  
The previous section contrasted Daniels’s account of healthcare with my own 
approach incorporating genetic cognitive enhancements into the Rawlsian 
framework. My attention now turns to the evaluation of Colin Farrelly’s theory for 
dealing with variations in natural talents and how this differs with my own account.  
Colin Farrelly chooses the Rawlsian difference principle as the platform for his 
theory. He modifies the difference principle in order to incorporate the demands 
posed by newly emerging technologies. Farrelly frames this modification by moving 
from the ideal to the non-ideal setting where “scarcity and pervasive 
disadvantage”409 prevail.  Farrelly criticises Rawls for ignoring the non-ideal 
conditions, particularly the fact that severe genetic inequalities between individuals 
leads to pervasive socio-economic inequalities. His initial response to the perceived 
shortcomings of the Rawlsian theory is to develop what he calls the “lax genetic 
difference principle” (LGDP). The LGDP extends the reasoning offered by the 
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difference principle to genetic constitutions and puts the following constraint on 
inequalities in the distribution of natural talents: 
 “inequalities in the distribution of genes important to the natural primary goods 
are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest reasonable benefit of the least 
advantaged”410   
This principle has been recently modified and replaced with the “Lax Biologically 
Difference Principle”411 Lax BPD henceforth. The only difference is that here Farrelly 
replaces the “distribution of genes” with “biological capacities” in order to capture 
the other features of our biology, in addition to genes, that have a role in realising 
the natural primary goods. Otherwise,  the justification and rationale for the 
principle itself remains the same. 
It is considered a lax principle because it avoids giving absolute preference to the 
interests of those most disadvantaged in their biological make-up. Replacing the 
absolute priority with a reasonable priority avoids falling into a situation where 
available resources are depleted in an effort to improve the situation of those most 
in need from a genetic perspective. As the situation of the worst off improves, our 
duty towards them, Farrelly claims, declines. Defending an absolute version of the 
genetic difference principle would have meant that “a small gain to the genetically 
disadvantaged is more important than a great loss to both the socially 
disadvantaged and advantaged.”412 Ignoring the plight of others that could be 
considered disadvantaged in other ways might create new inequalities where none 
might have existed. This would lead to the replacement of one least advantaged 
group with another that, perhaps, ends up even worse off. Furthermore, Farrelly 
does not believe that genetic or biological inequalities caused by inequalities in 
access to biotechnology are to be eliminated since, maintaining these differences in 
native talents,  could lead to increases in economic productivity and incentives in the 
development of new technologies that will eventually benefit the least advantaged. 
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However, not all genes and their distribution are treated equally under Farrelly’s 
account. He is only concerned with those genetic dispositions that will develop the 
potential of the natural primary goods as defined by Rawls namely, health, vigour, 
intelligence and imagination. 
Whilst the Rawlsian difference principle was only concerned with the distribution of 
social primary goods, Farrelly proposes a version that only deals with the 
genetically and biologically modifiable characteristics of natural primary goods.  
Furthermore, whilst the currency used in the difference principle is wealth and 
income, Farrelly changes Rawls’s account by replacing social with natural primary 
goods, more specifically, with their natural potentials for acquiring natural primary 
goods. 
Linked to this change in currency,  we find another departure from the Rawlsian 
difference principle in Farrelly’s definition of the least advantaged. This 
representative group is defined by Farrelly in terms of natural endowments whereas 
Rawls uses levels of authority and wealth to identify those most vulnerable in 
society.  Rawls was very aware of the difficulty of measuring who would fall within 
the least advantaged group and chose wealth and income to identify this group and 
make interpersonal comparisons. Additionally, Farrelly does not define the least 
advantaged in relative terms. Rather, the genetically disadvantaged is the one with 
the lowest level of genetic endowments. As an example of who might be included 
within the least advantaged group, he suggests those “with disease or at a high risk 
of developing disease.”413 The closer this group gets to a species typical functioning, 
the lower the requirements of justice are towards them. 
Having identified the least advantaged and developed the principle for governing 
the inequalities in the gene distribution, Farrelly needs to address how to tackle 
these inequalities taking into account scarce existing resources. Deciding how to 
allocate these resources amongst competing social goods is what Farrelly calls “The 
Problem of Weight.”414 Balancing what a society is going to spend on achieving 
genetic equality vs. the demands on healthcare, education or economic equality 
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might make the implementation of genetic cognitive enhancements an impossibility. 
Apart from the public financing of education and basic healthcare, resources are also 
needed to maintain the physical infrastructure of our communities and to ensure 
that pensions and benefits are not put in jeopardy should we decide to embrace 
these new technologies.415 The reality of this scarcity of resources would, according 
to Farrelly,  make genetic egalitarianism collapse into some kind of 
sufficientarianism or prioritarianism. Settling for what might be considered a 
genetic decent minimum is however not an acceptable option for Farrelly who 
claims that such a solution “might be of use in a society that already satisfied a 
decent minimum of other goods (e.g., housing, education, nutrition, wealth, etc.) and 
already possessed a vast supply of genetic therapies. But no society in this world is 
like that.”416 Farrelly’s answer to these concerns is to assess the potential 
implementation of genetic interventions according to three main criteria. First, the 
means used for the intervention will need to be rationally connected to the 
objective. Second, attempts will be made to violate the reproductive freedom of the 
individual as little as possible. Third, there has to be some sort of proportionality 
between costs and benefits achieved though the intervention. 
The point Farrelly makes about reproductive freedom betrays another departure 
from the Rawlsian thought. Farrelly does not adhere to the lexical priority that 
Rawls gives to his principles of justice. Basic liberties are not granted priority over 
considerations of efficiency or opportunity. His proposal involves balancing the 
demands of preserving reproductive freedom against a duty to prevent harm via 
what he calls the “Reasonable Genetic Intervention Model.”417 Issues of reproductive 
freedom under Farrelly’s account are secondary to the interests of the genetically 
disadvantaged. Restrictions on the reproductive freedom of parents would be 
justified if it related to “concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society”418. Rights and liberties do not trump other societal 
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considerations, they are just one of many considerations to be taken into account 
when we make decisions about the permissibility of genetic interventions. 
Farrelly endorses the use of the LaxBDP as a way to help balance the prioritarian 
commitments with other competing societal demands. Under a non-ideal 
framework, he uses the idea of genetic endowments as part of a biological account to 
define the least advantaged representative group. This departure from the non-ideal 
setting has two main implications for how he deals with the distribution of societal 
resources. First, the least advantaged no longer get absolute priority; second, the 
priority given to basic rights of liberties does not prevail over other societal 
considerations. 
Next, I will outline the differences between Farrelly’s  and my approach in dealing 
with differences in natural talents.  
 
5.8.1 Differences in the distribution of genetic cognitive enhancements, 
Reflecting on Farrelly’s account 
Farrelly’s approach can be contrasted with the account I have presented for the 
assimilation of genetic cognitive enhancements within the Rawlsian framework in a 
number of ways.  
The definition he provides of the least advantaged group is perhaps one of the 
clearest diversions from my account. Farrelly identifies the least advantaged with 
those who fare worst in terms of natural primary goods. This might seem an 
unnecessary change to the Rawlsian account since Rawls himself seems to assume 
that those possessing lower economic shares will usually also be most 
disadvantaged from a genetic perspective.419 Admittedly, this correlation may not 
always present itself, particularly once we drop the normal functioning assumption. 
However, by defining his account in this manner, he risks diverting social resources 
to citizens who, although severely impaired, do possess a high amount of economic 
shares, whilst those on very low incomes are not receiving the societal resources 
                                                        
419 Rawls, J. (1999b). "A theory of justice - Revised Edition." Harvard Univ Pr. Page 83 
  
184 
they need. A fuller account of the least advantage group may eliminate this 
counterintuitive outcome.  
Farrelly’s account on the distribution of genetic make-up having as a reference point 
those with fewer native talents, means that his account is one concerned with 
departures from normal functioning. Rather than dealing with enhancements that 
improve functioning beyond a given normal level, Farrelly’s approach seems to 
collapse into an account of how best to distribute healthcare resources to meet the 
requirements of those who need them the most. This is emphasised by his 
suggestion that inequalities in the distribution of natural talents can be addressed 
through the regulation of the distribution of a variety of social goods. These might 
include genetic technologies but also education or indeed economic resources.420 His 
distributive principle fails to provide the guidance needed for the distribution of 
genetic enhancements designed to take the individual beyond the normal 
functioning level. This means that the issue of genetic technologies remains largely 
unanswered.  
My thesis focuses on whether the Rawlsian theory is equipped to deal with potential 
distributional issues originating from the emergence of genetic cognitive 
enhancements themselves. It is the distribution of these technologies as social 
primary goods that are the focus of my account. Conversely,  Farrelly is concerned 
with biological characteristics and then uses a range of social primary goods to 
address shortcomings in the distribution of these natural characteristics.  
Consequently, my approach avoids having to make any assessment on the biological 
status of the individuals and therefore avoids having to evaluate who might be the 
most biologically deprived before making any allocation decisions.  
Related to this focus on natural capacities is the deconstruction that Farrelly makes 
of the Rawlsian difference principle. Farrelly’s difference principle is applied to 
genetic considerations alone making it unclear how the interests of other members 
of society disadvantaged in a non-genetic way will be met. Furthermore, Farrelly is 
ambiguous in relation to how and whether the least advantaged should be 
prioritised over other members of society. For instance, when discussing the 
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distribution of societal resources,  Farrelly affirms that some consideration also 
needs to be given to “those who have both favourable genes and social environment” 
but could, all the same, benefit from quality public education.421 It is unclear what 
the strength of this consideration should be and how we are to prioritise 
accordingly. The Lax BDP offers no guidance on how to distribute resources among 
different disadvantaged groups. 
My discussion of these new technologies assumes that the idealised conditions of 
normal functioning and moderate scarcity, set by Rawls, hold. Conversely Farrelly 
moves his theory to the non-ideal setting inevitably leading him to focus his 
discussion on issues closer to therapy than enhancement. Furthermore, in his 
attempt to make his theory applicable to the reality of non-ideal societies, he largely 
leaves the content of his principle indeterminate and without clear guidance on how 
to balance competing demands.  
Finally, I consider Farrelly’s failure to grant protection to basic rights and liberties 
particularly problematic from a Rawlsian perspective. In non-ideal circumstances of 
scarcity and pervasive inequalities this protection is essential to ensure that access 
to these technologies do not result in excessive accumulations of wealth and power.  
Recall that the Lax BDP does not rank itself in relation to other principles protecting 
rights, duties or liberties. Instead, society is supposed to balance the distributional 
demands of the Lax BDP against the need to protect rights and liberties as and when 
they arise. The indeterminacy of the guidance provided by his “reasonable genetic 
intervention model” makes it unclear which demands of justice should prevail. 
Although these are considered by Farrelly as common sense rules, there seems to be 
too high a level of indeterminacy to be able to apply these principles in non-ideal 
conditions, as was his objective. The Rawlsian principles protecting basic rights and 
liberties and access to opportunities could have easily been transferred to the non-
ideal setting in order to avoid these potential societal problems. 
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5.9  Conclusion 
A detailed analysis of the impact of genetic cognitive enhancements on basic rights 
and liberties, opportunities and socio-economic inequalities has shown that these 
concerns can be addressed from within the framework of the Rawlsian political 
conception of justice. Throughout, I have maintained that these interventions do not 
compromise the principles of justice. If these technologies do not undermine the 
principles of justice, their introduction may be permitted from the viewpoint of 
justice.422. 
Moreover, they might help towards achieving the goal of equality that underpins 
Rawls’s defence of the two principles of justice. Given their role as primary goods 
and how they facilitate access to jobs and positions, I argue that any legal barriers to 
access to these technologies need to be removed. Citizens must not be stopped from 
acquiring these goods on the basis of morally arbitrary factors such as gender, creed, 
genetic make-up or occupation.  
The Rawlsian answer to the social justice effects of the unfettered introduction of 
genetic cognitive enhancements must not be interpreted as one that appeals to one 
single principle of the political conception. Each of the principles fulfils its very own 
distribution role and has an impact on the restrictions imposed by the other 
principles. First, the protection given to liberties and the access to opportunities will 
prevent damaging concentrations of wealth at the hands of the few. Second, the 
priority given to the FEO principle over the distribution of economic goods will 
avoid the entrenchment of inequalities within specific economic classes and across 
generations by ensuring that economic gains are redirected towards educational 
and cultural resources. Third, wide economic inequalities will also be restricted in 
order to preserve the social bases of self-respect.  
The Rawlsian principles are therefore not to be assessed in isolation on how 
effectively they deal with newly emerging technologies, rather, they all work 
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together pulling towards equality and reciprocity. Rawls himself warns us about 
interpreting the potential effects of the difference principle in isolation:  
“The requirements of the prior principles have important distributive effects. 
Consider the effects of fair equality of opportunity as applied to education say, or 
the distributive effects of the fair value of the political liberties. We cannot 
possibly take the difference principle seriously so long as we think of it by itself, 
apart from its setting within prior principles.”423  
The chapter continues with the proposal that genetic cognitive enhancements may 
broaden the range of opportunities open to individuals and help to promote 
equality. These technologies will help to widen access to available opportunities, 
particularly to the least advantaged and strengthen the work done by the difference 
principle to minimise any resulting inequalities in wealth and income. Enhanced 
cognitive capacities might lead to better educational outputs which in turn may 
result in the widening of opportunities open to individuals. As a result, the access to 
more desirable positions may result in a higher share of socio-economic goods for 
the individual. The social product available for distribution under the difference 
principle may also itself increase through a rise in productivity and the generation of 
network effects.  
Finally, I conclude that my account for the incorporation of genetic cognitive 
enhancements within the Rawlsian framework is distinct from both Norman 
Daniels’s extended version of the FEO principle and Colin Farrelly’s lax biological 
difference principle. First, my account keeps faithful to the normal functioning ideal 
established by Rawls. In adhering to this condition, I am able to explore the 
implications for the Rawlsian theory of taking the cognitive capacities of citizens 
beyond what is required for them to be considered fully functioning citizens. Second, 
whilst Daniels’s account requires the establishment of new background institutions 
to deal with the distribution of health needs, my account requires the extension of 
the FEO to include the removal of barriers of access to genetic cognitive 
enhancements. Third, Farrelly’s definition of the least advantaged is only based on 
natural primary goods allocations. I retain Rawls’s definition of the least advantaged 
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whilst incorporating genetic cognitive enhancements as additional primary goods to 
be added to the Rawlsian index. Fourth, whilst Farrelly’s focus aims to address 
issues in the distribution of natural talents, I focus on the distribution of genetic 
enhancements in their role as primary goods. These differences in approach 
highlight my attempts to keep faithful to Rawls’s writings by working within the 
limits set by the ideal theory. 
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Chapter 6. Genetic moral enhancements and their relationship to 
social justice: An assessment of their contribution towards the 
stability of the Rawlsian society 
The previous two chapters have shown how genetic cognitive enhancements can be 
accommodated within the Rawlsian framework. This extension to Rawls’s theory 
was justified firstly on account of how these technologies met the conditions 
required of primary goods and secondly by demonstrating that, not only they did 
not contravene the principles of justice, but they had the potential to strengthen 
access to opportunities and increase the social product available for distribution 
under the difference principle. 
My enquiry is now extended to a set of genetic interventions designed to potentially  
augment the natural moral capacities of empathy and sense of fairness. I explore 
whether, in line with Rawls’s writings on moral psychology, the enhancement of 
these capacities can contribute towards securing the stability of the well-ordered 
society. 
Having developed principles of justice designed to regulate economic inequalities 
and  to protect basic rights and liberties and access to opportunities, Rawls’s 
concern turns to demonstrating that the well-ordered society will be stable.  The 
well-ordered society will need to be shown to endure across time, and ideally, 
across future generations. It is then vital that the chosen political conception, not 
only contains principles that are in line with the moral convictions of modern 
democracies, but that they also engender the appropriate moral motivation to 
secure the stability of society. 
This chapter begins by defining the role of stability in the Rawlsian theory of justice 
and providing a brief outline of the evolution of different strategies Rawls developed 
to justify this stability. Rawls’s understanding of stability centres on the ability of the 
political conception to generate its own support.424 I interpret the problem of 
stability as having two main components. The first concerns the development of the 
sense of justice as the motivational pull for citizens to affirm the principles of justice. 
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The second concerns how this motivation can be sustained over time to secure a 
lasting well-ordered society. 
After a brief description of the model of moral psychology endorsed by Rawls, I 
outline how the natural moral capacities of empathy and a sense of fairness relate to 
Rawls’s understanding of natural attitudes, moral sentiments and political virtues, 
such as the sense of justice. I propose that these capacities have a role in the moral 
development of individuals eliciting the required moral sentiments. This is the same 
role that Rawls attributed to the natural attitudes for love, mutual trust and 
friendship. Showing that these capacities could be part of the Rawlsian model is the 
starting point for a later argument in support of their enhancement through 
germline engineering. 
After a quick review of the congruence argument developed in A Theory of Justice, I 
focus on Rawls’s justification of stability provided in his later writings after he finds 
that this perfectionist account of stability, requiring justice to be part of the 
individual’s good, is not compatible with the political scope of his theory. Rawls’s 
answer to the stability problem relies now on the ability of the political conception 
to be the focus of an overlapping consensus amongst a plurality of reasonable 
comprehensive views. 
Next, I consider two challenges faced by the type of enduring stability sought by 
Rawls in Political Liberalism. First, I discuss the challenge of non-compliance caused 
by reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive views and their competing 
demands. Second, I consider the failure to develop an adequate sense of justice 
caused by the lack of appropriate natural attitudes and by the failings of the family 
as the main institution responsible for the child’s moral development. 
I conclude by arguing that the challenges to stability may lead Rawls to review his 
theory in substantial ways prompting him to consider one or more of the following 
options: enhancing the citizens’ sense of justice by biomedical means; revising the 
principles of justice; or relaxing the requirement for stability.  
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6.1 The problem of stability, a constant through the Rawlsian writings. 
Answers to the challenge of stability in the well-ordered society are first developed 
by Rawls in A Theory of Justice and revised in later writings, particularly in Political 
Liberalism. Throughout his writings Rawls aims to demonstrate that a society 
governed by his two principles of justice, chosen during the development of his 
justice theory, are able to secure a lasting, just and peaceful society over time. 
Stability is understood as a type of equilibrium, whereby people consistently act 
according to the precepts of justice in the knowledge that everyone else also acts 
justly. This equilibrium ensures that, even though institutions and social conditions 
may change over time, the justice of the basic structure and how this is affirmed by 
citizens will largely remain unchanged.425  
Even though Rawls tackles the issue of stability differently in his early and later 
writings, his concern remains the same throughout. We can find references to 
stability and its role in the feasibility of the political conception all through the two 
stages of the development of justice as fairness as a political conception. These two 
stages of Rawls’s social contract theory are first mentioned in The Sense of Justice.426 
This early paper, written eight years prior to the publication of A Theory of Justice, 
gives us a first glimpse of Rawls’s derivation of the principles of justice and the 
subsequent issue of citizens adhering to and affirming these principles. Rawls 
highlights here the significance of the problem of stability where we are warned that 
the derivation of the principles of justice, through the analytic construction,  does 
not suffice, we also need to show that the just society will last:  
 “The aim of this analytic construction is to derive the principles of justice which 
apply to institutions. How persons will act in the particular circumstances when, 
as the rules specify, it is their turn to do their part is a different question 
altogether.”427 
It is this “different question altogether” that now deals with the possibility of 
achieving a stable society making this the next stage in Rawls’s theory. Predicting 
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how people will behave troubles Rawls and leads him to consider whether 
adherence to the principles can be realised. The issue of stability means that Rawls 
needs to show that his is a lasting society where everyone accepts and knows that 
others accept the same principles of justice and that the basic social institutions 
satisfy, and are largely known to satisfy, these principles.  Stability is seen by Rawls 
as part of the justification that the chosen conception of justice is correct. The 
process of choosing a conception of justice will not be complete unless its feasibility 
can be demonstrated: 
“The argument for the principles of justice is not complete until the principles 
selected in the first part (stage) are shown in the second part (stage) to be 
sufficiently stable”428 
The justificatory role given to stability seems to be crucial to the success or failure of 
the political conception,  so much so that should there be another set of principles 
that fulfil this condition better, they should be chosen instead: 
“However attractive a conception of justice might be on other grounds, it is 
seriously defective if the principles of moral psychology are such that it fails to 
engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it.”429 
It could be argued that the problem of stability could rapidly be solved thorough the 
establishment of penalties to punish any potential de-stabilising behaviours. This 
might be justified by the fact that the principles of justice chosen are themselves 
considered to be fair. However, this is not the kind of stability that Rawls believes 
secures the long term viability of the well-ordered society. Stability is not to be 
secured at all costs, it needs to be secured for the right reasons. 
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6.1.1 Stability for the right reasons  
Rawls is careful to contrast his account of stability with two other approaches found 
historically across different societies. One way to achieve stability is represented by 
the enforcement of state oppression; the other one takes the form of a “modus 
vivendi”.  
An example of state enforced obedience in social cooperation is the contractual 
model devised by Hobbes.430 Under this system, non-conformity to the principles of 
justice is met with governmental intervention where “the sovereign maintains and 
stabilises the system of social cooperation by publicly maintaining an effective 
schedule of penalties.”431 Despite the potential effectiveness of this approach, the 
use of oppression however,  could not be justified in a society characterised by its 
non-voluntary membership. In his writings, Rawls assumes throughout that citizens 
belong to a society they do not themselves choose, entering at birth and exiting at 
death. This non-voluntary membership makes the use of coercive powers that force 
citizens to accept a comprehensive doctrine they did not choose deeply unjustified.  
An alternative to this state-enforced type of stability is stability achieved via a 
“modus vivendi”. In this case, those holding conflicting views reach an agreement 
and settle for a peaceful civil society rather than living in an unstable and 
unpredictable state of nature. This agreement leads to a “modus vivendi”432 where 
citizens, whilst often having conflicting interests, comply with a conception of justice 
as the best possible alternative given their current conditions and distribution of 
power. The danger of a society  characterised by a modus vivendi is that shifts in the 
power held by different groups are likely to have a de-stabilising effect and may lead 
to the domination, caused by the change in circumstances, of those who are least 
advantaged. 
Both the state-enforced and modus vivendi approaches to stability are 
unsatisfactory for Rawls. He is concerned not only with stability, but also with how 
stability can be achieved and sustained over time respecting liberal principles. This 
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is not the kind of stability that either one of the two approaches just described can 
offer. Rawls aims to achieve “stability for the right reasons” redefining the problem 
of stability as: 
“…not that of bringing others who reject a conception to share it, or to act in 
accordance with it, by workable sanctions, if necessary, as if the task were to find 
ways to impose that conception on others once we are ourselves convinced it is 
sound, rather, as a liberal political conception, justice as fairness relies for its 
reasonableness in the first place upon generating its own support in a suitable 
way by addressing each citizen’s reason as explained within its own 
framework.”433 
Rawls’s political conception needs to be capable of appealing to citizens and 
securing their support. This appeal is such that people with diverse conceptions of 
the good and very different starting places in life adhere to the principles of justice 
even when it goes against what they might perceive to be their best interest.  This is 
a more substantial and demanding type of stability rooted in the moral principles 
that have been chosen under conditions of fairness. It requires a different kind of 
moral commitment from its citizens, an un-coerced moral sentiment,434  as the 
motivating force for acting upon the sense of justice that leads citizens to support 
and affirm the principles of justice. Moreover,  these principles of justice are meant 
to be “final and made in perpetuity.”435 In other words, the support for these 
principles will not falter over time due to external contingencies or changes in the 
distribution of power amongst different groups.  
The political conception needs to be capable of engendering in citizens a  willingness 
and desire to comply by and support the principles of justice ruling the basic 
institutions. As Brian Barry accurately  highlights,  Rawls’s aim is to prove “the 
existence of appropriate motivation for doing what justice requires.”436 
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From the above we can infer that the problem of stability, as Rawls defines it, rests 
on the actual content of the political conception,  the moral psychology of individuals 
and whether citizens can find strong enough reasons to consistently act in 
accordance to justice. 
In order to fully understand Rawls’s account of stability this chapter proceeds as 
follows. First, I outline the Rawlsian account of citizens’ moral psychology. Second, I 
summarise the reasons why Rawls believes this motivation will persist across time, 
hence securing the stability of the well-ordered society. Whilst his account of moral 
psychology remains largely unchanged throughout his writings, his account of how 
this motivation is secured changes over time from A Theory of Justice to his final 
account in Political Liberalism. 
 6.2 The acquisition of a sense of justice – A brief introduction to the Rawlsian 
model of moral psychology. 
In order to understand the type of motivation that stability for the right reasons 
requires, we need to first have a closer look at the development of the moral 
sentiments of citizens in the well-ordered society. This section also explores 
whether the natural capacities of empathy and a sense of fairness can play a role in 
Rawls’s account of moral psychology.  First, I propose that they should be given the 
same consideration to that granted to love, mutual trust and friendship. This is 
justified by the role they have in the development of the sense of justice.  
Rawls remains faithful throughout his writings to the model of moral psychology 
developed in A Theory of Justice.  The entirety of chapter 8 in A Theory of Justice is 
devoted to the development of a sense of justice, which serves as the main 
motivation for citizens to act in accordance with the principles of justice. 
A sense of justice is defined as “a normally effective desire to act upon the principles 
of justice, at least to a minimum degree.”437  Its development  is grounded in Rawls’s  
theory of moral psychology, which in turn is inspired by the empiricist and 
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rationalist theories of moral development and developmental psychology.438 A sense 
of justice is a kind of moral sensibility, whose development presupposes the 
possession of certain natural attitudes and the existence of adequate social 
conditions.  Rawls describes a path for the acquisition of a sense of justice in the 
well-ordered society which takes the reader from its inception in childhood to its 
fully developed stage in adulthood. The sense of justice is acquired through three 
stages of moral development, each characterised by a specific moral law.  
The first stage identified by Rawls leads to a “morality of authority”. During this 
phase the child has her parent, almost exclusively, as the only reference of moral 
behaviour.  Characterised by the bond between parent and child, this stage sees the 
development of  feelings of affection and trust in the child that will guide her moral 
behaviour. The love the child feels for her parents is exclusively motivated by her 
recognition of the love and affection that she is being given. Because of their 
closeness to their parents,  young children care more about their parents feelings 
than others in their environment.439 These feelings develop further as the child’s 
sense of worth is nurtured by the parental relationship, which helps her internalise 
the moral precepts she has been exposed to in the familial environment. 
In this case the first law of moral development states that: 
“given that family institutions are just, and that the parents love the child and 
manifestly express their love by caring for his good, then the child, recognizing 
their evident love of him, comes to love them.”440 
Rawls is trying to model the family and subsequent environment of the citizen as a 
mini just society. He assumes that the structures surrounding the child are just. The 
family members will exhibit the type of just behaviours that the child will later 
encounter in educational institutions and society at large.  If we learn stage by stage 
to develop sentiments of justice towards those who love us and behave fairly with 
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us, these sentiments can then easily be extended towards those citizens of a society 
where just behaviours are common place.  
The second stage of moral development is dominated by a “morality of association”. 
At this point the child’s relationship circle is extended, with the family unit 
becoming just one of various small associations that are part of the child’s daily life. 
The law governing this stage differs from the first law insofar as: 
 “given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by acquiring 
attachments in accordance with the first law, and given that a social 
arrangement is just and publicly known by all to be just, then this person 
develops ties of friendly feeling and trust toward others in the association as they 
with evident intention comply with their duties and obligations, and live up to the 
ideals of their station.”441  
Through her relationship with new groups, the child increases her moral learning, 
recognising different behaviours displayed by those holding different positions of 
authority, understanding the role of cooperation, accepting diverging points of view 
and recognising how others equally accept and recognise her own perspective. 
Whilst the first stage of development was largely characterised by the obedience 
owed to parental dictates and motivated by feelings of love, the morality of 
association focuses on the development of cooperative behaviour and the 
beginnings of a desire to act according to the precepts of justice.   
The last stage of moral development is defined by Rawls as the “morality of 
principles”. The individual, now a young adult, engages in the most complex forms of 
association and develops a genuine concern for how her moral conduct is being 
perceived by others. The requirements of justice are internalised by the individual, 
that is, having experienced fairness and respect from others the young adult will act 
upon and adhere to the principles of justice. This development in the moral 
behaviour of individuals is encapsulated in the third law of morality: 
 “given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by his forming 
attachments in accordance with the first two laws, and given that a society's 
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institutions are just and are publicly known by all to be just, then this person 
acquires the corresponding sense of justice as he recognizes that he and those for 
whom he cares are the beneficiaries of this arrangement”442  
This final stage represents the realisation that we need to support the institutions 
that have contributed to the fruitful cooperation gained in our relationship with 
others, even when we don’t have any affective ties with those also involved in social 
cooperation.   
These stages show the moral journey taken by the individual from childhood where, 
through the love and nurture offered by the family, she develops true feelings of 
affection towards her parents. As she becomes involved in more complex 
associations at school, play groups or other social organisations she witnesses 
reciprocal behaviours of trust towards her, which stimulate a capacity for trust and 
responsibility that will eventually be extended to those with whom she has no 
particular affiliation. This moral development culminates in a fully developed sense 
of justice as these feelings of trust and empathy extend to a degree that compels the 
individual to abide by institutional arrangements in the knowledge that others do 
too.  
Having acquired an understanding of the moral process undertaken by the 
individual, the next step involves scrutinising the natural attitudes involved in this 
process. Once we understand the function that Rawls gives to these natural 
attitudes, I evaluate whether the natural attitudes of empathy and a sense of fairness 
can also  be part of this moral development process. 
6.2.1 Empathy, a sense of fairness and the innate attitudes constitutive of the 
Rawlsian account of moral development. 
Through the process of moral development the individual’s natural moral attitudes 
are being nurtured and developed as the child witnesses reciprocal  and mutually 
beneficial behaviours in social cooperation. Rawls recognises here that there is a set 
of natural dispositions that enable the development of appropriate moral feelings 
and drive us to act in accordance to the precepts of justice. The innate nature of 
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these attitudes is made explicit by Rawls when he describes the set of natural 
capacities that individuals are presumed to have and that are a constitutive part of 
the development of the sense of justice in individuals. The capacity for a sense of 
justice is supposed to include as constitutive components  “the capacities of feeling, 
attitude, and conduct, mentioned in the three laws of the psychological 
construction.” 443 These natural attitudes rely on the well-ordered society to provide 
the appropriate environment that turns them into moral sentiments or feelings.  It is 
these moral sentiments that will lead us to display just behaviours which are quite 
independent of our own personal circumstances and that extend beyond our 
relationship with those with whom we have directly engaged in mutually 
advantageous cooperation.  
The flowchart below illustrates how this process evolves during the moral 
development stages: 
 
Figure 2 – From natural attitudes to a sense of justice 
 
 
 
Natural attitudes of love, friendship and mutual trust, Rawls believes, are attitudes 
that everyone has and they are responsible for the manifestation of feelings of guilt 
or indignation, when the duties and obligations towards us or those we care about 
are not met. The capacity for a sense of justice can be said to develop from the moral 
sentiments which have arisen from the natural attitudes innate to the individual. 
I argue that the natural capacities of empathy and a sense of fairness are closely 
related to the natural attitudes identified by Rawls and should be included in this 
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process. Not only are they innate but they give rise to the moral sentiments that 
Rawls considers are needed for the development of a sense of justice. 
Now, this thesis has already explored how there are reasons to believe that some 
capacities, linked to our ability to display fair behaviours and be guided by the 
precepts of justice, are thought to have a genetic component. This genetic 
characteristic will make them “natural” or “innate” in the same way love, friendship 
and mutual trust are regarded by Rawls. The next step is to show that they can fit 
within the Rawlsian moral development scheme and fulfil the moral sentiment 
evoking role that Rawls allocated to love, mutual trust and friendship. 
Empathy and a sense of fairness are both examples of these innate capacities and 
they have the potential to foster the type of  behaviours Rawls would regard as 
useful in the adequate development of a sense of justice. When assessing the role of 
natural attitudes in the development of a sense of justice, Rawls assumes that there 
is an internal relationship between the emotion of guilt and the natural attitudes of 
love, friendliness and mutual trust.  He uses guilt as a sign that denotes the existence 
of these natural attitudes and that ultimately results in an emerging sense of justice. 
This relationship between the  emotion or feeling (guilt) and the natural attitude 
(for example love)  is so fundamental that, Rawls believes, you could not have one 
without the other:444 
“the existence of love and trust for those in authority implies feelings of guilt for 
violating authoritative injunctions, and that the absence of such guilt feelings 
implies the absence of the natural attitudes of love and trust. Similarly in the 
context of associative arrangements, the natural attitudes of friendship, affection 
and mutual trust imply feelings of guilt for recognised violations of duties of fair 
play, and the absence of such guilt feelings implies an absence of the natural 
attitudes of friendship, affection and mutual trust”445 
If the emotion of guilt is a sign for the existence of a natural attitude that causes it, I 
argue Rawls should add to his list the natural capacities of empathy and a sense of 
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fairness. To substantiate this claim, next I outline how the capacities for empathy 
and a sense of justice can give rise to emotions of guilt that will in turn contribute to 
the development of a sense of justice. 
Looking at empathy first,  I interpret this capacity as one’s identification with 
someone else’s plight:  
“empathy  (particularly in the sense of sympathetic concern) prompts us to feel 
the pain of others and to align their interests with our own.”446  
Empathy entails the ability to imagine and identify with other people’s feelings and 
it acts as a motivator to help others in need.  Empirical evidence447 indicates that 
children as young as two are thought to display empathy related behaviours 
towards others, offering help, comfort and sharing behaviours towards those 
thought to be in distress. At this young age, these displays of empathy seem to 
heavily depend on how closely related they are to the person in distress. The natural 
capacity for empathy will be further strengthened by the extended affective ties 
developed during the first and second stages of Rawls’s  moral development 
account. The child’s capacity for empathy will progressively become more 
sophisticated in how they understand and respond to the psychological states of 
those with whom they engage in social cooperation. Just like the attitudes of love 
and friendship, a capacity for empathy may provide the child with the necessary 
motivation to accept outcomes that do not necessarily improve her current 
situation. Rawls believes that at an early age,  feelings of “authority guilt”448 caused 
by the innate love the child has towards her parents will appear when the child fails 
to comply with her parents’ precepts. This emotion of guilt, I argue, is also likely to 
arise out of the feelings of empathy that the child has towards her parents. As the 
child grows feelings of friendship work together with that innate love and lead to 
“association guilt”449 when and if children fail to do their part in social cooperation.  
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Feelings of  love and friendship are then part of the motivational pull that children 
have to act fairly when they engage in social cooperation. Failing to act justly will 
generate feelings of guilt that would force them back into the just path.  There is no 
reason to believe however that the natural capacity for empathy cannot give rise to 
feelings of guilt just as love and friendship do when we fail to act in a morally just 
way. This failure to act against our empathic inclinations gives rise to feelings of 
guilt which Rawls takes as a sign of  successful moral development and resulting 
from having acted contrary to “the sense of right and justice.”450 
It follows that these feelings of guilt are a sign of development of a capacity for a 
sense of justice. This indicates that empathy can have a contributory role to the 
moral development of the child. This is perhaps not surprising since empathy is 
often presented as a key motivational force in the development of just behaviours, 
the ability to recognise ourselves in others and identify with their plight can often 
provide enough reason to act by the principles of fairness.451 Furthermore, not only 
will failure to act on our empathic attitudes give rise to emotions of guilt, but also 
guilt can often be taken as a sign of empathic tendencies. Research has shown that 
individuals who tend to feel guilt are also more likely to display greater empathy 
with a better ability to identify emotions such as sadness, happiness or anger in 
others.452 
Focusing on the capacity for a sense of fairness leads to similar conclusions. I 
suggest that this natural attitude  is a constitutive part of the moral development of 
the child in all stages of social cooperation.  
The capacity for a sense of fairness brings an ability to recognise reciprocal 
behaviours and a disposition to act in reciprocal ways whenever this is appropriate. 
In a sense, it relates to the more primeval “tit-for-tat” strategies explained by 
evolutionary biologists and present not only in humans but also in other animals as 
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a usual form of social co-operation. There is empirical support for the role of a sense 
of fairness in the moral development of the infant. Babies as young as 18 months 
display behaviours consistent with a disposition towards fairness indicating that 
“moral evaluations and pro-social behaviour are heavily interconnected from early 
in development.”453 Other studies revealed how 5 months and 8 month infants 
favour individuals who display pro-social behaviours towards others and reject and 
behave negatively towards those seen to display antisocial behaviours.454 These 
findings are in line with Rawls’s belief about the biological nature of this type of 
reciprocal responses. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that a tendency to answer 
in kind is a “deep psychological fact”455 that has made social cooperation possible. 
Our innate sense of fairness leads us to respond with gratitude to favourable 
behaviours and retaliate when someone harms us or behaves unfairly towards us or 
others close to us. Conversely responses of remorse and feelings of guilt emerge 
when we fail to reciprocate or harm others without good reason.456 When failing to 
act upon our sense of fairness, once again the concept of guilt in the development of 
morality appears. As with empathy, this tendency to feel guilt and remorse 
prompted by our natural sense of fairness is recognised by Rawls. Feelings of guilt, 
Rawls claims, arise when we fail to accept the principles of justice that enable social 
cooperation: 
“We want to do our part in maintaining these arrangements. We tend to feel 
guilty when we do not honour our duties and obligations, even though we are not 
bound to those of whom we take advantage by any ties of particular fellow 
feeling.”457 
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The emotional response originating from the innate capacity for a sense of fairness 
is present both at an early age in the form of “authority guilt” and later on as 
“association guilt”.  In the third stage, “principle guilt” arises as the young adult is 
able to abstract from familial and affective ties within the framework of a well-
ordered society and has developed a fully-fledged sense of justice. 
Nurturing  this innate sense of fairness by parental and other societal influences can 
be expected to have positive results in the successful development of the sense of 
justice. 
Both the innate capacities for empathy and a sense of justice have been shown to 
contribute to the moral development of the individuals. These capacities evoke 
emotions of guilt when we fail to act upon them. These feelings of guilt serve  both as 
a recognition by the individual of a failure to act upon precepts of justice and as 
potential motivator to act justly in the future. 
The presence and development of these two natural capacities progressively equips 
the child with essential tools to engage in successful social cooperation and gives 
rise to feelings of guilt when the child fails to act in line with moral precepts. 
6.3 The collapse of the congruence argument - The move from the 
comprehensive to the political. 
The moral development in citizens described by Rawls is assumed to have led to a 
sufficiently developed sense of justice. Furthermore, the well-ordered society has 
been arranged according to fair terms of cooperation derived from shared political 
intuitions characteristic of modern democracies. This however will not suffice to 
secure the stability of the well-ordered society. Rawls still needs to show that citizens 
have reasons to consistently act justly in order to secure stability. 
Rawls explores the nature of these reasons in A Theory of Justice and in Political 
Liberalism.  Citizens, Rawls believes, may sometimes lack the assurance that others 
will act on their sense of justice, this in turn will make their motivation to act justly 
falter, thereby endangering the stability of society. Rawls’s early discussions of 
stability in A Theory of Justice458 maintain that there are independent reasons why 
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people would consistently act from and adhere to the principles of justice. These 
reasons are grounded on the congruence of justice with our good. This means that 
consistently acting according to their sense of justice, would be seen by individuals as 
consistent with their own good. Justice then becomes part of living well and hence 
generates the desired stability of the political system: 
 “the sense of justice coheres with the conception of our good so that both work 
together to uphold a just scheme.”459  
Assuming the congruence argument is correct, citizens would have reasons to 
consistently act in accordance with their sense of justice, therefore securing the 
stability of society. 
However, this justification of stability advocated in part III of A Theory of Justice is 
dropped altogether in later writings. Whilst maintaining the account of moral 
psychology that explains the acquisition of a sense of justice, Rawls believes that the 
diversity of moral, religious and philosophical views held by citizens makes the 
congruence of justice with the citizen’s good no longer feasible.  This leads Rawls to 
make two fundamental and closely connected changes to his political conception 
influencing his later account of stability.  
First,  Rawls believes that there is a necessity to recognise that the existence of  
pluralism in the views and beliefs held by citizens acts as a barrier for the endurance 
of a just society ruled by the principles of justice: 
“The fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines  
- the fact of reasonable pluralism – shows that, as used in Theory, the idea of a 
well-ordered society is unrealistic…..The account of the stability of a well-ordered 
society in part III is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast.”460  
The presence of diverse comprehensive world views in modern democratic societies 
is the inevitable result of the citizens’ free exercise of their judgement and 
reasoning.  These views are reasonable insofar as, Rawls believes, they largely 
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accept the precepts of a democratic regime.461 In a pluralistic society, a conception 
of justice justified on metaphysical assumptions about the good will inevitably fail to 
gain a sufficient number of adherents to render society stable. So, in his later work, 
Rawls sets out to find other reasons for citizens to consistently act upon their sense 
of justice. 
Second, and further to the realisation that the plurality of views is a permanent 
feature of modern societies, Rawls recognises that the scope of his theory needs to 
be re-framed from having a comprehensive scope to one restricted to the political 
domain.462  
It is his preoccupation with the fact of  reasonable pluralism that leads Rawls to re-
consider justice as Fairness and evaluate whether “in the circumstances of a 
plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and non-religious, liberal and non-
liberal, a well-ordered and stable democratic government is possible”463. Reframing 
justice as fairness as purely a political conception that can be adopted and affirmed 
from very different points of view is Rawls’s starting point for his revision of the 
arguments for stability.  
Making this move from a comprehensive moral theory to a political one has the 
following conceptual implications:  
“i), that it is framed to apply solely to the basic structure of society, its main 
political, social, and economic institutions, as a unified scheme of social 
cooperation; (ii), that it is presented independently of any wider comprehensive 
religious or philosophical doctrine; and (iii) that it is elaborated in terms of 
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fundamental political ideas viewed as implicit in the public political culture of a 
democratic society”464   
The political scope of the principles of justice limits their application to the very 
specific subject of socio-economic and political institutions and not how we conduct 
other areas of our lives. Furthermore, this political conception is independent of any 
comprehensive doctrine; it’s justification is not anchored on nor its content derived 
from a particular religious, moral or philosophical doctrine. Finally, the principles of 
justice are grounded in a set of fundamental ideas that are implicit in the political 
culture of modern democracies.  
Demarcating the political conception in this way, Rawls believes puts less stringent 
demands on citizens to act according to the demands of justice and endorse the 
contents of the political conception. Rawls search for stability now depends on 
whether he can show how “the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception 
each from its own point of view”.465   
Abandoning the congruence argument has two direct consequences for the Rawlsian 
argument for stability. First, there is a recognition that the fact of reasonable 
pluralism is a reality of modern societies that make it unrealistic  for the good of 
citizens to always identify with the right of justice.  Second, and due to this plurality 
of views, Rawls will need to seek a less demanding basis of justification that gains the 
commitment of citizens consistently and long term. The combination of these two 
factors led Rawls to review his account of stability concluding that reaching an 
overlapping consensus is the most feasible way to achieve the stability of the well-
ordered society. 
6.4 The political conception rendered stable as the focus of  an overlapping 
consensus 
Having dropped the idea that the individual good necessarily coincides with the 
demands of justice, Rawls revised his account of stability in Political Liberalism.  The 
challenge of explaining how people holding deeply different and irreconcilable 
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religious, philosophical and moral views dominates the content of his later work.  
Rawls needs to show that citizens can consistently act upon their sense of justice 
despite the competing priorities  arising from their own comprehensive doctrines. 
Rawls holds that the fact of reasonable pluralism threatens the stability of the well-
ordered society regulated by the principles of justice. In a society characterised by 
reasonable pluralism what is good for Jo does not coincide with what is good for 
Mary. Mary and Jo have different desires and metaphysical and ethical viewpoints. 
Therefore Rawls turns his attention towards providing an explanation to whether  
“the political conception can be the focus of an overlapping consensus”466 This 
overlapping consensus entails that, those coming from very diverse comprehensive 
views can nonetheless reach a common ground on issues of background justice 
ruling the well-ordered society. Disagreements on religious, philosophical or moral 
matters will still remain but, what is important for the stability of society is that the 
political values are affirmed by individuals from within their own comprehensive 
doctrines. Rawls leaves citizens to “decide for themselves, how and in what way the 
political conception is related to their own comprehensive views”.467 To illustrate 
how citizens will be able to affirm the principles of justice from their own 
perspectives Rawls provided what he called a “model case”.468  This model case 
postulates that there are three main ways citizens come to accept and endorse the 
liberal conception of justice. First, citizens may affirm the political conception from 
their own religious doctrine and, in particular, from their commitment to a principle 
of toleration that leads them to “underwrite the fundamental liberties of a 
constitutional regime.”469 Second, their commitment to the political conception may 
be derived  from a comprehensive liberal moral doctrine.470 Citizens in this position 
find the political values fully agree with those proposed by their comprehensive 
doctrine. Third, citizens might endorse a pluralist view made up of a number of 
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political and non-political values whereby the political conception is “affirmed by 
balancing judgments that support the great values of the political”.471  
Whichever approach is taken, citizens reach a moral consensus from within their 
own internal justification giving the agreement the necessary strength to support 
the stability of the well-ordered society.  
I have shown how, Rawls hence refines the question of stability after realising that 
the requirement for congruence was too demanding, given the fact of reasonable 
pluralism,  to secure stability in the face of  reasonable pluralism.  By restricting his 
conception of justice to the political sphere, Rawls hoped to reach an overlapping 
consensus of diverging conceptions of the good by ensuring the moral affirmation of 
the principles of justice from within each reasonable comprehensive view.  
6.5 The natural capacities of empathy and their role in public reason and 
political justification. 
The above discussion showed how Rawls believed that his political conception could 
generate an overlapping consensus among members of different and often 
irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. Whether this overlapping consensus is 
achieved depends in part on whether the discourse on issues of justice is done in a 
way that reasonable citizens can accept. This section explores first Rawls’s proposal 
of the use of public reason in the sphere of justice. Second, I show the role that the 
natural capacities of empathy and a sense of justice can have in the exercise of public 
reason. 
A political consensus such as the one delivered by an overlapping consensus 
provides the content to public reason. Public reason is viewed by Rawls as the 
vehicle used to discuss and justify issues of political justice to citizens who generally 
hold views very different to our own. In order for the principles of justice to be 
acceptable and the focus of an overlapping consensus, they need to be publicly 
knowable and found to be acceptable to reasonable citizens. Although citizens may 
endorse the political conception of justice from their own non-public point of view, 
they have a duty to interpret and apply this political conception from a shared point 
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of view.  The use of public reason involves providing  public justification and  due 
concern to what other citizens holding diverse comprehensive doctrines might be 
willing to consider reasonable.472 The ideal of public reason is developed by Rawls 
to provide “standards of inquiry and reasoning that will allow people holding 
different comprehensive views to come to the same conclusion in applying the 
conception of justice.”473 Public reason will also serve to legitimise political power 
making it justifiable on grounds that are acceptable to citizens as reasonable and 
rational persons.474 The principles of justice that citizens advocate are legitimate 
when free and equal people are able to endorse them in terms “acceptable to their 
common reason”.475 This requirement for legitimacy imposes a “duty of civility” that 
calls for citizens to explain to one another how questions of fundamental justice can 
be supported by public reason.476 Furthermore this public justification must be done 
in a receptive and congenial manner: 
” This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in 
deciding when accommodations to their view should reasonably be made”477 
The above passage shows how Rawls appeals to a set of political virtues needed in 
order to reach a consensus on issues of justice. These virtues are reasonableness, 
fair mindedness and a reason to honour the duty of civility.478 Elsewhere479 he 
adds to this list the virtues of tolerance, being able to meet others halfway and a 
sense of fairness.  A cursory look at this list reveals the similarity480 between each 
of these capacities. Rawls himself does not provide a detailed definition of each one 
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of them or indeed explain how they relate or support one another. Notwithstanding 
this lack of clarity, it is clear that Rawls believed that these qualities were essential 
for political cooperation which includes the public justification of our political 
values. It is through their exercise, Rawls believes, that “reasoned public discussion 
of political questions”481 takes place and consensus and unity is achieved between 
citizens. My view is that each of those virtues is necessary for the correct exercise of 
the duty of civility, therefore, and for the purpose of this discussion I understand the 
duty of civility to encompass the set of political virtues needed for political 
cooperation.  Through the duty of civility, Rawls demands of citizens to conduct 
public reason using political values that fall within a range of liberal accounts of 
which justice as fairness is an exemplar. 
Given the prominent role that the duty of civility has in political discussion, I next 
explore whether the natural capacities of empathy and a sense of fairness can affect 
its exercise.  
The willingness to act upon a duty of civility and listen to the arguments that may be 
considered reasonable by citizens not sharing our conception of the good requires 
empathy. Engaging with the other party’s reasons, consciously putting ourselves in 
the mind of another person with very different views, will help us engage with their 
reasons and perhaps elucidate the common shared reasons that can form the basis 
of political agreement. This does not mean that we come to accept the point of view 
emanating from specific comprehensive world views. A duty of civility requires that 
the reasons put forward on matters of justice are those drawn from the shared 
political culture. However empathy will help establish ties of cooperation with those 
very different from us and help elucidate those shared reasons. 
This natural empathic attitude will contribute to the exercise of the duty of civility 
required in our dealings with others when discussing matters of justice. This may 
enable the individual to devote the required time and energy to see the shared 
political argumentation. This must not be interpreted as encouraging a situation 
where unreasonable arguments are accepted in the domain of public justification. 
Empathy may however contribute to find the common public reasons in situations 
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where originally we may have struggled to find some due to the very irreconcilable 
character of the comprehensive views. Empathy complements the duty of civility 
that it is owed to one another in the public discussion and justification of matters of 
justice.  
The sense of fairness can also relate to the duty of civility. When engaging in political 
discussion our sense of fairness might compel us to use shared public values when 
others engage in that same manner for us. However strong we feel about the moral 
convictions and justifications coming from our comprehensive doctrines we might 
be more ready to appeal to shared values out of a sense of justice. When others are 
willing to set aside their own particular views and debate in terms reasonable 
people can accept, our sense of fairness will motivate us to do likewise. Seeing that 
others behave according to the duty of civility might appeal to our sense of fairness 
and be a driver to reciprocate when engaging in political discourse. 
On these grounds, these capacities can reasonably be expected to influence the duty 
of civility owed to one another when engaging in  public reason. Knowing the 
positive contribution that the capacities of empathy and a sense of fairness can make 
to public political deliberations will help us consider later in the thesis whether their 
enhancement via genetic means can contribute towards securing the stability of the 
well-ordered society. This will become particularly relevant once I evaluate the 
reasons why the stability conceived by Rawls may be more fragile than he originally 
envisaged. 
6.6  When stability goes wrong: 
Rawls insists  that a political conception such as justice as fairness,482 where citizens 
have a sufficiently developed sense of justice, can be the focus of an overlapping 
consensus and therefore stable. However, whether this stability is secured or not, I 
argue, seems to depend on two distinct yet related factors. First, the political 
conception, and therefore its principles of justice,  may not engender the motivation 
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to give justice priority over any other competing demands originating from deeply 
held comprehensive views. This, I argue is a problem for Rawls originating from  
both reasonable and unreasonable doctrines.  Second, the assumption that the sense 
of justice of citizens has been developed to the adequate level may not hold. This 
could be due to the failure of natural attitudes to generate appropriate feelings of 
fairness or because of inadequate social conditions that fail to nurture these natural 
attitudes. 
Next, I explore how the Rawlsian stability might not succeed by first exploring each 
of these factors in succession. This discussion will be followed by proposing a 
biomedical solution to each of these challenges to stability, involving the genetic 
enhancements of moral dispositions. Finally I look at the potential Rawlsian 
objections to a biomedical answer to the problem of stability. 
6.6.1 Failure to secure the Priority of Justice - the lack of assent from reasonable 
and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines 
Citizens will regularly need to face not only the demands of justice but also the 
competing moral requirements arising from their comprehensive views. Rawls 
acknowledges that the stability of the well-ordered society will depend on the 
political conception’s ability to generate the appropriate motivation in citizens: 
 “the sense of justice it (a conception of justice) tends to generate is stronger and 
more likely to override disruptive inclinations and if the institutions it allows 
foster weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly”483  
The conflict arising between the priority given to justice and the priority given to the 
individual comprehensive doctrine is what Rawls calls the “strains of 
commitment”.484 According to Rawls, principles that impose strains of commitments 
in citizens will inevitably fail to generate the stability needed for the endurance of 
the well-ordered society. Nonetheless Rawls believed that demands from a liberal 
conception, such as justice as fairness, will gain priority over those coming from the 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by citizens. This allegiance is motivated 
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by  the way the principles of justice secure equal basic rights and liberties as well as 
safeguard equality of opportunity publicly recognising its citizens as free and equal 
members of society. Furthermore  Rawls believed that political society was good for 
the individual because it supported the social basis of self-respect.485 
Rawls’s reliance on the special status of the political domain over others belonging 
to each comprehensive doctrine is evident when he writes: 
 “the values of the political are very great values and hence not easily overridden: 
these values govern the basic framework of social life – the very groundwork of 
our existence – and specify the fundamental terms of political and social 
cooperation.”486  
These values are enshrined within the principles of justice and the value of public 
reason that guides public inquiry in political discussion. The failure to see the 
priority of these political values over others we might hold within our own 
comprehensive doctrine is what Gerald Gaus has defined as “the problem of 
justificatory instability.”487 This happens “when people consider their full set of 
reasons they find the principles are not “fully justified.”488 This presents a problem 
to the stability desired by Rawls, since it needs to be shown that when justice 
conflicts with other values we cherish , the demands of justice win in order to secure 
a lasting stability.  
The issue of justificatory stability is one that can apply to reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, or more specifically, to the individuals subscribing to those doctrines.489 
Part of the difficulty in arguing that the priority of justice will prevail amongst 
reasonable people and doctrines stems from the “reasonableness” quality ascribed 
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to them by Rawls. The Rawlsian definition of reasonableness is very loose and 
diverse throughout his writings . At points he assumes that reasonable doctrines are 
those that act from the principles of justice; specifically, he asserts that the 
principles of justice themselves put limits on what can be conceived as a reasonable 
doctrine.490 However, he also warns us against assessing the reasonableness of a 
doctrine by its content and therefore  risk giving up the neutrality that a political 
conception needs to endorse. Rawls’s answer to avoid the neutrality objection is to 
provide three defining features characteristic of reasonable doctrines: 
First, the doctrine will be coherent, that is, “the major religious, philosophical, and 
moral aspects of human life must be integrated in a more or less consistent and 
coherent manner.”491 Second,  it will provide direction and practical guidance  by 
organising and characterising “recognized values so that they are compatible with 
one another and express an intelligible view of the world.”492 In relation to this 
second feature, the comprehensive doctrine must act as a filter, recognizing those 
values that are most relevant, and assessing their priority when they conflict with 
each other. Third, a reasonable comprehensive  doctrine will tend to “evolve over 
time in the light of what, from its point of view, it sees as good and sufficient 
reasons.”493 
This very broad definition of reasonable comprehensive doctrines tell us little about 
the reasons why certain reasonable comprehensive doctrines might fail to endorse 
the political conception. Furthermore, it allows for what we would ordinarily 
consider  “unreasonable doctrines” to be included within the reasonable category.494 
This, I believe, is the result of Rawls’s desire to avoid any accusations of 
perfectionism and to keep his account of justice strictly political. 
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Rawls claims that “Political Liberalism counts many familiar and traditional 
doctrines – religious, philosophical and moral- as reasonable.”495 However, this 
assertion may seem counterintuitive given the way religious conflicts are 
resurfacing and the lack of common ground  that is often present in attempts to 
resolve fundamental differences affecting people’s basic rights and liberties. 
Furthermore, as Brian Barry points out, across the major religions we find wildly 
different ways to approach egalitarianism: 
“mainstream Christian denominations have always tolerated socio-economic 
inequalities (including, in the past, slavery) vastly in excess of anything that 
could be justified by Rawls’s “difference principle”. Islam and Judaism embrace a 
similar spread of views, while Hindu and Confucian systems are inegalitarian to 
the core in a way that no monotheistic religion can be.”496 
If Barry is correct, Rawls may have miscalculated the over-inclusiveness of his 
definition of reasonable doctrines and the threat this might pose to the stability of 
the political conception. The clash between the political values of liberal democratic 
societies and certain religious views can make the possibility of reaching an 
overlapping consensus highly difficult. The political values of the Rawlsian justice 
account need to win over those conflicting religious views that citizens regard as 
true.  To illustrate the difficulty in securing the priority of political value, let us 
consider the example of the anti-abortionist Christian movement in America. 
Abortion is indeed a very emotive issue, nonetheless, Rawls believed that a 
politically reasonable resolution to the abortion debate could be reached  through a 
balance of political values that were acceptable to reasonable persons.497  However, 
terrorist acts associated with the anti-abortionist movement seem to suggest that 
such a balance may not always be possible. Since 1993, 11 people in the US are 
thought to have been killed in abortion clinics that are also regularly the object of 
fire and bomb attacks.498  
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Now, the question that follows is how Rawls would respond to the objection that 
reasonable doctrines do not always lead to the stability required for the political 
conception. Rawls would claim that the occasionally unreasonable behaviour linked 
to a Christian movement does not deem the movement unreasonable. Rawls 
believes that a reasonable doctrine cannot be deemed as unreasonable just because 
sometimes it leads to unreasonable conclusions and behaviours. As long as a 
doctrine is reasonable most of the time this does not cause a problem for Rawls.499 
He might also add that the liberal conception does not demand full adherence by 
every single citizen to the principles of justice. For a democratic regime to endure, 
Rawls believes that “it must be willingly and freely supported by at least a 
substantial majority of its politically active citizens.”500   
However,  even if a doctrine is only sometimes unreasonable it can be so with such a 
force that it has the potential to destabilise the democratic principles  in an 
unacceptable manner. As Samuel Freeman501 suggests when discussing the issue of 
abortion, this may lead their supporters to reject the principles of justice and public 
reason, not only in the issue of abortion but in other occasions causing a very real 
problem to the stability of society: 
“Depending on how many citizens and how many reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines are in this position, it raises questions regarding the stability of the 
family of liberal conceptions.”502 
Allowing the occasional unreasonable behaviours of reasonable doctrines may 
unwittingly lead to a de-stabilising force that a well-ordered society might be unable 
to stop. This brings the issue of when a reasonable doctrine shifts from occasionally 
displaying unreasonable behaviours to becoming an unreasonable one. Rawls does 
not tell us much about what that transition might look like. However, he does 
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explore how unequivocally unreasonable doctrines are a threat to the well-ordered 
society. 
Unreasonable doctrines are believed to pose such a problem to stability that Rawls 
excludes them from the political process all together and they are liable to the 
legitimate use of coercion by the state. Rawls’s concern about the threat of 
unreasonable doctrines makes him assert that liberal societies should contain them 
with the same force that they dedicate to fighting war and disease.503 
Whereas his definition of reasonable doctrines, I have argued, was too wide, Rawls 
provides us with some clues throughout his texts on what he deems to be 
unreasonable conceptions. Comprehensive doctrines affirmed by people who refuse 
to engage in social cooperation and reject reasonable pluralism are considered to be 
unreasonable.504Additionally, unreasonable doctrines will try to impose the truth505 
of their comprehensive doctrines on others and use coercive power, if needed, to 
establish their authority.506 
So, Rawls provides us with some guidance to help us identify unreasonable 
doctrines but he does not say much in terms of how we deal with them. This could 
be because, notwithstanding the threat of unreasonable doctrines, Rawls seems to 
consider that most comprehensive doctrines are indeed reasonable. The citizens of 
the well-ordered society, Rawls claims,  will largely find a way to support the 
principles of justice within their own comprehensive view even if this means 
adjusting their own beliefs to accommodate the demands of justice. These revisions 
will “take place over time as the political conception shapes comprehensive views to 
cohere with it.”507 Having assessed the inconsistencies of the political values with 
their own doctrines via a process of reflective equilibrium, citizens will revise their 
own doctrines to accommodate the political conception.  There is some hope that 
both occasionally unreasonable and unequivocally unreasonable doctrines will 
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eventually come to recognise the value of justice and affirm it within their own 
comprehensive views. As a result, Rawls believes that the well-ordered society will 
not give rise to unreasonable doctrines at such a rate that would be a substantial 
threat to stability.  
However, Rawls wants for his political conception to be a “realistic utopia”,508 that is, 
the ideal of the well-ordered society is regarded as an achievable ideal. 
Underestimating the danger posed by unreasonable doctrines will not help his 
political conception to become a reality. Acknowledging that the prevalence of 
unreasonable doctrines might be higher than he originally anticipated will be the 
first step to develop the necessary tools to deal with them. Rawls does recognise this 
point and argues that, should these unreasonable doctrines prevail in society,  the 
intended overlapping consensus will decrease and the liberal political conception 
will be jeopardised.   
6.6.2 Inadequate moral development – The failure to develop an sufficient sense 
of justice. 
Rawls has always assumed that those living in a well-ordered society will develop an 
appropriate sense of justice: 
“given certain assumptions specifying a reasonable human psychology and the 
normal conditions of human life, those who grow up under just basic institutions 
acquire a sense of justice and a reasonable allegiance to those institutions 
sufficient to render them stable.”509 
The above passages show that the moral development of individuals is therefore 
dependent on two main factors. First, the human nature of individuals needs to be 
such that the appropriate natural attitudes in the development of a sense of justice 
are present. Second, the appropriate social structures (family and civic education) 
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characteristic of a just society need to be such that allow these natural attitudes to 
develop into a functioning sense of justice. 
I will deal with each of these issues in turn and propose that genetically modifying 
the individual’s natural capacities might address any potential deficiencies in the 
development of a sense of justice. 
First, looking at Rawls’s account of moral psychology, it is evident that it hinges on 
normative facts about human nature that influenced the choice of his political 
conception: 
 “human nature and its natural psychology are permissive: they limit the viable 
conceptions of persons and ideals, and the moral psychologies that may support 
them.”510 
Furthermore, Rawls writes: 
“…an ideal presupposes a view of human nature and social theory ; and given the 
aims of a political conception of justice, we might say that it tries to specify the 
most reasonable conception of the person that the general facts about human 
nature and society seem to allow.”511 
The restrictions imposed by human nature and how this affects his account of moral 
development will determine the different political conceptions that citizens would 
be able to adopt. In light of this, Rawls acknowledges that a conception of justice 
might need to be adjusted if the assumptions made prove to be wrong: 
“It is for example, a consideration against a conception of justice that, in view of 
the laws of moral psychology, men would not acquire a desire to act upon it”512  
Limits imposed by our human nature can curtail our ability to develop an 
appropriate sense of justice. 
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Given the reliance of the choice of political conception on assumptions about the 
moral psychology of its citizens, it seems reasonable to question the validity of these 
assumptions. This is the view that George Klosko endorses when he writes: 
 “Assessing the possibility of his new society also requires examining the facts of 
moral psychology on which his claims rest.”513  
Rawls takes it for granted that individuals have a natural capacity for love, mutual 
trust and friendship and that the feelings these attitudes evoke will give rise to just 
behaviours when engaging in social cooperation. However, do citizens have these 
capacities at an appropriate level and can they go beyond their immediate circle? 
Research suggests that innate helpfulness and friendliness does not extend beyond 
the immediate circle.514 This may make it difficult to move beyond the second stage 
of moral development and extend the fellow feeling to those with whom we don’t 
have any familial and affective ties.  The same reasoning applies to the natural 
capacities of empathy and a sense of fairness, which I have discussed in this chapter. 
Even though it is possible, given the empirical evidence presented in this thesis, that 
we have inherent capacities for empathy and fairness, these two moral attitudes 
might not always extend beyond our familial and affective circles. An evening 
watching the news might teach us a lot about how far our empathy and reciprocal 
inclinations for one another might stretch. This is perhaps best exemplified by the 
amount of coverage received by domestic terrorist attacks compared to those 
happening outside our borders. Even though Rawls developed his account of justice 
limiting its applicability to closed domestic societies, this sentiment of detachment 
from the plight of others also applies to those who might not share our religion or 
socio-economic status. Empirical evidence shows that this feeling of detachment 
towards those who are not like us is present in toddlers from an early age.  
These potential shortcomings in the reach of our natural attitudes can potentially be 
balanced with strong social structures that encourage the emergence of fellow 
feeling and adherence to precepts of justice. The problem arises when these 
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structures are not robust enough to deliver the moral sense of justice required for 
the stability of the well-ordered society. 
So, how can the development of a sense of justice be compromised by an 
unsupportive social context, in particular by the family environment? Let us recall 
that blaming a faulty sense of justice solely on inadequate native talents would fall 
into the trap of genetic determinism. Although these native talents have been shown 
to be a necessary component of the moral development of individuals, they will only 
be developed under the right environmental conditions. Furthermore,  there are 
times when that developmental process fails even when we are dealing with normal 
functioning individuals, with the required natural talents. The social context that the 
individual inhabits can also contribute to inadequate moral development.  
Due to the paramount role that the family plays in the early development of the 
child, I focus on the family as the main institution involved in the development of a 
sense of justice in children. Most children up to the age of 4, spend the majority of 
their time with their parents. They are therefore the main influence in their lives 
until most of them enter the educational system. The growing trend of home 
education515 means that this continued influence will continue well into adolescence 
making the input of the parents or carers in the development of the child even more 
pronounced. How the child evolves in the early years rests on the affection lavished  
by parents and the relationships of trust that children develop with their friends, 
fellow pupils and later on as citizens of a well-ordered society. The role that the 
family plays in the moral development of the individual is key.516 517 However, 
despite this prominent role,  Rawls is not clear on whether the family should be 
considered an institution ruled by the public conception of justice. At points, Rawls 
insists that the institution of the family belongs to the private life of the individual 
where their own conception of the good applies and determines how the family 
functions. However, his writings also indicate that, unlike other associations 
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belonging to the private sphere, the family would be required to be just in the 
Rawlsian society and be ruled by the principles of justice.  This assertion is found in 
his later works when Rawls writes: 
“The family is part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is to be the 
basis of the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from 
one generation to the next”.518   
Given the importance of the family in raising our future citizens, it would make 
sense for Rawls to ensure that it functions according to principles of justice that 
protect basic rights and liberties and opportunities.  This could avoid unfair and 
dysfunctional behaviours in the family that might fail to instil the required moral 
dispositions in children.  
The tension between the two perspectives on how the family fits within his political 
conception has prompted criticisms from writers such as Susan Moller Okin.519  
Given the hierarchical and gendered nature of the family, Okin doubts its suitability 
as a “school of justice”520 for children in their development into autonomous 
citizens. Furthermore, the gender inequality in the family will lead to the unequal 
chances that Rawls was trying to avoid with his theory of justice. In her analysis, 
Okin questions the just character of the family: 
“Rawls’s neglect of justice within the family is clearly in tension with the 
requirements of his own theory of moral development. Family justice must be of 
central importance to social justice.”521 
Whilst Rawls claims that the principles of justice do not directly apply to the running 
of the family, like Okin, he is also fearful of how the different versions of the family 
allowed under reasonable pluralism could endanger the equality of opportunity so 
valued in the political conception of justice as fairness. This leads him to question 
whether the institution of the family should be eliminated due to the likelihood of it 
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leading to unequal life chances amongst its members.522 Because of the potential 
inability of some families to provide an affectionate and nurturing environment for 
the child, presumably the “moral development fails to take place to the extent that 
these conditions are absent.”523  Rawls’s answer to this problem is that at the very 
least parents “should prepare them to be fully cooperative members of society and 
enable them to be self-supporting.”524  
The problem for Rawls is that delegating the moral development of the child to an 
institution that cannot be guaranteed to be just, risks not achieving the goals set 
within the moral development model. If the family does not instil the appropriate 
moral dispositions in children we risk failing to secure the priority of the justice. 
This is at odds with the role that the stages of moral development play in securing 
stability. 
Perhaps aware of the shortcomings of the family in delivering the civic education 
required in the well-ordered society, educational institutions are established to 
deliver that function. Educating children in civic matters is a requirement of the 
well-ordered society. It is important that the requirements of civic education are 
restricted to those areas that secure good citizenship without making any non-
political claims that permeate into other areas of the comprehensive doctrines of the 
citizens. In order for this civic education to remain within the political domain, 
Rawls claims its content should be restricted as follows: 
“(it will) include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights 
so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society 
and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this is to ensure that their continued 
membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their 
basic rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist.”525.  
Children receiving this kind of education are expected to become fully cooperating 
members of society, aware of the basic rights and liberties enjoyed by all. This will 
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enable them in the future to freely support and endorse their own comprehensive 
doctrine in the knowledge that they have the right and freedom to change their 
endorsement should they chose to. Part of this education will also include an 
understanding of the political virtues that will make citizens “want to honour the 
fair terms of cooperation in their relations with the rest of society.” 526 The content of 
this education should be confined to the areas that promote the civic virtues that 
allow the child to become a fully cooperating member of the well-ordered society. 
Ideally, parents should be the ones in charge of this education, however, in 
recognition of the limitations of the family in developing the role of their children as 
citizens,  there should be other provision in place in the form of public education. 
The commitment to the provision of this kind of education implies, according to 
Okin “at least some compulsory public schooling for all.”527Although Rawls does not 
explicitly state that civic education must be compulsory he considers it a 
requirement 528  of political liberalism. 
The provision of a universal civic education could contribute towards correcting any 
moral development ‘glitches’ caused within the familial environment, however it 
might not be enough to counteract the damaging effect caused by the promotion of 
non-liberal values within the family.  
6.6.3 Enhancing the moral development of individuals via genetic means  
The previous sections highlighted how Rawlsian stability can be threatened by the 
non-compliance of reasonable and unreasonable doctrines and the inadequate 
development of a sense of justice. Next, I propose that these deficiencies in moral 
development could be addressed by biomedical means through the moral 
enhancement of future offspring. This proposal involves germline interventions 
designed to enhance the capacities for empathy and a sense of fairness. I also 
explore the potential contribution that the cognitive capacities already explored in 
this thesis can make to Rawlsian moral development. 
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Focusing first on the non-compliance of comprehensive doctrines, the enhancement 
of the natural capacities for empathy and a sense of fairness could contribute 
towards stability in two distinct ways. First,  an enhanced capacity for empathy 
might decrease the instances where citizens force their views on others holding 
different comprehensive world views. Going back to the case of the Christian 
antiabortion group, the members of this radical movement might have found it 
easier to identify themselves with the plight of the health professionals and 
pregnant women, visualising their feelings and more generally “putting themselves 
in their shoes”. This enhanced empathic concern might have restrained any 
inclinations they had to impose their “truth” on citizens that did not share their 
comprehensive view. Second,  the enhancement of both empathy and the sense of 
fairness may have strengthened their moral duty of civility and motivated them to 
make use of shared political values when publicly proposing or debating issues 
related to fundamental justice such as procreative liberty and the foetus’s right to 
life. This way a resolution to the abortion dispute may have been reached in the way 
Rawls originally envisaged. 
Second, let us consider the situation where the human nature of the individual is not 
as envisaged by Rawls. In this case, the innate reciprocal behaviours and capacities 
for fellow feeling might either not be present or be present at an insufficient level to 
secure the development of a sense of justice or other political virtues such as the 
duty of civility. In this case, we would have the option to modify the human nature of 
future citizens to fit the requirements of the political conception. This would clearly 
be a controversial move, however let us assume for a moment that Rawls’s demand 
for the stability of the political conception was strong enough to justify such a move. 
Enhancing the natural capacities of future persons would ensure adequate moral 
development provided the suitable social structures to foster and develop those 
natural dispositions were in place. 
Third, the use of germline enhancements might help us minimise the damage that 
the family might cause to the development of the child’s sense of justice. 
Strengthening the natural moral disposition towards reciprocal behaviours could 
counteract the potential negative impact that the family environment might cause. 
Equipping children with better than normal enhanced natural attitudes might 
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enable them to develop them with fewer environmental inputs or with 
environments that do not nurture liberal political values. When exposed to 
environments that fail to nurture the value of the precepts of the political 
conception, the negative effects on the moral development of children might be less 
pronounced if their natural dispositions towards just behaviours have been 
enhanced. In summary, enhancing the natural attitudes of the child might result in a 
sense of justice that is developed to the appropriate level and secures the support of 
the political conception despite defective social structures that fail to promote 
liberal political values.  
Finally, let us consider how a joint genetic intervention, enhancing both cognitive 
capacities and the capacities for empathy and for a sense of fairness, may affect 
stability.  Together with a family and educational system delivering an effective 
programme of civic education, genetic interventions could increase the chances of 
successfully “producing” citizens who endorse and affirm liberal political values 
consistently. At this point the introduction of genetic cognitive capacities, alongside 
those enhancing empathy and a sense of fairness could be justified on the following 
grounds. First, chapter two discussed how the prospect of genetic moral 
enhancements will need to be accompanied by cognitive capacities that help us 
elucidate when and how to be moral.  A higher capacity for empathy, for example, 
might not always generate the just results needed for stability. Citizens with an 
enhanced capacity for empathy might find themselves more permissive of doctrines 
that fail to respect liberal political values. This might lead to a higher number of 
instances where individuals successfully and forcefully impose their private beliefs 
in others that could not reasonably share them. Introducing the enhancement of 
cognitive capacities alongside these enhanced moral capacities would help us to 
identify which behaviours deserve our empathy and which ones should be rejected 
on the grounds of justice. Furthermore, increased cognition may increase our 
deliberative and reasoning skills and help us to better understand each other’s 
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reasons and points of view529 leading to a more harmonious society.530 Accompanied 
by the relevant cognitive capacities, moral genetic enhancements may provide 
citizens with the tools to engage in political deliberation under the duty of civility. 
Second, going back to Rawls’s original discussion on unreasonable doctrines, let us 
recall how Rawls believed that living under just institutions would eventually lead 
citizens to find a way to accommodate the demands of justice. This was done via a 
process of reflective equilibrium which would lead them to revise their own 
doctrines to accommodate the demands of justice. Arguably, genetic interventions 
designed to increase the capacities associated with fluid intelligence might help with 
this process.  
It is important when thinking about the potential effects of these genetic 
interventions to keep reminding ourselves not to fall into the trap of genetic 
determinism. None of these enhancements will have any value unless they are 
accompanied by the right environment to help them develop into actual moral 
dispositions. If the appropriate social structures are not in place these improved 
dispositions are unlikely to be developed. Therefore, whether we are dealing with 
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines or with unsuitable family structures, 
additional societal measures need to be in place to secure the realisation of these 
enhanced capacities. These genetic interventions need to be supported by 
appropriate institutions offering the civic education that enables individuals to 
become fully functioning citizens. 
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6.7 Alternatives approaches to the challenge of Rawlsian stability 
Having shown how genetic enhancements may reduce the instances when stability 
might be at risk, it is necessary to look closely at the Rawlsian political conception 
and identify any objections that might prevent us from supporting their 
implementation. First, I will begin by considering how the enforcement of these 
interventions may go against the Rawlsian ethos and jeopardise the protection of 
basic rights and liberties. Second, I will consider two other options open to Rawls in 
order to address the challenge of stability.  One option is whether changes to his 
political conception need to be made in order to accommodate a less optimistic view 
of human nature. The other option is that he might concede that even though the 
chosen principles of justice are justifiable given the shared fundamental intuitions, 
settling for a modus vivendi might make the implementation of his political 
conception more realistic. 
6.7.1 Against the enhancement of moral capacities – A Rawlsian response 
Notwithstanding the appeal of enhancing human capacities to secure the stability of 
the well-ordered society I argue that there are some features of the Rawlsian 
political conception that would make the enforcement of these interventions 
incompatible with its liberal precepts.  
To illustrate how the principles of the liberal conception might be compromised, I 
begin by contrasting the implementation of these interventions with the provision of 
civic education. A society governed by the liberal principles of justice requires some 
sort of compulsory civic education. The aim of this type of education is to promote 
the political virtues and civic duties needed for a liberal ideal of citizenship.  Its 
compulsory nature contributes to a sustained well-ordered society across 
generations through the social reproduction of just citizens,  eventually leading to 
the elimination of  comprehensive world views that fail to adhere to liberal precepts.  
Another implication of an established compulsory system of civic education is that 
parental rights to the control of the education of their children are no longer 
absolute. The requirement for civic citizenship overwrites the parental desire for 
their children not to be exposed to liberal values. This limitation to parental freedom 
however, only applies to the political sphere; with regards to issues unrelated to 
political justice,  parents will be free to educate their children according to their own 
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comprehensive world view. Now, arguably, the assisted moral improvement of 
citizens via genetic interventions would seem to fulfil, or at least help fulfil, similar 
aims to those required from civic education alone. However, there seems to be 
something importantly different between both approaches to achieving stability. 
Can the limitations to the reproductive right of parents, through the imposition of 
genetic interventions, compare to the limits set for their parental education rights? I 
argue that the type of rights that would be violated through compulsory genetic 
interventions are more fundamental than those pertaining to freedom of education. 
As it was the case when I considered compulsory cognitive enhancements, any 
attempts to impose these genetic modifications will breach the basic rights 
protecting the integrity of the person under the first principle of justice.531 
Furthermore, this would constitute for Rawls an unacceptable invasion of the 
private life of citizens that he was determined to keep separate from the public 
duties of justice. 
Nevertheless, citizens of the well-ordered society may freely choose to genetically 
intervene in the moral dispositions of their offspring without the need of any 
compulsory social policy. These interventions have the potential to be freely chosen 
by citizens,  either for reasons of justice or for reasons stemming from their own 
comprehensive view. Some citizens may decide that these interventions are 
generally valuable. This could be the case for those that are considered 
unreasonable under a liberal conception of justice. Let us consider the case of the 
religious fundamentalist doctrine that, according to Rawls, would struggle to thrive 
under a society governed by the principles of justice. This type of comprehensive 
doctrine may consider it useful for their adherents to display higher levels of 
empathy and fairness to help consolidate the social cooperation within their group. 
This, they might argue, will enable them to secure their existence across 
generations. An unexpected result, however, could be that those improved empathic 
and fairness tendencies are not just limited to their very own comprehensive world 
view. Once our moral capacities are enhanced it will be hard to restrict how far they 
will reach. These dispositions might extend to the reasonable doctrines inhabiting 
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the liberal society leading to an increased willingness to listen, be more perceptive 
to other views and share in the liberal political values characteristic of the well-
ordered society. Indirectly, the effort to reinforce the permanency and supremacy of 
unreasonable doctrines may lead to them publicly sharing in and engaging with the 
public values of social cooperation. 
I have briefly explained how genetic interventions contributing to the moral 
development of stability cannot be part of a compulsory model of civic education 
without risking harming the basic rights and liberties that the liberal conception of 
justice aims to protect. Nonetheless the voluntary endorsement of these 
interventions by citizens may contribute to the long lasting stability of the well-
ordered society. This endorsement might be extended to unreasonable doctrines 
with their citizens becoming motivated to publically affirm the liberal conception of 
justice. 
The non-compulsory character of these technologies means that Rawls cannot rely 
on them to secure a long lasting stability. Should the prospect of stability not prove 
achievable, I argue that Rawls can modify his theory in one of two ways. One option 
is to re-design the principles of justice so that they are compatible with natural and 
social conditions. The other option is to relax his requirement for achieving stability 
for the right reasons. 
6.7.2 Amend or re-design the principles of justice   
Stability first becomes a consideration at the point when the political conception is 
being developed.  When assessed against other accounts of justice, mainly 
utilitarianism, Rawls concludes that a conception such as justice as fairness is likely 
to gain a larger number of supporters. Utilitarianism proves to be too demanding as 
a political conception because it requires that citizens make sacrifices for the sake of 
others’ wellbeing, which is not consistent with the principles of moral psychology.532 
However, I have already argued that the assumption that Rawls makes about the 
moral psychology of individuals may not be correct. The possibility that reciprocal 
behaviours may not be present at the level that Rawls anticipated might mean that 
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his liberal political conception does not become the focus of an overlapping 
consensus., 
Rawls leaves open the possibility that, should stability not be achieved, we might 
need to consider either amending the principles of justice to make the conception 
more stable or the possibility that a democratic conception cannot always achieve 
stability: 
“ We should have to see whether acceptable changes in the principles of justice 
would achieve stability or indeed whether stability could obtain for any 
democratic conception”533 
Rawls does not specify what changes would be considered acceptable nor does he 
pursue the possibility of changing the principles of justice further. Furthermore, he 
never expands on the idea of stability not becoming a realistic possibility. This is an 
outcome that Rawls does not consider further,  the case for stability on a liberal 
conception such as, or similar to, justice as fairness has been argued and should 
obtain. Nonetheless, the above passage suggests that he would be open to consider 
either of these options should his assumptions for the development of the political 
conception prove to be wrong. Should this be the case, Rawls is left with the difficult 
task of amending the principles or potentially abandoning the liberal precepts that 
are the focus of his theory of justice. This could potentially lead him to abandoning 
the protection given to basic rights, liberties and access to opportunities and 
compromising on the distribution of all-purpose goods. Rawls might find that his 
principles become less liberal or that stability, if it is to be achieved, cannot do so 
without breaching the democratic ethos.  
If an enduring society is what really matters then normative considerations 
regarding the content of the principles themselves might need to reconsidered so 
that stability is achieved. 
There is however another option that Rawls might need to consider: relaxing the 
requirement of stability for the right reasons. 
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6.7.3 Relaxing the requirement for stability. 
Should stability  play such a central a role in the Rawlsian political conception? 
Authors such as James D Wright believe that concerns over the stability of modern 
democratic regimes are overstated.534 Smooth transitions of power, the coexistence 
of a plurality of views and freedom of speech, amongst other  factors, renders 
democratic regimes more stable than their authoritarian counterparts. Political 
history since World War II shows how most industrial democracies have remained 
stable, this leads Wright to claim the following: 
“In the modern world, democracies prove not to be inherently unstable, as much 
theory suggests, but rather obdurately stable under almost all circumstances”535 
Rawls may respond that a period of stability lasting less than 70 years is not a sign 
of stability, at least not the kind of stability he wished to achieve. Nonetheless, Rawls 
himself seems to be conflicted about the value that should be given to issues of 
stability. Whereas answering the problem of stability becomes one of his main 
concerns in Political Liberalism, he seems to downplay its importance in A Theory of 
Justice.  Throughout A Theory of Justice Rawls maintained that stability alongside 
justice and efficiency was one of the virtues that should be present in social systems. 
Nonetheless, he provides an important qualification to this statement asserting that 
justice should always take priority.536  
This implies, that if we are comparing two political conceptions one of which is more 
stable but more unjust than the other, this would not be enough reason for adopting 
it. Stability will sway the decision only if we are comparing two schemes which are 
equally just. The emphasis given to stability might commit Rawls to choosing 
conceptions of justice where, for example, not enough protection is given to basic 
rights and liberties.  This would be unacceptable if Rawls is to remain true to his 
early writings when considerations of justice prevail and once again becomes the  
“most important virtue of institutions.”537  
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If, as Rawls seems to believe, justice should be the main consideration in the design 
of basic institutions then he might decide to settle for a less demanding account of 
stability. A “modus vivendi” might be the less demanding form of agreement on 
social cooperation whilst preserving the justice of basic institutions. 
I have shown that the case for the compulsory use of genetic enhancements for the 
moral development of citizens would fall foul of the precepts of liberal justice. 
However, the free, un-coerced use of these interventions will still make a positive 
contribution towards securing the stability of the well-ordered society. In addition 
to this I have proposed that, if the problem of stability remains a problem for Rawls, 
there are two non-genetic options open for consideration.  One option involves 
reconsidering the content of the principles of justice so that they are consistent with 
a different account of human nature. The other option is to relax the demand for 
stability so that justice once again becomes the primary concern in the choice of 
principles of justice 
6.8 Conclusion 
Rawls’s concern with stability is reflected in his comprehensive attempts to justify 
that his political conception could engender the right motivation in the citizens of 
the well-ordered society. 
I argued that the capacities for empathy and a sense of fairness play a key role in the 
development of this motivation. In my attempt to show that the enhancement of the 
natural capacities for empathy and a sense of fairness could contribute towards 
solving Rawls’s problem of stability, I begun by showing how they can become part 
of his moral development account. I showed that both natural attitudes evoke the 
emotion of guilt when failing to act morally. This emotional response is the same 
elicited by the natural attitudes of love, friendship and mutual trust that Rawls 
considers essential for the development of a sense of justice. I concluded that 
empirical evidence of the innate nature of empathy and a sense of fairness together 
with the guilt evoking quality they share with love, mutual trust and friendship 
qualify them to be part of the Rawlsian account of moral development. 
The discussion then moved to a brief outline of the congruence argument and the 
overlapping consensus illustrating the evolution of Rawls’s thinking on stability. His 
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final account of stability describes how the liberal political conception can be stable 
by becoming the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. Explaining Rawls’s account served as a platform to speculate on how the 
stability of the well-ordered society might be threatened by two distinct factors. 
First, the failure to secure the priority of the right; and second, the inadequate moral 
development of citizens. 
I proposed that the moral enhancement of individuals might contribute to the 
stability of the well-ordered society. First, instances of unreasonable behaviours 
might decrease as empathetic concern for the views of others restrains the 
inclination of unreasonable citizens from imposing their truth. Furthermore, 
enhanced capacities for empathy will strengthen their moral duty of civility and 
increase the use of public reason in political discourse. Second, moral enhancement 
will contribute to the adequate moral development of citizens in instances where 
they lack the natural attitudes or where the social institutions that help develop 
these capacities are defective. I finished this section by re-introducing the possibility 
of genetically enhancing cognition and suggesting that, in order to morally enhance 
citizens, it might also be necessary to enhance their cognition. This will help them to 
better identify unreasonable doctrines; regulate their tendencies towards empathy 
and fairness and engage in a process of reflective equilibrium that might lead to a 
revision of their own doctrines to accommodate the demands of justice. 
Finally, I argued that despite the positive contribution that moral enhancement can 
make towards securing the stability of the just society, this kind of genetic 
intervention could never be compulsory. These interventions would be permissible 
under the Rawlsian political conception, however the protection given to 
fundamental rights and liberties would forbid any enforced genetic modification. 
Nonetheless, citizens may opt to voluntarily enhance their children either for 
reasons grounded on justice or for reasons coming from their own comprehensive 
doctrines. Should the stability of the well-ordered society still be at risk, Rawls is left 
with two additional alternatives. One option would be to re-design the principles of 
justice to render a more stable society. Another option would be to relax the 
requirement for stability for the right reasons. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
When I began this project seven years ago, I did not have a clear notion where the 
arguments I was developing were going to lead. As I became immersed in Rawls’s 
immense philosophical body of work, I started to get the very slight inkling that I 
might be able to contribute to his theory, even in the smallest of ways. Throughout 
the thesis I have explored Rawls’s political conception drawing largely from the 
early edition of A Theory of Justice, Justice as Fairness, a Re-statement and the latest 
formulation of Political Liberalism. Political Liberalism provided the basis for 
exploring the arguments for securing the stability of the society organised by the 
principles of justice, whilst the majority of my discussion of primary goods and 
moral psychology relates to the first edition of A Theory of Justice. I have also 
explored the many papers that lead to the development of Rawls’s books that, in his 
own admission, he often saw as “opportunities to experiment with ideas which 
would later be revised or rejected in a book.”538 These papers, mostly derived from 
lectures delivered over the years provided an invaluable insight into how his ideas 
developed and helped formulate his final account of justice. 
My wish was to find a way whereby the introduction of both genetic cognitive and 
moral enhancements into Rawls’s political theory could potentially strengthen his 
liberal account of justice. I hope that my arguments during this thesis convinced the 
reader that this was indeed the case. I will now summarise how I believe my 
research has made a positive contribution to developing Rawls’s theory of justice. 
Due to the inevitably limited scope of this dissertation,  I will also briefly mention 
some other areas of unresolved issues and areas deserving of potential future 
research. 
 
 
                                                        
538 Freeman, S. R. (2006). "Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political 
Philosophy."Appendix B, Page 327 
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7.1 Contribution to the Rawlsian theory of justice 
Genetic cognitive enhancements can contribute to the Rawlsian political conception 
in two distinct ways. First, I have proposed that the index of primary goods be 
modified to accommodate the incorporation of those genetic cognitive technologies 
designed to augment the capacities constitutive of fluid intelligence. 
Having assessed the role that genetic cognitive enhancements have as all-purpose 
means for the pursuit of a wide variety of ends, I argue that they are suitable 
candidates for their inclusion in the index.  These new technologies, serve the 
Rawlsian theory in making interpersonal comparisons, identifying the least 
advantaged representative group and, ultimately, in being part of the process to 
assess permissible inequalities in socio-economic shares. 
Second, after demonstrating the permissibility of these technologies under a society 
governed by the Rawlsian principles of justice, I argued that voluntary uptake of 
these technologies by citizens can have a positive role in delivering the goals of the 
Rawlsian theory. This claim is substantiated by the way enhanced capacities, 
alongside education, can broaden the range of opportunities open to citizens, as well 
as increasing the social product available for distribution under the dictums of the 
difference principle. 
Besides the above contribution to the Rawlsian theory of justice, an important 
strength of my account, I believe, is my adherence to the Rawlsian framework.  
Throughout the evaluation of genetic cognitive enhancements I have remained 
faithful to the conditions set by Rawls in the development of his theory of justice. 
This differentiates my approach from other contemporary attempts to extend 
Rawlsian theory.  These differences are highlighted when contrasting my theory to 
Daniels’s extended FEO principle and Farrelly’s lax biological difference principle. 
First, whereas discussions about genetic enhancements, in both approaches, are 
limited to their role in restoring normal functioning, I assume throughout that these 
technologies will take the individual beyond this level. Although dropping the 
normality assumption restrains the potential role these enhancements can have in 
the Rawlsian theory, my approach is more daring in dealing with, I believe, the more 
ethically problematic prospect of making citizens “better than well”. Second, unlike 
Daniels’s account, my approach does not require significant modification of the basic 
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institutions in order to accommodate these new technologies. The Rawlsian FEO 
only needs to be extended to secure the removal of barriers that would prevent or 
limit access to genetic cognitive enhancements. Third, unlike Farrelly’s approach, 
the method used to identify the least advantaged representative group remains 
unchanged, therefore minimising issues of measurability and complexity. This is 
achieved by the continued use of wealth and income as a suitable proxy for the 
identification of the least advantaged group. Measuring the least advantaged in 
terms of natural primary goods, as Farrelly proposes, risks falling into value 
judgements about the moral worth of individuals based on their natural 
endowments and compromises the real-life workability of the theory. 
The discussion around moral cognitive enhancements revolves around the 
capacities for empathy and a sense of fairness and their contribution towards the 
stability of the Rawlsian society. I argue that these moral dispositions should 
become part of the Rawlsian account of moral development. Furthermore, I show 
how both empathy and a sense of fairness can help the stability of the well-ordered 
society through the reduction of unreasonable behaviours, strengthening the moral 
duty of civility and helping towards the development of a sense of justice when 
either citizens lack the appropriate natural attitudes, or the  social institutions to 
help develop these capacities fail. 
As a consequence of the respect and protection given to the procreative liberty of 
citizens, the implementation of these germline technologies cannot be enforced. 
Nonetheless, the arguments presented in this thesis grant their moral permissibility 
within the scope of the Rawlsian well-ordered society. 
7.2  Limitations:  what was left untold 
This dissertation has hopefully convinced the reader of the moral permissibility, 
from within the perspective of the Rawlsian justice account, of germline cognitive 
and moral enhancements. 
It is clear however that this is only part of a much bigger picture. Although, a 
snapshot of other relevant ethical concerns was given in Chapter 3, a much more 
thorough discussion needs to take place before embracing these technologies. 
Importantly the responses to these ethical concerns have been left untold. Let us 
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consider for example the issue regarding the existence of future persons. 
Challengers to the arguments from dignity, authenticity and autonomy and 
sympathetic towards Derek Parfit’s “Non-identity Problem”, 539 may reject these 
types of objections outright. Our obligation to future generations, in their eyes, may 
therefore be a lot less restrictive than these ethical concerns may convey. This is the 
view that transhumanist thinkers, such as Anders Sandberg540 and Nick Bostrom541 
endorse. If these technologies are safe, parents, they believe, should have the 
freedom to enhance their offspring if that results in a happy, healthy and talented 
child. Although I have merely highlighted the most frequently discussed issues in the 
literature, a more thorough analysis is needed, with each of the concerns being 
satisfactorily addressed for a full defence of germline cognitive and moral 
enhancements. 
Another important question that remains yet unanswered is the feasibility of these 
genetic interventions. I have briefly addressed, in Chapter 2, the practical limitations 
of genetic interventions. However, the difficulties associated with the potential 
alteration of both cognition and morality cannot be understated.  Intelligence is 
renowned for its multifactorial character.542 Although there is evidence supporting 
the heritability of intelligence and cognitive capacities, the number of genes involved 
in their development and how they interact  with each other is still largely unknown.  
We encounter similar problems when dealing with moral cognitive enhancements.  
The multifactorial character of morality and how genetic manipulation could affect 
other emotional capacities needs further investigation. This challenge is further 
compounded by the current debates on what morality really means. In order to 
assist with the feasibility of my enquiry, I recognise that I have been required to 
simplify these very complex issues. Based on current evidence, I have chosen those 
cognitive and moral capacities more likely to have a biological component and most 
amenable to manipulation. More research, both empirical and philosophical is 
                                                        
539 Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons: OUP Oxford. Part IV 
540 Bostrom, N., and Sandberg, A. (2009). "Human enhancement." Human Enhancement, 375. 
541 Bostrom, N. (2005a). "A history of transhumanist thought.", Bostrom, N. (2005b). "In defense of 
posthuman dignity." Bioethics, 19(3), 202-14. 
542 Burt, C., and Howard, M. (1956). "The multifactorial theory of inheritance and its application to 
intelligence." British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 9(2), 95-131. 
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needed before we assert that an individual can be morally enhanced via biomedical 
means. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, there is, I believe, huge value in this ethical 
enquiry. Discussions about distributive justice are most pertinent before any justice 
related concerns become a reality.  
7.3 Taking the research forward 
This dissertation has only made a small but hopefully valuable contribution to the 
distributive justice debate arising from the introduction of genetic cognitive and 
moral enhancements. 
The scope for further research is vast, however I would like to suggest two potential 
areas that could be explored. 
First, the indexation problem intrinsic to the measurement of primary goods is yet 
to be resolved. I am aware that the expansion of the index to allow the incorporation 
of genetic cognitive enhancements, will only add to this challenging problem. 
However, I have tentatively suggested a potential solution that requires further 
consideration. In deciding the weight of these technologies against other primary 
goods, an assessment of achieved milestones that can be, in part, linked to having 
received the cognitive enhancement could be a plausible option.  
Second,  this piece of work has been restricted to closed domestic societies without 
considering the effects these technologies could have at a global level. In particular,  
I suggest the evaluation of  how the introduction of these technologies could affect 
social cooperation between a Society of Peoples as described by Rawls in The Law of 
Peoples.543 Differences in access to these technologies could mean that reasonable 
interests, and therefore the demands made by different peoples, vary between 
nations. This could warrant assessment of whether these new technologies may 
destabilise a just and stable political order between democracies and 
nondemocratic, but decent, societies.  
                                                        
543 Rawls, J. (2001b). The law of peoples: with, The idea of public reason revisited: Harvard University 
Press. 
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The novel character of these technologies makes the range of possible research both 
wide and exciting. I hope that my own work may serve as a starting point for future 
philosophical deliberation. 
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